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All  Rights  Reserved Abstract 
The  collapse  of  the  Californian  electricity  trading  system  in  2001  and  other  power 
markets  crisis  since  then  have  motivated  accelerated  research  in  electricity  trading 
strategies  and  intelligent  systems  for  electricity  power  markets.  The  market  system 
of  the  UK  is  physically  and  economically  similar  to  that  of  California.  Power 
generation  companies  in  the  UK  are  making  efforts  to  develop  gaming  strategies  in 
their  trading  systems.  Although  the  electricity  trading  system  in  the  UK  is  a 
deregulated  market  with  the  longest  history  in  global  energy  industry  and  has  become 
the  benchmark  of  worldwide  electricity  markets,  there  are  few  research  results 
published  for  analyzing  such  a  trading  system  involving  human  intelligence.  More 
crucially,  the  market  power  and  market  manipulation  remain  unaddressed  by  either 
industry  or  academia  so  far.  Further,  current  research  on  modelling  market  player 
strategies  and  behaviours  are  mostly  based  on  noncooperative  assumptions  rather  than 
on  competitive  and  also  cooperative  game  theories,  which  are  commonly  practiced 
and  cause  real  problems  through  market  power  involving  electricity  suppliers  and 
customers. 
In  this  thesis,  current  work  carried  out  on  analyzing  the  strategic  behaviours  in 
electricity  trading  is  first  reviewed.  An  intelligent  decision-making  and  support 
technique,  game  theory,  is  often  used  in  the  market  practice.  Game  theory  is  a 
discipline  concerned  with  how  individuals  make  decisions  when  they  are  partly  aware 
of  what  their  action  might  affect  each  other  and  when  each  individual  might  take  this 
into  account.  Deficiencies  and  limitations  of  traditional  game  theory  based  methods 
developed  for  decision-making  in  electricity  trading  are  also  investigated.  This 
research  then  explores  to  discover  the  impact  of  intelligent  systems  based  trading 
strategies  in  the  UK  power  markets.  To  model  these  behaviours  and  the  New 
Electricity  Trading  Arrangements  (NETA)  system  of  the  UK,  traditional  competitive 
and  cooperative  game  theory  strategies  are  taken  into  account  in  the  work  reported  in 
this  thesis.  An  improved  methodology,  "trigger  price  strategy",  is  introduced  to 
simulate  power  generation  companies'  enhanced  gaming  strategies.  Such  a  modelling 
problem  is,  however,  intractable  and  hence  an  extra-numerical  search  technique, 
Evolutionary  Computation,  is  employed  to  solve  the  game  theory  based  system 
modelling  problem.  An  encoded  Genetic  Algorithm  based  technique  is  developed  to 
I search  for  an  effective  model  for  the  complex  decision-making  process  and  to  help 
decision-makers  evaluate  their  strategies  and  bidding  parameters. 
A  novel  and  effective  electricity  trading  simulation  model  is  thus  developed,  where  its 
design  features  are  close  to  the  NETA.  The  model  scale  is  as  close  as  possible  to 
NETA.  A  complex  and  more  realistic  two-sided  transaction  mechanism  with  demand 
fully  incorporated  is  incorporated  in  this  model.  These  are  a  world  first  in  this 
research  area. 
Using  the  intelligent  systems  methods  and  the  model  developed,  market  states  and 
consequences  of  which  some  generators  maintain  strategic  gaming  behaviours  are 
analysed  for  prediction  and  decision  making.  Experimental  tests,  verification  and 
validation  are  carried  out  with  various  strategies,  using  different  model  scales  and  data 
published  by  NETA.  Testing  and  validation  show  that  the  modeling  and  decision 
making  methodologies  based  on  the  hybrid  game  theory  and  evolutionary  algorithm 
provide  an  effective  tool  for  analysis  and  prediction  under  such  a  circumstances  on  the 
NETA. 
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1  Introduction 
1.1  Problems  Facing  Power  Markets 
I 
Since  the  1980's,  much  effort  has  been  made  to  restructure  the  traditional 
monopolistic  electricity  industries.  Whilst  the  details  differ,  the  core  of  this  reform 
involves  the  introduction  of  competition  among  electricity  generators  and  suppliers' 
through  the  creation  of  an  open  electricity  market.  Ideally,  the  market  structure  and 
management  rules  in  an  electricity  market  are  expected  to  be  well  designed  and  it  is 
generally  believed  that  opening  the  power  industry  to  competition  would  benefit 
trading  participants  and  improve  economic  efficiency.  However,  the  energy  crisis  in 
California  in  the  Winter  of  2001  and  problems  in  other  power  markets  cross  the  world 
have  motivated  research  interests  into  more  understanding  of  the  market. 
Before  the  crisis,  the  California  power  systems  had  been  considered  a  benchmark 
example  to  which  others  made  reference,  and  world-wide  developments  towards 
similar  competitive  electricity  markets  were  in  process.  However,  during  the  shocking 
market  collapse  in  California  some  of  the  major  Californian  power  generation 
companies  successfully  manipulated  the  market  to  obtain  skyrocket  profits  [1],  the 
perceptions  of  the  California  market  has  now  completely  changed.  With  the  truth  of 
the  market  power  applied  to  this  crisis  being  exposed  [2],  the  "made-up2  shortage  of 
installed  capacity  or  plant  availability  appears  to  have  been  a  key  driver  to  the 
California  difficulties.  The  emergence  of  market  power  and  collusion  among  energy 
1  The  word  'suppliers'  here  is  used  in  the  sense  of  retailing  electricity  to  end  consumers,  which  is  the 
convention  within  the  UK  industry,  as  opposed  to  the  physical  production  of  electricity  (which  is  the 
meaning  of  the  term  in  many  other  markets). Chapter  I  Introduction  2 
companies  have  been  drawing  more  attention  on  strategic  gaming  behaviour  and 
market  system  on  global  electricity  trading. 
Would  an  energy  crisis  develop  in  the  UK  electricity  markets?  Would  British  power 
generators  attempt  to  carry  out  market  distortions  and  "price  tricks"  exploited  by 
Californian  generators?  What  consequence  would  it  have  under  such  circumstances9 
These  questions  should  be  answered  through  analysis  and  modelling  of  the  British 
electricity  trading  system. 
1.2  Gaming  Strategies  and  Market  Power  on  NETA 
In  March  2001  the  New  Electricity  Trading  Arrangements  (NETA)  were  implemented 
to  operate  power  markets  in  England  and  Wales  [3].  The  trading  management 
mechanisms  are  still  on  trial  operation  and  being  improved. 
The  NETA  trading  systems  do  not  however  alter  the  fact  that,  there  exist  loopholes 
which  can  be  exploited  and  scope  which  is  left  for  market  power  and  gaming  trading 
strategies  to  disrupt  trading  operations  and/or  distorts  market  prices  in  NETA. 
1.3  Aims  of  This  Research 
This  aims  of  this  research  are  to  model  the  dynamic  and  decision  making  behaviour  of 
the  UK  electricity  trading  system  under  and  to  discover  the  impact  of  gamin  trading 
strategies  on  the  NETA.  Since  gaming  strategies  are  widely  practiced  in  trading 
systems  for  decision-making  and  decision  support,  game  theory  will  be  used  to  model 
such  systems.  To  achieve  this  goal,  Evolutionary  Computing,  whose  search  power  is 
beyond  pure  numerical  optimisation,  will  be  used  to  assist  the  model  building.  With 
the  model  established,  the  research  will  then  attempt  to  address  the  following 
objectives. Chapter  I  Introduction  3 
A  market  model  where  the  number  of  trading  participants  is  similar  to  the  real 
scale  of  NETA  and  real  data  published  by  NETA  will  be  established  to  simulate 
the  market  operation  and  trading  programs. 
(2)  The  decision  making  process  of  how  power  generators  attempt  to  employ  market 
power  and  to  maintain  strategic  gaming  behaviours  to  maximize  profits  on  NETA 
will  be  analyzed  based  on  the  designed  model. 
(3)  The  market  states  and  consequence  of  such  actions  developed  above  will  then  be 
analysed.  The  study  will  also  search  for  possible  market  equilibrium  and  optimal 
trading  strategies  under  such  circumstances. 
(4)  Since  there  are  an  amount  of  non-linear  and  uncertain  variables  existing  on  the 
decision  support  and  optimisation  process,  Evolutionary  Computing  will  be 
introduced  to  assist  the  search,  learning  and  optimization  problems. 
(5)  Based  on  the  research  achievements,  the  formation  of  such  a  decision  making 
system  would  also  be  able  to  provide  an  advanced  platform  for  potential 
electricity  trading  participants  to  analyse  generators  and  suppliers'  behaviours  and 
to  gain  experience  of  the  trading  enviromnent  that  they  will  face  under  NETA. 
1.4  Contributions 
*A  novel  electricity  trading  system  model  is  developed  to  reflect  the  New 
Electricity  Trading  Arrangements  that  administers  the  power  markets  in  England 
and  Wales.  The  model  scale  is  as  close  as  possible  to  NETA  and  the  model  is 
validated  against  real  data  published  by  NETA. Chapter  I  Introduction  4 
eA  more  sophisticated  and  realistic  two-sided  transaction  mechanism  has  been 
developed.  The  demand  is  fully  incorporated  in  this  new  model;  a  fact  that  so  far 
had  not  been  achieved  successfully  in  this  research  field. 
9A  widely  used  intelligent  decision-making  support  technique,  game  theory,  has 
been  successfully  applied  to  develop  the  model.  The  model  can  take  account  of 
actions  affecting  each  participant  who  may  or  may  not  apply  traditional 
competitive  and/or  cooperative  game  theory  strategies.  An  improved 
methodology,  "trigger  price  strategy",  is  introduced  to  simulate  power 
generation  companies'  gaming  trading  strategies. 
9  Evolutionary  Computing,  an  intelligent  search  and  global  optimisation 
technique,  has  been  applied  to  build  game  theory  based  models  and  to  solve  this 
type  of  decision-making  problems  which  has  been  intractable. 
*  The  methodologies  developed  are  world  first  in  that  they  employ  game  theory  to 
model  the  NETA  trading  players'  behaviours  and  then  employ  Genetic 
Algorithms  to  search  for  the  game  theory  model  parameters  and  market 
equilibrium  forecasts;  and  hence  optimal  trading  strategies.  This  should  help 
decision-makers  evaluate  and  optimize  their  strategies  and  bidding  parameters. 
1.5  Outline  of  The  Thesis 
Chapter  2.  The  market  structure  of  NETA  and  current  trading  strategies  adopted  in 
power  market  are  studied.  Chapter  2  begins  with  preliminary  information  of  the 
NETA  trading  systems,  which  covers  its  basic  key  building  blocks,  trading 
mechanism,  and  sequential  markets.  This  is  followed  by  the  start-of-the-art  analysis 
on  the  gaming  strategies  and  market  power  existing  in  NETA  and  world-wide  power Chapter  I  Introduction 
markets.  Work  carried  out  in  the  area  of  decision  making  on  trading  strategies  in 
power  market,  over  the  past  decade,  is  then  reviewed.  Evaluation  and  comparison  are 
also  presented  in  this  chapter. 
Chapter  3.  The  trading  strategies  published  in  literatures  are  studied  in  Chapter  3.  This 
Chapter  is  aim  to  provide  the  development  trend  and  direction  of  the  decision-making 
methodologies  on  trading  strategies  for  power  trading,  since  these  results  will  have 
important  practice  implications.  The  deficiency  and  limitations  of  traditional 
analytical  techniques  applied  to  study  trading  strategies  in  power  markets  are  also 
highlighted. 
Chapter  4.  Chapter  4  demonstrates  the  trading  strategy  modelling  of  development  of 
competition  between  power  generation  companies  and  supply  companies  through 
hybrid  methods  of  Game  Theory  and  Genetic  Algorithms  on  NETA.  A  set  of  trading 
strategies,  including  gaming  generation  companies',  competitive  generation 
companies"  and  the  suppliers',  are  developed  to  simulate  the  market  behaviours  of 
players  from  both  of  two  sides  of  NETA  market.  A  mix  of  cooperative  and 
competitive  gaming  strategies  are  adopted,  which  has  never  been  done  in  both 
industry  and  academia.  It  also  attempts  to  discover  the  interaction  between  the  market 
environment  and  the  market  player's  payoff. 
Chapter  5.  Based  on  the  trading  strategies  developed  in  last  Chapter,  the  NETA 
trading  mechanism  is  simulated  in  this  Chapter.  The  objective  of  this  market 
modelling  is  to  to  simulate  the  dynamic  and  decision  making  behaviour  of  the  UK 
electricity  trading  system,  and  to  discover  the  impact  of  gaming  trading  strategies  on 
the  NETA.  The  model  is  based  on  real  case  of  NETA  and  published  documents.  Its 
designed  feature  is  as  close  to  NETA  as  possible. Chapter  I  Introduction  6 
To  exercise  the  model's  veracity  and  efficiency  and  exercise  the  modelling's 
performance,  the  validation  experiments  are  carried  out  against  real  NETA  data.  All 
experimental  parameters  are  from  actual  published  data. 
Chapter  6.  Following  modelling  of  the  NETA  market,  the  model  is  used  to  analyse 
the  market  behaviour  of  gaming  strategies  practiced  in  the  power  market  and  to  find 
out  possible  influence  on  NETA.  Both  of  cooperative  and  competitive  strategies  are 
adopted  and  examined  in  two  experiments,  which  involveg  various  model  scales 
including  a  small-scale  market,  similar  to  California  power  market,  and  a  relatively 
large-scale  market  where  the  number  of  trading  participants  is  similar  to  the  real  scale 
of  NETA.  The  experimental  results  are  compared  and  evaluated.  Discussion  is  carried 
out  to  evaluate  the  performance  the  developed  model  and  trading  strategies  in  this 
marketplace., 
Chapter  7.  In  order  to  assess  the  performance  of  the  proposed  NETA  market  model 
and  the  evolving  trading  strategy,  it  is  evaluated  with  a  comparably  similar  simulation 
model,  which  adopts  Genetic  Algorithms  coupled  with  various  price  forecasting 
techniques  to  select  appropriate  bidding  strategies  for  the  current  market  conditions. 
The  major  modelling  results  and  market  trading  outputs  are  compared  and  discussed. 
The  difference  of  these  two  models  with  the  developed  strategies  are  discovered. 
Chapter  8.  The  final  Chapter  presents  the  conclusions  drawn  form  this  research  and 
recommends  the  possible  directions  for  future  work. Chapter  2  NETA  Systems  and  Current  Trading  Strategies  7 
2.  NETA  Systems  and  Current  Trading  Strategies 
2.1  Introduction 
In  this  chapter,  the  market  structure  of  NETA  and  current  trading  strategies  adopted  in 
power  market  are  studied.  The  aim  of  this  chapter  is  to  provide  a  clear  scheme  of  the 
NETA  market  structure  and  start-of-the-art  analysis  on  the  trend  and  direction  of  the 
developments. 
2.2  Structure  of  NETA  Market  System 
Prior  to  the  introduction  of  NETA,  from  April  1990  until  March  2001  the  trading 
arrangements  centered  around  the  electricity  Pool  which  was  a  traditional  centralized 
mechanism  for  dispatching  generating  plant  at  the  day-ahead  stage  to  meet  forecast 
demand,  and  operated  on  a  marginal  pricing  basis  with  all  generator  dispatched  in  a 
particular  half-hour  being  paid  the  same  price.  The  Pool  was  criticized  that  the  market 
was  dominated  by  a  small  number  of  generators  but  the  Pool  facilitated  the  exercise  of 
market  power  at  the  expense  of  customers  by  enabling  all  generators  to  receive  a  uniforrn 
price  that,  in  practice,  was  set  by  just  a  few  of  them. 
In  order  to  avoid  the  unsatisfactory  respects  of  the  Pool,  the  design  of  NETA  was  built 
upon  a  small  number  of  key  building  blocks  encompassing  the  need  for  [4]: 
oA  two-sided  market,  with  demand  fully  incorporated; 
0  Bilateral  contracting  rather  than  a  centralized  market  as  the  heart  of  the 
arrangements,  to  put  greater  competitive  pressure  on  generators  and  encourage 
innovation  and  customer  responsiveness  in  suppliers; Chapter  2  NETA  Systems  and  Current  Trading  Strategies  8 
*  (Contractually)  firm  bids  and  offers,  to  enable  costs  and  risks  to  be  reduced  and 
shared  efficiently; 
9  Simple  bids  and  offers,  to  improve  transparency  and  encourage  liquidity;  and 
e  Centralized  real  time  physical  balancing  and  financial  settlement  arrangements,  to 
allow  the  system  to  be  balanced  and  to  target  appropriately  those  balancing  costs. 
The  New  Electricity  Trading  Arrangements  are  designed  to  be  more  efficient  and  provide 
greater  choice  for  market  participants  whilst  maintaining  the  operation  of  a  secure  and 
reliable  electricity  system.  The  proposals  are  based  on  bilateral  trading  between 
generators,  suppliers,  traders  and  customers,  as  shown  in  Figure  1.  These  bilateral 
contracts  can  be  traded  in  [3]: 
*  Forwards  and  futures  markets  (including  short-tenn  power  exchanges),  which 
evolve  in  response  to  the  requirements  of  participants,  that  will  allow  contracts  for 
electricity  to  be  struck  up  to  several  years  ahead; 
9  Short  tenn  power  exchanges,  where  participants  have  the  opportunity  to  "fine 
tune"  their  contract  positions  in  a  simple  and  accessible  way; 
9A  Balancing  Mechanism  in  which  NGC,  as  System  Operator,  accepts  offers  and 
bids  for  electricity  to  enable  it  to  balance  the  system;  and 
eA  Settlement  Process  (for  charging  participants  whose  contracted  positions  do  not 
match  their  metered  volumes  of  electricity,  for  the  settlement  of  accepted Chapter  2  NETA  Systems  and  Current  Trading  Strategies  9 
Balancing  Mechanism  offers  and  bids,  and  for  recovering  the  System  Operator's 
costs  of  balancing  the  systern. 
Forward  Markets  One  hour  1/2hour  After  the  event 
II1  01 
Balancing  Mechanism  Real  Time  Trading  Settlement 
bilateral  contracts  Period 
Gate 
Closure 
Figure  2.1:  Trading  stream  on  NETA 
The  system  operator  and  power  exchanges  are  central  to  the  functioning  of  NETA.  The 
physical  nature  of  electricity  does  not  allow  a  true  spot  market  (instant  pricing  and 
delivery)  so  financial  transactions  must  be  scheduled  some  time  in  advance  of  the 
physical  delivery.  Power  exchanges  thus  substitute  for  a  true  spot  market.  A  variety  of 
financial  relationships  manifest  themselves  in  electricity  market  trading.  Bilateral 
contracts  may  be  agreed  between  generators  and  suppliers,  standardised  contracts,  futures 
and  forwards,  can  be  traded  through  power  exchanges  and  half-hourly  spot  markets 
provide  short-time  adjustment  of  the  contractual  position  of  market  players  close  with  the 
time  of  physical  delivery. 
As  introduced  earlier,  the  NETA  market  structures  are  based  upon  sequential  markets, 
which  are  investigated  as  following  [3]  [5]  and  [64]. 
2.2.1  Forward  and  Futures  Markets 
The  Forward  and  Futures  Markets  evolve  in  response  to  the  requirements  of  double-side 
participants.  Essentially  these  are  markets  for  buying  and  selling  large  volumes  of Chapter  2  NETA  Systems  and  Current  Trading  Strategies  10 
electricity  in  advance.  Typical  trades  would  be  for  an  annual  amount  of  electricity,  or  for 
electricity  just  for  the  coming  winter  or  following  summer,  though  they  can  be  for  some 
years  ahead.  They  are  termed  bilateral  physical  trades,  meaning  that  two  parties  (for 
example,  a  generator  and  a  supplier)  enter  into  a  contract  to  deliver  electricity  at  an 
agreed  time  in  the  future.  These  sorts  of  contracts  are  used  both  to  manage  price  risk  and 
speculate  against  future  prices  to  avoid  the  risk  of  having  to  buy  or  sell  at  the  last  minute 
through  the  Balancing  Mechanism  where  prices  are  very  volatile. 
2.2.2  Power  Exchange 
Power  exchanges  provide  the  forum  for  buying  and  selling  power  from  a  few  hours  ahead 
to  many  months  ahead.  There  are  a  number  of  power  exchanges  in  existence  through 
which  traders  can  enter  bids  and  offers  onto  a  System  Operator,  and  these  can  be  taken  up 
by  other  traders  with  neither  party  being  aware  of  the  other's  identity. 
A  power  exchange  offers  trading  typically  of  relatively  small  quantities  of  electricity  to 
enable  to  participants  to  fine  tune  their  contract  positions  by  buying  or  selling  up  to  the 
last  possible  moment.  Contracts,  mostly  for  the  very  short-term  (next  day)  can  be  made 
for  specified  amounts  of  electricity  at  specified  times  and  are  binding. 
The  contract-matching  process  is  performed  by  System  Operator  (SO)  in  UKPX's 
Clearing  House.  The  single  matching  round  proceeds  as  following  [5].  In  each  iteration 
each  market  participant  from  two  sides  respectively  submits  a  set  of  bids  (offers) 
including  prices  -  responding  volumes,  i.  e.,  flI.  50/MWh  -  11.23MW,  E16.62/MWh  - 
18.30MW,  ... 
E68.42/MWh  -  78.70MW,  and  so  on,  to  the  SO.  All  the  offers  are  sorted Chapter  2  NETA  Systems  and  Current  Trading  Strategies  II 
out  by  their  prices  in  ascending  order  and  all  the  bids  are  sorted  out  in  descending  order. 
Then  the  SO  matches  the  prices  as  below. 
(I)The  point  of  the  lowest  selling  price  is  matched  with  the  point  of  the  highest  buying 
price.  If  the  buying  price  is  higher  than  the  selling,  a  contract  is  granted.  Then  for  the 
seller  the  amount  sold  is  subtracted  from  the  amount  available  to  sell  and  for  the  buyer 
the  amount  bought  is  subtracted  from  the  amount  available  to  buy.  Once  a  buy  and  a 
sell  order  have  been  matched,  the  Clearing  House  becomes  the  counterparty  to  both 
the  buyer  and  the  seller  who  never  become  aware  of  each  others  identity.  At  all  times 
the  Clearing  House  has  a  flat  position  and  it  does  not  hold  positions  for  itself 
(2)After  that  if  the  lowest  selling  point  still  has  electricity  available  for  sale,  it  is  matched 
with  the  next  buying  point  with  second  higher  bid  price. 
The  above  procedures  I  and  2  are  repeated  until  the  offer  exhausts  all  its  electricity 
available  for  sale  on  this  specific  point  or  run  out  of  buyers  available  to  buy  his 
electricity. 
The  next  offer  with  second  lowest  selling  price  is  picked  and  the  above  procedures  1  and 
2  are  repeated.  The  procedure  is  demonstrated  in  Figure  2.1.  Procedures  1,2  and  3  are 
repeated  until  all  offers  and  bids  are  matched. 
Based  on  the  trading  process  the  PX  mean  market  clearing  price  (MCP)  is  defined  as: 
PXP  =J(QSPX',  -  -, 
QSPXiy  PSPX  1, 
-  -, 
PSPXi;  PBPX  1, 
-  -, 
PBPX  i,  QBPXI, 
--, 
QBPý)  (2.1) Chapter  2  NETA  Systems  and  Current  Trading  Strategies  12 
where  i  is  the  number  of  generators,  i=I,  2, 
....  n;  j  is  the  number  of  suppliers,  j=19  21 
M'.  QSPx  ,.  and  Pspx'  .  are  the  quantity  and  price  generator  i  wants  to  sell  at  PX,  QBPý 
and  PBpx'  are  the  quantity  and  price  supplierj  wants  to  buy  at  PX. 
Ascending 
Selling  Prices  Buying  Prices 
order 
16MW 
Lowest  1.10.20c/.  NjW-16.  OONINV  1.45.34CfNjW-68.53XIW 
17.4A 
2.10.48c/N1W-17.401VRV---- 
, 
z*  2.43.06  C/IvIW-70.0  4XIW 
3.11.04ie/.  NIW-I,  -q.  9Al[W,  e'il.  94MW  3.38.10  C/XjW-67.29XfW 
Descending 
order 
Highest 
Highest  Lowest 
60.57.94C/NIW,  -78.32VFVV  90.8.12C/IVIW--9.  S9-kTW 
Figure  2.2:  Clearing  Process  on  Power  Exchange 
2.2.3  Balancing  Mechanism 
The  Balancing  Mechanism  (BM)  is  a  near  real  time  tool  operated  by  NGC  to  ensure  that 
the  supply  and  demand  of  electricity  exactly  matches  [  17]. 
Each  trading  day  is  divided  into  48  half  hour  periods.  One  hour  before  the  start  of  each 
period  trading  is  effectively  'frozen',  this  is  known  as  'gate  closure'.  Whatever  the  type 
of  contract  struck,  for  the  NETA  the  'last  possible  moment'  will  occur  at  the  'gate 
closure'.  This  one-hour  interval  is  used  to  enable  the  NGC,  as  the  System  Operator  (SO), 
to  balance  the  system.  In  order  to  enable  the  NGC  to  do  this,  participants  will  be 
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9  Their  physical  positions  (either  generation  or  demand)  at  gate  closure; 
9  Their  expected  production  in  that  period; 
9  Their  forecast  of  customer  demand; 
9  Any  flexibility  available  to  NGC  (bids  and  offers) 
The  NGC  will  then  operate  this  'Balancing  Mechanism'  (BM)  by  accepting  offers  of 
electricity  (generation  increases  and  demand  reductions)  and  bids  for  electricity 
(generation  reductions  and  demand  increases)  at  very  short  notice. 
2.2.4  Settlement  Process 
In  the  Settlement  Process  generators'  metered  generation  and  suppliers'  metered  demand 
are  compared  with  the  contractual  position  they  notify  as  the  Balancing  Mechanism 
opens  together  with  any  accepted  Balancing  Mechanism  trades.  The  sum  total  of 
contracts  negotiated  in  forward  and  futures  bilateral  markets  and  short  term  PX  is  added 
together  to  arrive  at  these  contract  positions.  Participants  that  act  both  as  generators  and 
suppliers  will  be  exposed  to  separate  production  and  consurnption  imbalance  charges  for 
the  two  sides  of  their  business. 
The  difference  between  the  amount  of  electricity  bought  and  sold  under  contracts  and  the 
actual  amount  produced  and  consumed  is  calculated  by  the  imbalance  settlement  system. 
Companies  with  a  mismatch,  who  either  need  to  buy  'top-up'  energy  to  meet  their 
customers  demand,  or  'spill'  excess  energy  into  the  system,  are  subject  to  an  energy 
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The  price  for  buying  more  energy  is  known  as  the  System  Buy  Price  (SBP),  and  is  a 
weighted  average  of  accepted  Offers  and  generally  higher  than  the  forward  market  price 
because  it  reflects  the  cost  of  extra  generation  at  short  notice.  Conversely,  the  price  for 
selling  excess  energy  to  the  system  the  System  Sell  Price  (SSP),  is  a  weighted  average  of 
accepted  Bids  and  generally  lower  than  the  forward  price,  reflecting  the  relatively  low 
price  that  generators  are  prepared  to  bid  to  NGC  to  reduce  output  at  short  notice. 
If  a  generator  is  producing  electricity  and  find  at  the  last  minute  that  it  has  generated 
more  than  it  contracted  customers  demand,  the  generator  will  have  to  sell  its  excess 
production  at  a  discounted  price.  This  is  the  System  Sell  Price. 
However  if  it  finds  at  the  last  minute  that  it  has  not  generated  enough  electricity  to  meet 
customer  demand,  it  will  have  to  buy  some  more.  Not  surprisingly  the  genarator  would 
need  to  pay  a  premium  because  it  is  buying  at  the  last  minute.  In  fact,  with  electricity  it 
could  pay  10,100  or  even  1000  times  as  much  as  the  normal  price.  This  is  the  System 
Buy  Price. 
The  same  goes  for  suppliers.  If  a  supplier  contracts  or  sells  more  electricity  than  they  said 
they  would  (the  demand  forecast),  they  will  have  to  pay  a  premium  for  the  extra 
consumption  (the  System  Buy  Price).  Similarly,  if  they  contract  less  than  the  demand 
forecast,  they  will  have  some  excess  electricity  to  sell  and  may  not  be  able  to  get  a  very 
good  price  for  it  (the  System  Sell  Price). 
This  is  one  of  the  main  principles  of  trading  electricity.  If  a  market  participant  falls  to 
achieve  what  it  predicted  then  it  is  going  to  cost  it  to  balance  the  system.  The  nsk  of Chapter  2  NETA  Systems  and  Current  Trading  Strategies  15 
having  to  buy  and  sell  in  this  way  through  the  Balancing  Mechanism  with  its  very 
volatile  prices  emphasises  the  importance  of  suppliers  working  closely  with  their 
customers  to  get  the  prediction  of  demand  correct. 
The  spread  between  the  two  prices  is  intended  to  provide  a  penalty  for  being  out  of 
balance:  The  SSP  (SBP)  is  expected  to  be  considerably  lower  (higher)  than  forward 
market  price  PXP  [  18  ]. 
SBP  is  calculated  as  [  19]: 
x 
(QA  aar  *  Paar  *  TLMar)+BCAr 
a  SBPb 
x 
1:  (QA  aar  *  TLMar)+BVAr 
a 
where 
QAO'ar  is  the  Unit  a  Total  Accepted  Offer  Volume, 
Paar  is  the  Offer  Price  for  the  Offer  acceptance  x,  Unit  a  and 
Settlement  Period  r, 
TLMar  is  the  Transmission  Loss  Multipliers,  set  as  1  in  this  model, 
BCAr  is  the  Buy  Price  Cost  Adjustment, 
B  VA,  is  the  Buy  Price  Volume  Adjustment, 
SSP  is  calculated  as  [19]: 
x 
Y  (QAByar  *  PBvar  *  TLMar)  +  SCA, 
Sspb  ax 
II  (QAByar  *TLMab)  +  SVAr 
a 
where 
(2.2) 
(2.3) 
Q.  4Y',  is  the  Unit  a  Total  Accepted  Bid  Volume, Chapter  2  NETA  Systems  and  Current  Trading  Strategies  16 
PBY,,  is  the  Bid  Price  for  the  Bid  acceptance  y,  Unit  a  and 
Settlement  Period  r. 
TLMaris  The  Transmission  Loss  Multipliers, 
SCAr  is  the  Sell  Price  Cost  Adjustment, 
SVAr  is  the  Sell  Price  Volume  Adjustment. 
2.3  Problems  Existing  in  NETA  Market 
In  a  perfect  electricity  market,  any  power  supplier  is  a  price  taker.  Microeconomic  theory 
holds  the  optimal  trading  strategy  for  a  supplier  is  simply  to  bid  marginal  cost.  When  a 
generator  bids  other  than  marginal  cost,  in  an  effort  to  exploit  imperfections  in  the  market 
to  increase  profits,  this  behaviour  is  called  gaming  strategic  bidding.  If  the  generator  can 
successfully  increase  its  profits  by  strategic  behaviours  or  by  any  means  other  than 
lowering  its  costs,  it  is  said  to  have  market  power.  Theoretically  the  NETA  is  not 
perfectly  competitive,  and  consequently  the  generation  companies  would  be  able  to 
increase  profits  through  gaming  trading  strategies,  specially,  through  exercising  market 
power  on  trading  in  NETA. 
Since  competition  mainly  exists  at  the  generation  side  on  NETA,  and  the  transmission 
and  distribution  systems  remain  regulated  monopolies  [20],  the  gaming  problem  in 
electricity  markets  is  concerned  mainly  with  power  generators  although  demand  side 
gaming  is  also  gaining  importance. 
Research  of  the  relationship  between  generators  spot  market  behaviours  and  their 
financial  trading  or  hedging  contract  position  on  NETA  market  conclude  that  a  generator 
in  the  physical  spot  market  can  directly  exploit  the  rigidities  of  the  electricity  market  to Chapter  2  NETA  Systems  and  Current  Trading  Strategies  17 
exert  a  'dramatic'  influence  over  the  physical  balancing  and  financial  settlements  within 
NETA.  In  other  words,  in  the  very  short  term,  the  market  is  vulnerable  to  the  exercise  of 
market  power  by  any  physical  participant  whose  flexibility  (whether  in  supply  or 
demand)  is  required,  at  a  particular  time,  to  achieve  system  balance  and  to  avoid  very 
costly  supply  failures. 
The  'rigidities'  of  the  physical  market  for  electricity,  namely  highly  variable  demand  and 
order  flows  coupled  with  inelastic  supply,  also  make  the  financial  markets  related  to 
electricity  vulnerable  to  potential  indirect  manipulation  strategies  being  adopted.  These 
strategies  could  potentially  be  used  by  players  who  have  relatively  small  positions  in 
physical  markets. 
All  these  economic  interactions  between  the  physical  and  financial  market,  and  the 
physical  characteristic  of  only  a  limited  number  of  generating  companies  to  service  a 
given  geographic  region  described  above,  which  conduct  in  one  can  affect  trading  in  the 
other,  make  the  NETA  vulnerable  to  market  power  yet,  in  particular  under  a  critical 
situation  on  NETA  where  the  supply  exceeds  demand,  and  thereafter  the  price  of 
electricity  on  the  wholesale  market  has  dropped  40%  in  the  past  six  years.  As  a 
consequence,  some  major  market  players  are  being  driven  out  from  the  industry  [6].  It 
has  been  more  realistic  and  practicable  that  generators  tend  to  maximize  profit  in  using 
gaming  strategies  to  exploit  the  loopholes  and  scopes  of  NETA. 
There  has  been  an  amount  of  effort  imposed  on  analysing  the  mechanism  of  gaming 
strategies  and  market  power  and  their  influences  over  the  electricity  trading  market.  game Chapter  2  NETA  Systems  and  Current  Trading  Strategies  18 
theory  is  the  most  widely  used  methodology  to  model  market  players'  strategies  [7]  [8] 
[9].  The  performance  of  trading  participants  who  attempt  to  make  coalition  in 
competitive  market,  particularly  the  bargaining  process  and  negotiation  protocols,  are 
also  studied  by  intelligent-agent  systems  [  10]  [II].  Some  employ  probability  distribution 
to  predict  market  players'  behaviours  [12]. 
Research  for  the  practice  of  gaming  trading  strategies  over  the  world-wide  power  market 
has  demonstrated  that,  the  direct  exercise  of  market  power  by  those  who  control 
deliverable  supply  can  occur  in  various  ways,  such  as  through  changes  in  the  quality  of 
the  product  supplied,  or  through  artificial  increases  in  price  or  restrictions  in  supply,  as 
what  happened  in  California.  In  addition,  the  potential  may  also  exist  for  market  power  to 
be  exercised  indirectly,  through  gaming  the  relationship  between  the  physical  and 
financial  markets. 
The  indirect  exercise  of  market  power  in  this  way  seeks  to  exploit  the  relationship 
between  the  spot  price  for  the  physical  electricity  and  the  price  of  financial  contracts  over 
it.  Given  the  relationship  between  the  spot  price  and  the  prices  of  financial  contracts,  this 
may  provide  an  opportunity  for  a  firm  to  profit  substantially  in  a  tightly  constrained 
market  from  movements  in  either  the  spot  price  of  the  electricity  or  from  the  increase  in 
prices  of  financial  contracts.  The  classic  market  'squeeze'  or  'comers'  are  two  examples 
of  market  manipulation  strategies,  which  could  be  introduced  on  NETA  by  trading 
participants.  Occurrences  of  manipulation  strategies  such  as  comers  and  squeezes  have 
been  detected  in  power  electricity  markets  as  diverse  as  in  worldwide  [2  1  ]. Chapter  2  NETA  Systems  and  Current  Trading  Strategies  19 
A  market  'squeeze'  occurs  where  an  artificial  scarcity  in  deliverable  physical  supply  is 
created,  which  raises  the  price  that  those  who  have  large  contractual  obligations  to  supply 
are  forced  to  pay  to  close  out  of  their  contracted  position  in  financial  markets.  Similarly, 
a  'long'  comer  occurs  where  a  market  participant,  who  typically  has  control  over  a 
significant  amount  of  deliverable  supply,  commits  other  participants  to  large  contractual 
positions  to  supply  at  a  future  date  (through  buying  large  numbers  of  long  futures 
contracts  for  example)  and  then  subsequently  artificially  restricts  physical  supply  for 
which  those  who  are  contracted  to  supply  are  forced  to  pay  to  close  out  their  position  as 
the  delivery  date  approaches. 
In  the  extreme,  for  example,  consider  a  situation  whereby  a  generator  withdrew  all  of  its 
available  capacity  from  the  NETA  market,  and  the  reduced  level  of  available  generation 
results  in  an  upward  movement  in  prices.  If  attention  were  confined  to  the  physical 
market,  such  an  action  would  clearly  not  be  profitable,  since  the  generator  supplies  no 
output.  If,  however,  the  generator  contracts  ahead  of  time  to  purchase  claims  to  output,  a 
profit  will  be  obtained  from  any  difference  between  the  spot  price  (which  is  raised  by 
capacity  withdrawal)  and  the  contract  price. 
2.4  Review  of  Decision  Making  on  Trading  Strategies 
Current  research  has  focused  on  designing  optimal  trading  strategies  in  electricity  market. 
Broadly  speaking,  there  are  three  ways  for  developing  optimal  trading  strategies  on 
NETA.  The  first  one  relays  on  estimations  of  the  MCP  in  the  next  trading  period,  the 
second  utilizes  estimations  of  bidding  behaviour  of  the  rival  participants,  and  the  third  is 
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used  for  investigating  gaming  strategic  behaviour  [22],  but  these  do  not  lead  to  systematic 
approaches  for  building  gaming  strategies. 
The  first  approach  is  simple  in  principle.  Based  on  the  estimation  of  the  MCP,  it  is  quite 
straightforward  for  a  power  supplier  to  determine  its  strategy  by  simply  offering  a  price  a 
little  cheaper  than  the  MCP.  However,  predicting  electricity  price  in  a  pool  requires 
analysis  that  combines  demand  forecasts  with  an  understanding  of  participants'  bidding 
and  transmission  congestion.  Since  there  is  very  little  historical  data  available  in  most 
electricity  markets,  it  is  difficult  to  achieve  accurate  predication  because  of  the  fast- 
moving  reform  of  the  electricity  industry.  Another  problem  with  this  method  is  an 
implicit  assumption  that  the  bid  from  one  supplier  will  not  influence  the  MCP.  Since  the 
electricity  market  is  basically  an  oligopoly,  this  assumption  is  unlikely  to  hold  for  any 
reasonable  length  of  time.  This  method  has  seldom  been  applied  in  developing  bidding 
strategies  in  electricity  markets. 
Most  of  the  methods  published  so  far  are  based  on  estimations  of  trading  strategy  on 
bidding  of  rival  participants  in  which  different  techniques,  such  as  probability  analysis 
and  fuzzy  sets,  are  utilized  for  estimation.  A  description  of  publications  under  this  group 
will  be  given  in  the  next  several  sections  according  to  their  features. 
The  third  approach  is  the  most  sophisticated  which  is  to  apply  some  methods  or 
techniques  from  the  game  theory.  There  are  many  publications  available  in  the  area  of 
electricity  markets  that  follow  this.  There  are  basically  three  methods  in  this  catalogue. Chapter  2  NETA  Systems  and  Current  Trading  Strategies  21 
The  first  method  is  the  matrix  game  based  [23]  [24]  where  gaming  bidding  strategies 
have  to  be  represented  as  discrete  quantities  such  as  "bidding  high",  "bidding  medium"  or 
"bidding  low"  to  cater  for  the  nature  of  this  game.  With  discrete  bidding  strategies, 
payoff  matrices  are  constructed  by  enumerating  all  possible  combinations  of  strategies, 
and  an  equilibrium  state  of  the  bidding  game  that  corresponds  to  the  optimal  bidding 
strategies  for  the  participants  can  be  obtained.  However,  in  realistic  situations,  bidding 
strategies  can  be  continuous  and  therefore  it  is  not  theoretically  guaranteed  that  an 
equilibrium  state  does  exist  for  an  electricity  market.  While  this  method  may  be  suitable 
for  roughly  analyzing  the  strategic  behaviours  of  power  suppliers,  it  is  not  appropriate  as 
a  tool  for  developing  bidding  strategies. 
The  second  method  follows  oligopoly  games  such  as  the  Stackelberg  model  and  supply 
function.  Basically,  these  models  are  more  appropriate  for  analysis  of  potential  market 
power  than  constructing  trading  strategies,  although  in  principle  the  equilibrium  state  of 
these  models  represents  the  optimal  bidding  strategies  of  the  participants.  This  is  because 
many  simplification  assumptions  have  been  made  in  applying  these  models,  and  as  a 
result,  the  equilibrium  state  may  not  make  sense  for  building  optimal  trading  strategies. 
Coalition  gaming  is  the  third  and  most  sophisticated  approach  employed  which  is  a  fonn 
of  cooperative  gaming  among  the  members  in  subgroups  while  non-cooperative  gaming 
may  still  apply  among  the  subgroups.  Most  coalition  strategies  studied,  which  some 
generators  make  an  agreement  including  the  allocation  of  production  among  the  members 
and  the  policing  of  the  agreement  (sometimes  and  the  allocation  of  organization  profits), 
are  based  on  methods  and  techniques  from  cooperative  game  theory  techniques.  Most  of Chapter  2  NETA  Systems  and  Current  Trading  Strategies  22 
coalition  strategies  on  electricity  markets  are  on  a  basis  of  cooperative  game  theory.  In 
[14],  a  classical  game  theory,  Cournot  gaming  strategy,  is  adopted  to  model  a  coalition 
among  generators.  In  [I  I],  cooperative  gaming  is  implemented  to  perforn-1  negotiation 
with  potential  collusion  partners  and  then  suggests  market  strategies  that  the  generator 
can  adopt. 
2.5  Summary 
The  trading  strategies  currently  used  in  power  trading  systems  have  been  reviewed  in  this 
chapter.  The  approaches  for  building  gaming  strategies  on  different  forms  of  markets 
models  will  systematically  analysed  in  next  chapter.  And  the  advantages  and  drawbacks 
of  current  trading  strategy  research  will  also  be  addressed. Chapter  3  Current  Research  Review  23 
Current  Research  Review 
3.1  Introduction 
In  this  chapter,  the  trading  strategies  published  in  the  literature  are  studied.  Although 
these  have  been  attempted  by  many  in  both  academia  and  industry,  the  aim  of  this  chapter 
is  to  provide  a  more  comprehensive  analysis  on  the  trend  and  direction  of  the 
developments. 
The  main  aim  of  investigating  these  objectives  is  to  identify  methodologies  for  analyzing 
and  modelling  trading  strategies,  since  these  results  will  have  important  market 
implications.  In  recent  years,  some  research  has  been  done  in  building  optimal  trading 
strategies  for  competitive/cooperative  generators  and/or  large  consumers,  and  on 
investigating  the  associated  market  power  in  world  wide  electricity  markets  in  which  the 
gaming  strategies  are  widely  utilized. 
3.2  Developed  Activity  Rules  and  Market  Model 
The  development  of  gaming  trading  strategies  on  NETA  is  based  on  a  mechanism  in 
which  the  power  generators,  and  sometimes  large  consumers  also,  are  required  to  offer 
price  and  quantity  bids  to  a  market  operator.  The  market  operator  then  determines  the 
winning  bid  and  a  market  clearing  price  (MCP)  using  a  simple  merit  order  dispatch 
procedure.  The  current  research  in  this  field  is  focused  on  market  model  and  activity 
rules,  especially,  auction  rules  and  bidding  protocols. 
An  auction  is  an  economically  efficient  mechanism  to  allocate  demand  to  suppliers,  and 
the  formation  of  electricity  markets  in  many  countries  is  based  on  auctions.  Bidding  is  an Chapter  3  Current  Research  Review 
issue  connecting  to  the  auction. 
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Many  auction  methods  exist,  and  can  be  classified  in  many  ways  [25].  Two  main 
categories  differ  according  to  whether  the  auction  is  static  or  dynamic.  In  static  auctions, 
the  bidders  submit  sealed  bids,  while  in  dynamic  auctions  bidders  can  observe  the  bids  of 
others  and  revise  their  own  sequentially.  Static  auctions  can  be  classified  according  to 
discriminating  or  non-discriminating  pricing.  In  the  former  bidders  are  paid  their  offered 
prices  if  they  win.  In  non-discriminating  auctions,  all  winning  bidders  are  paid  a  uniform 
price,  such  as  the  first  losing  bid  or  the  last  winning  bid.  In  cases  of  multiple  sellers  or 
multiple  buyers,  the  non-discriminating  pricing  auction  is  usually  employed  to  encourage 
the  bidders  to  bid  their  marginal  costs  or  benefits. 
Auctions  can  also  be  classified  as  "open"  or  "sealed-bid".  Open  auctions  may  be 
classified  as  English  (ascending  bid)  or  Dutch  (descending  bid).  Scaled-bid  auctions  can 
be  classified  into  "first  price'  and  "second  price'  auctions,  and  both  of  them  are  usually 
referred  to  as  non-discriminating  auctions,  the  only  difference  is  whether  the  uniform 
price  is  set  according  to  the  last  winning  bid  or  the  first  losing  bid.  An  auction  is  called  a 
double  one  when  both  the  sellers  and  buyers  are  required  to  submit  bids. 
To  our  knowledge,  almost  all  operating  electricity  markets  worldwide  employ  the  sealed 
bid  auction  with  uniform  mar  et  price. 
Another  important  factor  related  to  trading  strategies  is  auction  bidding  protocols. 
Depending  on  different  market  designs,  the  energy  bids  may  include  several  price 
components  (multipart  bid)  or  a  single  price  component  (single-part-bid).  In  either  case, Chapter  3  Current  Research  Review  25 
the  energy  bid  include  several  energy  price  segments  depending  on  the  amount  of  energy 
supply  (e.  g.,  a  separate  price  for  each  block  of  energy  from  the  same  unit  or  a  portfolio  of 
units). 
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Figure  3.1:  MultiPart  bid  curves  of  generators 
Various  auction  bidding  protocols  bring  significantly  different  concerns  while  developing 
trading  strategies.  The  research  on  design  and  performance  of  development  trading 
strategies  on  different  bidding  models  in  electricity  markets  are  discussed  below. 
3.2.1  Strategies  on  Multipart  Bidding 
A  multipart  bid,  sometimes  called  a  complex  bid,  may  include  separate  prices  for  ramps, 
start-up  costs,  shut-down  costs,  no-load  operation,  and  energy.  This  kind  of  bid  can 
reflect  the  cost  structure  and  technical  constraints  of  generation  units.  The  market 
clearing  procedure  must  be  based  on  an  optimization  algorithm  that  determines  the 
winning  bids  and  wholesale  prices  taking  into  account  not  only  the  bid  prices,  but  also 
technical  constraints  and  related  economic  information. 
This  approach  leads  to  a  centralization  of  the  unit  commitment  decisions  at  the  market 
operator  Is  level  and  does  not  make  market  power  involved:  bidders  are  required  to  send 
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all  the  relevant  information  and  the  market  operator  makes  optimal  decisions.  This 
approach  can  guarantee  the  technical  feasibility  of  the  resulting  schedule. 
The  unit  commitment  problem  is  non-convex,  and  there  does  not  exist  a  method  that  can 
guarantee  to  converge  to  the  global  optimal  solution  for  large  scale  systems.  This 
an  roach  has  been  widely  because  a  local  optimal  solution  may  not  produce  equitable  r-P 
dispatches  for  all  participants. 
A  well-known  example  of  the  multipart  bid  is  the  Pool  of  England-Wales  electricity 
market,  in  which  a  combined  bid  of  many  items  had  been  required  for  the  next  48  half- 
hours  before  the  NETA  was  introduced. 
The  trading  strategic  problem  for  competitive  power  suppliers  was  addressed  for  the  first 
time  in  [26].  A  conceptual  optimal  bidding  model  and  a  dynamic  programming  based 
ap  roach  was  developed  for  this  market  in  which  each  supplier  is  required  to  bid  a  r,  p 
constant  price  for  each  block  of  generation.  System  demand  variations,  unit  conunitment 
costs,  and  commercial  considerations  such  as  profit  or economic  utility  maximization  and 
expectations  of  competitor  behaviour  were  considered  in  the  model.  In  [27],  an  analytical 
formulation  for  building  the  optimal  gaming  strategy  in  this  type  electricity  market  was 
developed  under  a  very  stringent  assumption  that  the  market  clearing  price  is independent 
of  the  bid  of  any  supplier,  or  in  other  word,  the  market  is  perfectly  competitive.  Under 
this  assumption  the  MCP  can  be  accurately  known  before  the  auction  takes  place.  This 
assumption  seems  not  reasonable  for  the  electricity  market,  which  is  more  akin  to 
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theoretical  development,  it  provides  little  insight  into  the  formulation  of  the  optimal 
bidding  problem  under  nonperfect  competitive  conditions. 
3.2.2  Strategies  on  Single-Part  Bidding 
In  this  scheme,  generators'  strategy  is  only  based  on  independent  prices  for  each  hour, 
and  a  simple  market  clearing  process  based  on  the  intersection  of  supply  and  demand  bid 
curves  is  used  to  determine  the  winning  bids  and  schedules  for  each  hour.  This  approach 
is  intrinsically  decentralized:  the  market  operator  does  not  make  unit  commitment 
decisions.  Hence,  suppliers  need  to  internalize  all  involved  costs  and  physical  constraints 
in  preparing  their  bids  since  this  bidding  structure  does  not  explicitly  account  for 
recovery  of  these  costs. 
This  approach  does  not  guarantee  feasibility.  Therefore,  whenever  a  generation  unit 
presents  significant  technical  constraints,  this  approach  typically  requires  a  mechanism  to 
eventually  introduce  modification  in  the  schedule,  such  as  a  short  term  balancing  market, 
which  is incentive  for  market  participants  to  adopt  strategic  bidding. 
The  single-part  bid  has  been  implemented  in  several  electricity  markets  such  as 
California,  Australia  and  Norway/Sweden.  A  variation  of  the  simple  bid  approach  is 
employed  in  Spain,  in  which  certain  complex  conditions  were  allowed  for  but  were  not 
used  in  the  bid  sorting  itself  Most  of  the  publications  discussed  next  aim  at  developing 
bidding  strategies  for  this  kind  of  markets. 
In  [28],  a  simple  suboptimal  strategic  bidding  strategy  was  proposed  for  the  situation 
when  two  buyers  (utilities)  are  competing  for  a  single  block  of  energy,  and  the Chapter  3  Current  Research  Review  28 
competitor's  cost  function  are  modeled  with  probability  density  functions.  This  method 
cannot  be  extended  to  the  general  case  with  multiple  suppliers  and/or  multiple  buyers.  In 
[29],  a  dynamic  model  of  strategic  bidding  for  the  situation  with  three  power  suppliers 
was  proposed  by  utilizing  the  historical  and  current  market  clearing  prices.  This  model  is 
heuristic  in  principle,  and  is  not  applicable  to  the  general  case  with  more  than  three 
suppliers.  In  [30],  a  linear  supply  function  model  was  presented  to  investigate  strategic 
bidding  behaviour,  and  to  illustrate  some  of  the  ways  market  power  can  be  exercised.  A 
similar  linear  supply  function  model  was  employed  in  [31]  to  build  optimal  trading 
strategies  for  competitive  suppliers,  and  the  rival  suppliers'  bidding  behaviours  are 
represented  as  discrete  probability  distributions.  Moreover,  a  payment  rule  named 
4multiple-commodity  second  price  auction'  is  compared  with  the  popular  uniform  price 
rule,  and  it  is  shown  by  simulation  results  that  the  suppliers  have  a  larger  incentive  to  bid 
at  marginal  costs  if  the  former  rule  rather  than  the  latter  one  is  utilized.  In  [12],  the 
bidding  problem  over  a  planned  horizon  is  represented  as  a  multiple  stage  probabilistic 
decision-making  problem,  and  a  discrete-state  and  discrete-time  type  Markov  Decision 
Process  (MDP)  was  applied  to  calculate  a  supplier's  bidding  decisions,  in  which  a 
competitor  is  modeled  by  its  discrete  bidding  options  associated  with  a  corresponding 
probability.  In  [32],  the  authors  argue  that  since  the  electricity  market  is  relatively  new 
and  there  is  not  sufficient  data,  it  may  not  be  realistic  to  calculate  some  probabilities  such 
as  the  probability  of  rivals'  bidding  option  and  heuristic  methods  may  be  an  alternative. 
A  probabilistic/fuzzy  heuristic  inference  system  based  on  observable  evidences  and  the 
subjective  probabilities  is  then  proposed  as  a  tool  for  this  purpose.  In  [33],  a  trading 
bidding  strategy  for  suppliers  in  the  uniform  price  clearing  auction  is  developed  by Chapter  3  Current  Research  Review  29 
estimating  the  probability  of  winning  below  and  on  the  margin,  and  a  simple  bidding 
model  is  then  obtained  under  some  simplified  assumptions.  The  result  indicates  that 
suppliers  have  incentive  to  mark  up  their  bids  above  their  costs.  In  [34],  intelligent 
trading  agents,  such  as  genetic  algorithm,  genetic  programming  and  finite  state  automata, 
are  utilized  for  developing  adaptive  and  evolutionary  bidding  strategies. 
Up  to  now,  research  work  on  strategic  bidding  has  been  concerned  with  one-period 
auctions,  only  little  has  been  done  on  multiple-period  auction  [35]  [36]  [37].  In  [35],  this 
problem  was  described  as  a  two-level  optimization  procedure.  At  the  top  level  a 
centralized  economic  dispatch  is  employed  to  determine  the  market  clearing  price,  the 
production  and  demand  levels  of  all  generators  and  consumers,  and  at  the  lower  level  a 
self-unit  commitment  based  on  a  parametric  dynamic  programming  with  an  embedded 
variable  bidding  parameter  is  used  by  each  supplier  to  determine  a  profitable  bid.  An 
implicit  assumption  is  that  each  supplier  has  complete  information  about  rivals  so  that  a 
centralized  economic  dispatch  can  be  used  to  design  the  bidding  strategy,  and  certainly 
this  assumption  is  not  reasonable.  In  [36],  a  Lagrangian  relaxation  based  method  is 
presented  for  daily  bidding  and  self-scheduling  decision  from  the  viewpoint  of  a  utility 
which  can  bid  part  of  its  energy  to  the  market  and  self-schedule  the  rest,  as  is  the  case  in 
New  England.  Bids  are  represented  as  quadratic  functions  of  power  supply  levels,  and  the 
parameters  in  rivals'  bids  are  assumed  to  be  available  as  discrete  distributions.  In  [37],  a 
systematic  approach  is  presented  for  developing  bidding  strategies  for  power  suppliers 
participating  in  the  California-type  day-ahead  energy  market.  In  this  market,  a  series  of 
24  auctions  are  conducted  simultaneously  and  separately,  one  for  each  hour.  A  supplier 
first  builds  optimal  bidding  strategies  for  each  of  the  24  hours,  if  the  unit  cannot  be Chapter  3  Current  Research  Review  30 
dispatched  in  some  hours,  a  self  unit  commitment  algorithm  is  then  employed  to  account 
for  operating  constraints  and  startup  and  shutdown  costs  to  develop  an  overall  bidding 
strategy  in  the  day-ahead  market. 
Since  a  uniform  price  over  the  whole  network  cannot  provide  economic  signals  for  the 
suppliers  and  consumers,  much  research  work  on  nodal  pricing  has  been  carried  out 
which  is  the  most  complicated  but  accurate  pricing  method  derived  from  the  marginal 
cost  theory.  This  method  determines  prices  for  power  at  each  bus  of  the  system, 
accounting  for  all  costs  and  transmission  constraints.  The  nodal  prices  are  typically 
calculated  as  dual  variables  or  LaGrange  multipliers  of  an  optimal  power  flow  (OPF) 
calculation.  A  major  advantage  of  this  method  is  that  the  right  operational  pricing  signals 
are  revealed.  Although  there  is  not  a  fully  operative  example  of  nodal  pricing  in  the 
industry,  some  research  work  has  been  done  to  address  the  potential  strategic  behaviours 
of  power  suppliers  by  intentionally  causing  congestion  and  exploiting  arbitrage 
opportunities  of  nodal  price  differences  [25]. 
3.2.3  Strategy  on  Iterative  Bidding 
In  [38],  an  iterative  bidding  scheme  is  suggested  in  which  generators  and  consumers  are 
permitted  to  modify  their  bids,  according  to  several  rules,  to  make  sure  that  their  costs  are 
appropriately  allocated  and  their  technical  constraints  respected.  This  method  may  have 
heavy  computational  burden  and  could  pose  practical  problems.  Ref  [39]  first  argues  that 
a  single  bid  may  not  be  the  best  mechanism  to  ensure  the  market  is  driven  to  an  efficient 
operating  condition,  and  then  presents  an  asynchronous  iterative  strategic  scheme  in 
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following  the  first-round  of  market  clearing,  suppliers  are  allowed  to  modify  their  bids 
once  more  if  they  so  desire.  The  optimal  trading  bidding  problem  is  addressed  based  on 
this  bidding  scheme,  and  a  radial  basis  function  neural  network  has  been  employed  for 
this  purpose.  Ref  [35]  also  addressed  the  bidding  strategy  problem  under  a  suggested 
iterative  bidding  scheme  in  which  the  auction  proceeds  iteratively  and  closes  when  a 
physical  feasible  dispatch  and  a  stable  market  clearing  price  is  obtained. 
3.2.4  Demand  Side  Strategies 
In  some  electricity  markets  such  as  NETA,  California,  New  Zealand  and  Spain,  demand 
side  bidding  is  permitted  for  large  consumers  to  react  to  electricity  pricing.  In  this  case 
the  maximization  of  social  welfare  approach  should  be  employed  for  bid  clearing,  and  the 
minimum  price  approach  employed  in  those  markets  only  with  supply  side  bidding  is  no 
longer  fair  to  the  sellers.  This  is  because  in  this  case  both  the  sellers  and  buyers  are 
bidders,  and  the  buyers  are  no  longer  passive.  If  the  demand  side  bidding  is  not  permitted, 
the  minimum  price  approach  should  be  employed  because  in  this  case  the  buyers  are 
passive  and  their  benefits  should  be  protected  by  regulations. 
Up  to  now,  research  work  on  trading  strategies  is  concentrated  on  the  supply  side,  quite 
little  attention  has  been  imposed  on  demand  side.  In  [40],  the  potential  impacts  of  the 
demanding  side  trading  strategies  on  market  prices  are  analyzed  and  several  somewhat 
negative  remarks  on  the  effects  of  the  demand  side  bidding  are  made.  In  [41],  a  two-level 
optimization  procedure  for  building  trading  strategies  was  presented  in  which  market 
participants  try  to  maximize  their  profits  under  some  constraints.  An  independent  system 
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optimal  power  flow  (OPF)  program  with  an  objective  of  maximizing  social  welfare.  It  is 
assumed  that  each  participant  has  an  estimated  value  for  the  bid  from  each  of  the  other 
participants.  In  [42],  the  optimal  trading  strategies  of  generators  and  large  consumers  are 
addressed  simultaneously  utilizing  linear  bidding  functions,  and  the  behaviours  of  rival 
competitors  are  represented  as  continuous  probability  distributions.  A  Monte  Carlo based 
method  is  developed  to  find  the  optimal  bidding  strategies  and  the  associated  market 
power  is  evaluated.  It  is  shown  that  the  market  power  can  be  mitigated  through 
introduction  of  the  demand  side  bidding. 
3.2.5  Trading  Strategies  in  Ancillary  Service  Market 
Similar  to  energy  markets,  it  has  been  recognized  that  most  of  the  generation  based 
ancillary  services  such  as  spinning  reserves  and  AGC  provision  can  be  procured  through 
auction  based  competitive  markets.  In  some  electricity  markets  such  as  NETA  and  Spain, 
some  ancillary  services  markets  such  as  AGC  provision  have  been  in  operation  for  a 
period. 
Serious  strategic  behaviour  by  power  suppliers  has  been  observed  at  the  initial  operation 
stages  of  the  NETA  ancillary  services  markets.  It  has  been  noted  in  [43]  that  these 
markets  did  not  operate  in  a  manner  consistent  with  workable  competition  and  prices  do 
not  fluctuate  in  a  manner  that  reflects  changes  in  the  underlying  marginal  costs  of 
supplying  these  products.  These  markets  have  exhibited  extreme  price  volatility,  even 
during  periods  when  demand  was  unchanged  for  long  periods  of  time.  The  conditions  are 
not  yet  in  place  to  rely  on  these  markets  to  set  efficient,  cost-reflective  prices.  Prices  for 
lower  quality  services  such  as  replacement  reserve  routinely  exceed  the  prices  for  higher Chapter  3  Current  Research  Review  33 
quality  services  such  as  regulation.  Often  ancillary  services  capacity  prices  exceed  the 
energy  market  price  for  the  same  hour.  For  example,  on  July  9,1998  the  prices  in  the 
replacement  reserve  market  was  as  high  as  $9999/MW  in  Californian  ancillary  services 
markets.  Since  then  a  price  cap  was  introduced  to  limit  this  strategic  bidding  behaviour. 
Some  of  the  main  factors  that  lead  to  these  problems  are  structural  deficiencies,  irrational 
procurement  method  for  ancillary  services,  and  perverse  incentives  created  by  reliability 
must-run  contracts.  A  rational  buyer  algorithms  [44]  has  been  utilized  for  ancillary 
services  procurement  since  August  18,1999  as  a  partial  solution  to  these  problems. 
3.3  Discussions 
Current  research  results  have  gain  significant  insights  into  overall  aspects  of  most 
existing  power  market  trading  systems  in  the  world,  especially  the  mode  of  the  California 
power  market.  Most  linear  and  static  strategy  development  problems  have  been 
successfully  solve  out  by  these  research  efforts.  Besides,  solely  using  either  of 
competitive  game  strategy  or  cooperative  game  strategy  has  been  able  to  the  traditional 
game  theory 
While  a  lot  of  work  has  been  done,  quite  limited  attention  has  been  paid  to  the  NETA 
market  research.  [13]  analyses  the  economic  dispatch  for  the  NETA  balancing 
mechanism.  A  load  management  technology  is  developed  in  [14].  [15]  presents  risk 
assessment  on  local  demand  forecast  uncertainty.  The  wind  generation  trading  in  NETA 
short-terrn  energy  markets  is  carried  out  in  [16].  There  exists  a  lack  of  attempt  to  model 
this  trading  market  mechanism  in  current  research.  Furthermore  the  other  major  work  that Chapter  3  Current  Research  Review  34 
has  so  far  not  been  undertaken  by  academia  and  industry  is  to  study  the  possibility  and 
consequence  of  gaming  behaviours  and  market  power  on  NETA. 
Furthennore,  the  effort  on  studying  trading  strategic  behaviours  is  to  find  suitable 
solutions  to  solve  the  problems  that  have  happened  and  would  happen  in  power 
industries.  However  current  strategies  research  is  inadequate  in  some  aspects  described  as 
below. 
(1)  Game  theory  has  been  widely  utilized  analyzing  market  power  and  market 
participants'  gaming  behaviours.  However  there  are  deficiencies  existing.  For 
example,  Nash  Equilibrium,  which  is  the  most  adopted  Game  theory  to  simulate 
participants'  strategies,  assumes  that  the  rules  of  the  game,  the  strategies  available  to 
the  players,  and  the  payoffs  are  common  knowledge,  which  does  not  reflect  the  real 
cases  in  power  markets.  Also,  some  research  model  which  employ  Coumot  game 
theory  to  stimulate  oligopoly  game,  only  involves  two  firms  deciding  how  much  to 
produce  without  knowing  the  output  decision  of  the  other,  turns  into  a  simplified 
duopoly  game  that  are  not  applicable  to  the  general  cases  with  more  than  two  or 
three  trading  participants.  More  crucially,  all  published  research  contributions  have 
only  solely  used  either  noncooperative  or  cooperative  game  theory  to  model  and 
develop  market  player's  gaming  strategies.  It  is  not  capable  of  analyzing  the  gaming 
behaviours  practiced  in  power  market,  because  market  players  have  been  using  mix 
of  both  to  manipulate  the  market  prices  to  maximize  their  profits,  especially  the 
cooperative  game,  which  is  getting  more  practical  to  study  the  real  problems  caused Chapter  3  Current  Research  Review  35 
be  market  power  and  coalition  game  practiced  by  electricity  suppliers  in  global 
electricity  market. 
(2)  Although  a  vast  amount  of  contributions  has  been  done  by  academia,  there  are  a  few 
published  research  results  of  analysis  on  NETA,  which  is  one  of  blueprint 
deregulated  electricity  trading  arrangements  in  the  world.  Principally,  the  research  on 
modelling  this  market  structure  and  trading  strategies  are  still  in  their  infancy.  For 
instance,  the  process  of  how  power  generators  attempt  to  employ  market  power  and 
to  maintain  strategic  gaming  behaviours  to  maximize  profits  has  never  been 
addressed.  And  the  possibility  of  forming  cooperation  agreement  among  generation 
companies  and  consequence  of  such  actions  were  unknown  for  industry.  This 
problem  has  become  acute  since  the  prices  of  global  energy  products  have  been 
soaring. 
(3)  Many  real  world  problems  generally  do  not  have  accurate  measurement  of  its 
variables.  Many  published  electricity  bidding  strategies  are  represented  as  discrete 
quantities  at  which  in  realistic  situations,  bidding  strategies  can  be  continuous.  Some 
models  are  calculus-based  that  require  derivatives  information  to  find  out 
equilibrium;  it  is  easy  to  be  trapped  on  local  peaks. 
Considering  the  problems  and  lack  of  current  research  stated  above,  it  is  necessary  and 
important  to  go  further  of  developing  more  practical  and  complete  game  theory  strategies 
and  analysing  the  influence  of  gaming  strategies  on  NETA  market.  Further,  the  extra- 
numerical  search  technique  should  also  be  taken  into  account  to  solve  the  search,  learning 
and  optimization  problems. Chapter  4  Development  of  Game  Theory  Based  Trading  Strategy  and  Decision  36 
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4  Development  of  Game  Theory  Based  Trading  Strategy 
and  Decision  Making  Systems 
4.1  Introduction 
Based  on  the  analysis  of  the  previous  chapters,  the  main  purpose  of  this  chapter  is  to 
demonstrate  the  trading  strategy  modelling  of  development  of  competition  between  power 
generation  companies  and  supply  companies  through  hybrid  methods  of  Game  Theory  and 
Genetic  Algorithms  on  NETA.  A  set  of  trading  strategies  are  developed  to  simulate 
market  players'  behaviors  and  to  discover  the  interaction  between  the  market  environment 
and  the  market  player's  payoff.  The  essential  feature  of  the  stretegy  design  and 
development  is based  on  the  market  structure  of  NETA  [3],  [5],  [17],  [181,  [19]  and  [58]. 
4.2  Generator  Cooperative  Trading  Strategy  Modelling 
4.2.1  Introduction 
The  fundamental  fact  on  NETA  is  that  high  level  of  over-capacity  exsits  in  the  market,  the 
wholesale  prices  have  been  gradually  falling  down  and  some  major  British  generation 
companies,  like  British  Energy,  were  forced  to  edge  of  bankcuptcy.  The  central  object 
behind  these  generators'  strategic  trading  is  to  manipulate  the  market  prices  through 
reaching  coalition  among  main  generators  under  NETA,  in  order  to  transform  the 
marketplace  into  a  profitable  situation,  idealy  given  oligopoly  in  some  markets  of  NETA 
for  some  periods.  Along  with  this  challenge,  electricity  suppliers  are  forced  to  adjust  their 
trading  methodology  keeping  their  profits. 
Such  action  in  which  major  market  players  bind  together  to  control  market  and  manipulate 
the  market  prices  has  been  applied  to  other  kinds  of  commodity  markets.  For  instance, Chapter  4  Development  of  Game  Theory  Based  Trading  Strategy  and  Decision  37 
Making  Systems 
or  a  rise  since  2003,  OPEC  producers  have  increased  their  output  10  percent  to  make  up  f 
in  global  oil  demand,  however  the  oil  price  has  still  been  pushing  up  over  the  last  two 
years.  It  is  believed  that  it  is  unlikely  that  either  lifting  the  group's  quota  or  indicating  that 
it  is  ready  to  produce  more  oil  will  bring  much  new  supply  to  the  market,  because  the 
bottleneck  in  energy  supplies  comes  from  the  inability  of  refiners  to  process  enough  oil  to 
meet  demand,  not  from  a  shortage  of  crude  oil.  Analysis  results  [59]  present  that  some 
major  oil  companies,  like  Royal  DutchShell,  Chevron,  have  been  making  up  constraint  on 
the  downstream  of  this  industry  -  to  withhold  their  refining  capacity  to  cause  the  shortfall 
in  energy  markets. 
Coalition  is  a  form  of  cooperative  gaming  strategy  among  the  members  in  subgroups  while 
non-cooperative  gaming  may  still  apply  among  the  subgroups.  It  is  simply  a  subset  of  N 
that  is  allowed  to  make  a  binding  agreement.  As  pointed  out  by  Heap  [60],  "In  the  N- 
person  case,  ... 
if  a  coalition  is  to  form  and  remain  for  some  time,  the  different  members  of 
the  coalition  must  reach  some  sort  of  equilibrium  or  stability.  It  is  this  idea  of  stability  that 
must  be  analyzed  in  any  meaningful  theory.  "  In  this  model,  the  equilibrium  (or  stability)  in 
a  coalition  is  defined  as  follows:  each  and  every  member's  profit  in  a  coalition  is  greater 
than  the  profit  it  can  obtain  from  a  non-cooperative  game  among  all  of  the  producers.  This 
means  that  the  individual  profits  of  the  n  producers  in  a  completely  non-cooperative  game 
must  be  calculated  first.  The  individual  profits  from  any  non-cooperative  game  between  or 
among  the  coalition  subgroups  are  then  calculated  and  compared  with  the  profits  obtained 
from  the  complete  non-cooperative  game.  If  no  individual  profit  falls  short  in  the  latter 
case,  the  equilibriums  within  the  subgroups  can  be  achieved  on  condition  that  an 
equilibrium  is  also  achieved  among  the  subgroups.  Note  that  the  case  of  complete 
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from  our  analysis.  This  is  why  n  is  set  to  be  no  less  than  3;  the  case  with  N=2  has  only 
one  coalition  that  is  also  collusion. 
The  coalition  formation  is  a  process  of  forming  a  profitable  partnership  among  some  main 
generators.  The  objective  of  these  generation  companies  is  to  artificially  restricts  physical 
power  supply  volumes  during  some  specific  periods,  i.  e.  in  Christmas  or  Easter,  then  lead 
the  whole  marketplace  to  an  oligopoly  situation  then  subsequently  make  the  market  prices 
driven  up. 
It  is  assumed  that  participants  form  a  coalition  either  by  being  the  founder  or  by  joining 
one  at  a  time  with  a  coalition  that  already  exists.  There  are  some  uncertainties  involved 
with  this  strategy  that  need  be  solved  by  the  partnership  members: 
(1)  As  the  NETA  consists  of  two  separate  markets,  i.  e.  PX  and  BM,  how  do  cooperative 
strategy  players  arrange  output  volumes  between  these  two  markets  and  make  the 
most  profits  through  this  strategy? 
(2)  For  each  generator,  how  much  are  the  optimal  volume  of  withheld  output  capacity  and 
selling  prices? 
(3)  How  do  coalition  agreement  members  keep  cooperative  generators  loyally  carrying 
out  the  agreement? 
(4)  Is  it  likely  that  there  exists  equilibrium  that  collusive  generators  can  make  best  profits 
meanwhile  the  markets  trading  can  be  kept  in  balance,  e.  g.,  may  not  lead  to  endless 
competition  or  collapse? 
Currently  in  studying  the  gaming  trading  strategy  used  in  electricity  trading,  cooperative 
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because  of  the  extensice  application  of  traditional  game  theories,  Nash  and  Cournot  game 
theories,  which  are  applicable  to  noncoperatIve  strategy.  The  problems  in  real  power 
market  call  for  more  practical  solutions.  Furthermore  present  research  examples  examined 
by  academia  have  never  been  involved  with  the  constraint  among  binding  agreement 
members,  which  may  be  the  most  difficult  and  intereting  point  that  collusive  energy  firms 
are  concemed  about. 
4.2.2  Strategy  Combination  of  Generator  Gaming  Strategies 
Based  on  the  introduction  outlined  in  Chapter  2,  the  imbalance  penalties  in  BM  are  much 
higher  than  market  clearing  prices  in  wholesale  market  PX  where  most  of  power  volumes 
are  traded.  As  effect  of  maintaining  this  stragety  at  which  gaming  generators  make  the 
supply/demand  unbalanced  on  this  market,  power  suppliers  are  expected  to  be  driven  to 
BM  and  purchase  the  shortfall  with  imbalance  charges. 
The  cooperative  power  generators'  strategy  combination  can  be  described  by  a  small 
number  of  paths  together  with  rules  stating  when  to  switch  from  one  paht  to  another.  The 
first  path,  is  followed  at  the  beginning  and  continues  to  be  followed  until  a  deviation  from 
it  occurs.  In  this  model,  the  initial  step  to  implement  this  gaming  strategy  is  that  a  certain 
number  of  collusive  generators  withhold  a  portion  of  their  available  capacities  to  change 
the  PX  market  into  an  oligopoly  situation.  Withholding  can  be  physical  (bid  only  a  portion 
of  one's  capacity)  or  economic  (bid  a  portion  at  a  very  high  price).  Theoretically  which 
type  of  withholding  a  generator  should  choose  depends  on  the  market  structure.  In  NETA 
circumstance,  all  markets  (forwards  and  futures  markets,  short-term  Power  Exchange  and 
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withholding  is  employed  to  make  the  maximal  profit  by  gaming  generators.  The  details  are 
descnbed  as  below. 
The  basic  content  of  this  cooperative  strategy  is  presented  below: 
(1)  Each  member  of  the  agreement  withholds  a  portion  of  its  total  capacity,  as  variable  X, 
expressed  as  a  percentage  of  its  total  generation  capacity.  The  range  of  X  is  assumed  to 
be  from  10%  to  25%.  Then  the  remaining  volume  Q,, 
na,, 
'.  (I-X),  is  traded  into  the  PX, 
where  Q,,,, 
al 
is  generator  i's  maximal  generation  capacity. 
(2)  After  the  suppliers  are  driven  to  BM  and  have  to  submit  bids  for  getting  extra  supply 
with  paying  SBP,  the  gaming  generators  need  to  provide  offers  to  BM  to  meet  the 
shortfall  demand  and  determine  how  much  volume  should  be  taken  from  the  withheld 
volumeQsmaxi  .X  to  trade  in  BM.  Given  the  part  taken  from(?  smaxi  *  X'SY,  expressed 
as  a  percentage  from  0-  100%. 
(3)  The  last  part  of  the  cooperative  strategies  is  to  optimise  the  trading  on  forward 
markets.  Because  the  state  of  suppliers  is  no  longer  superior  when  the  market  is  under 
an  oligopolistic  condition,  generators  can  improve  their  selling  curves  to  drive  up  the 
market  prices  as  high  as  the  suppliers  could  accept  under  PX. 
Each  generator  is  characterized  by  a  set  of  portfolio  parameters: 
(1)  S  elf-electri  city  generation  parameters.  Each  agreement  participant  first  derives  its 
local  information,  for  example,  the  maximal  generation  capacityQsrriaxl  marginal  cost 
Pn,, 
ý'  ,  and  so  on,  then  detennines  the  profit  when  acting  alone.  This  profit  is  called  the 
player's  self-value.  This  set  of  such  local  information  depends  on  the  player's 
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Once  each  participant  has  the  requested  information  from  all  other  participants  in  the 
environment,  the  local  calculation  phase  begins.  Here,  each  participant  calculates  the 
strategic  variables  and  parameters. 
(2)  Strategic  variables:  X  being  generator  i's  portion  parameter  on  PX,  Pspxl  being  the 
price  that  generator  i  wants  to  sell  on  PX,  Qspxl  being  the  quantity  that  generator  1 
wants  to  sell  on  PX,  portfolio  instrument  1  expressed  as  a  percentage  of  its  total 
generation  capacity,  BM  Offer  price  Pol  and  Qs,,  ml  being  the  quantity  generator  i 
wants  to  sell  at  BM.  Their  relationship  is  fonnulated  as: 
Qsmaxl  * 
1=  (? 
SPX1+QSBM1 
(3)  Collusion  parameters:  PTR,  T,  Q, 
Onp  and  QcOOp. 
There  are  two  types  of  remaining  paths  being  used  by  cooperative  generators  in  the  game. 
One  follows  a  strategy  called  "opportunistic  collusion"  whereby  generators  withhold 
capacity  from  the  market  only  when  they  perceive  an  "opportunity"  to  raise  profits  by 
doing  so  exists.  Opportunistic  collusion  might  result  in  a  generator  setting  aside  a  portion 
of  their  capacity  and  deciding  for  each  hour  whether  or  not  to  offer  that  capacity  to  the 
market  depending  on  expectations  of  raising  profits.  This  is  different  from  the  other  type, 
suggesting  that  generators  should  "always"  withhold  a  portion  in  anticipation  of  an 
agreement.  The  second  kind  is  named  "loyal  cooperator". 
For  making  the  agreement  more  efficient,  a  more  extreme  management-enforcement  is 
utilized  to  constrain  the  agreement  members.  In  this  application,  a  well-known  technique 
of  cooperative  game  strategy,  "trigger  price  strategies"  [61],  which  was  created  and  used  to 
constrain  "Coffee  Cartel"  that  dominated  80  percent  of  global  coffee  market  share  in Chapter  4  Development  of  Game  Theory  Based  Trading  Strategy  and  Decision  42 
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1970s,  is  employed  to  enhance  this  agreement  by  "loyal  cooperator".  In  a  trigger  price 
strategy,  "loyal  cooperators"  make  inferences  about  any  members  in  this  agreement  from 
the  observation  of  market  price  PpX.  If  market  price  remains  above  some  critical  value  - 
the  trigger  value  -  then  these  generators  will  infer  no  cheating  on  the  collusive  agreement 
and  will  maintain  a  cooperative  output  level.  If  the  price  falls  below  the  trigger,  then  some 
punishment  must  be  imposed  on  the  cheater(s). 
Trigger  price  strategies  depend  on  four  parameters,  PTR,  T  QcOmp  and  Q, 
O,,  P,  where  PTR  is 
the  trigger  price,  T  is  the  number  of  time  periods  the  punishment  will  last,  Q, 
OmP 
is  the 
competitive  output,  given  100%  generation  volume  Q, 
ma, 
l  in  this  model,  and  Qc,,. 
p 
is  the 
cooperative  output  given  Q,.,,,  '  .  (I  -X). 
Th  trigger  price  strategy  works  as  follows: 
Each  trading  round  is  designatedas  either  cooperative  or  competitive.  In  a  competitive 
round,  a  menber  of  the  "loyal  cooperator"  produces  an  output  level  Q,,, 
np,  where 
Qcomp=Qsmax1,  and  in  a  cooperative  round,  it  produces  an  output  level  Q, 
00P. 
In  initial  rounds, 
both  of  the  "opportunistic  generator"  and  "loyal  cooperator"  cooperate.  After  that,  the 
"loyal  cooperators"  continue  to  cooperate  as  long  as  there  is  evidence  that  the  other 
member  of  the  agreement  is  cooperating.  However  the  "opportunistic  generator"  will 
decide  for  each  round  whether  or  not  to  cooperate  depending  on  expectations  of  raising 
profits  by  doing  so.  With  the  trigger  price  strategy,  the  evidence  that  the  other  member  is 
cheating  consists  of  a  "suspiciously  low"  market  price,  PTR.  So  if  the  market  price,  PpX, 
fell  below  the  trigger  price,  PTR,  the  next  T-I  years  are  competitive  and  year  t+T  is 
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The  trigger  price  strategy  described  above  is  less  extreme  than  traditional  grim  strategy. 
Unlike  grim  strategy,  the  punishment  is  of  limited  rounds.  After  a  fixed  period  of  time  has 
elapsed,  the  players  begin  cooperating  again  instead  of  the  punishment  lasting  forever. 
4.3  Generator  Noncooperative  Strategy  Modelling 
The  generators  who  do  not  join  the  collusion  independently  sell  their  individual  output 
volume  on  the  NETA  markets.  The  relationship  among  these  individual  market 
participants  and  those  gaming  generators  is  completely  non-cooperative.  There  are  two 
situations  existing  that  these  non-cooperative  generators  need  to  face.  Firstly,  according  to 
the  initial  situation  on  NETA  that  there  is  high  level  of  over-capacity  emitting  in  the 
market,  the  state  of  such  generators  is  inferior  to  suppliers  because  the  latter  have  enough 
choices  to  select  generators  with  low  selling  prices  to  make  contracts,  and  hence  all 
suppliers'  demand  is  theoretically  satisfied.  The  contracted  prices,  as  forward  markets 
prices,  could  be  as  low  as  what  generators  could  accept.  Consequently,  generators  can  only 
sell  out  parts  of  their  total  volumes  at  PpX  level.  Secondly,  because  some  major  generators 
are  using  gaming  strategies  in  manipulating  the  trading,  the  market  circumstance  might  be 
driven  to  oligopoly  situation.  The  non-cooperative  generators  would  adjust  their  strategies. 
4.4  Suppliers  Combined  Strategy 
As  introduced  earlier,  the  dual  cash  out  prices  of  BM  are  intended  to  discourage  market 
participants  from  being  out  of  balance  because  the  penalty  for  contracting  at  less  than 
actual  demand  can  be  extremely  high.  The  main  concens  of  the  suppliers  focus  on  two 
main  issues:  demand  prediction  capabilities  and  contract  cover  (how  much  of  there 
expected  demand  they  want  to  buy  in  the  PX).  The  first  is  beyond  the  covery  of  this Chapter  4  Development  of  Game  Theory  Based  Trading  Strategy  and  Decision  44 
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research.  Therefore  the  study  here  is  to  discover  how  suppliers  respond  to  NETA 
imbalance  prices  by  over-contracting  to  reduce  exposure  to  SBP  [58].  The  cost  of  over- 
contracting  can  be  viewed  as  an  insurance  premium  that  reduces  exposure  to  the 
potentially  high  risks  of  being  short. 
Each  supplier's  objective  is  to  optimize  its  contract  position,  as  well  as  trading  prices,  to 
minimize  the  cost  of  contracting  in  order  to  maximize  total  daily  profits.  The  strategy  of 
each  supplierj,  is  characterized  as  following  [62]: 
48 
cL  -Pxpr.  Qr  D 
r 
(4.2) 
where  C..,,  is  the  marginal  revenue  of  supplierj,  r  is  the  settlement  period  number,  PXP  is 
the  PX  clearing  price  and  Q,  1  is  the  actual  demand  at  settlement  period  r: 
48 
Cs  =I  (pXpr.  Qcr  -  Max[O,  (?  cr-  QD  r].  SSpr  +  Max[  0,  QD  r-  Qcr]  .  SBpr)  (4.3) 
r 
where  Cc.,,  is  the  contracted  revenue  of  supplier  j,  Qý  is  the  contracted  volume  at 
settlement  period  r  on  PX. 
A  percentage  premium  for  supplier's  strategy  can  be  defined  as  (Cs/  C,  )  .  100;  the  lower 
the  premium  the  more  efficient  the  strategy. 
4.5  Strategy  Development 
In  order  to  find  out  the  best  solutions,  both  sides  of  the  trading  need  to  constantly  improve 
and  optimize  their  adopted  strategies  through  varied  tools  during  the  trading  procedure. Chapter  4  Development  of  Game  Theory  Based  Trading  Strategy  and  Decision  45 
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On  the  selling  side  of  this  marketplace,  cooperative  generators  have  many  strategic 
parameters,  i.  e.  5 
Pspxiý  QSpxi,  1,  X  POiý  QSBMi.  which  need  to  be  optimaized.  Whereas  non- 
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cooperative  generators  face  a  dilemma:  on  one  hand,  they  need  to  offer  selling  prices 
higher  than  individual  marginal  cost  P 
..  cl 
to  cover  the  production  cost;  on  the  other  hand, 
they  have  to  make  their  selling  prices  appropriately  low  to  win  contracts.  On  the  other  side 
of  this  competition,  supply  companies  also  face  the  evaluation  and  optimization  problems 
expressed  in  equations  (4.2)  and  (4.3). 
The  major  task  here  is  to  model  generators  and  suppliers  as  decision-making  participants. 
Many  performancec  and  problems  in  the  power  market  trading  strategy  developernent  do 
not  have  accurate  measurement  of  their  varibles.  Pure  maths  is  not  enought  here.  Many 
incommensurable  and  competing  objectives  require  to  met  before  any  solution  is 
considered  adequate.  By  the  nature  of  Genetic  algorithms,  it  can  handle  this  inaccuracy 
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Figure  4.2:  Flowchart  of  "loyal  generators"  gaming  strategy 
problems.  Strategic  variables  and  parameters  of  market  players  are  mapped  into  GA 
chromosomes.  Each  auction  round  represents  a  generation.  The  GA  population  is  divided 
into  sellers  and  buyers.  Infonnation  is  exchanged  solely  within  each  type  of  trader.  There 
is  no  information  exchange  between  buyers  and  sellers  other  than  the  amount  of  profit  they 
make.  The  fitness  of  each  trader  is  proportional  to  the  profit  made  in  the  auction  round  and 
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I  ive  anses,  the  next  step  is  to  preferentially  select  a  subset  of  that  should  survi 
into  the  next  generation.  These  genetic  operators  introduced  in  Chapter  3  are  perfonned  on 
the  populations. 
Tournament  selection  is  employed  in  this  research.  This  is  based  on  grouped  competition. 
Here  a  population  is  divided  into  subgroups  or  members  with  the  best  fitness  among  the 
subgroups  get  selected.  The  subgroups  could  be  any  size,  it  is  set  as  three  in  this  model. 
The  tournament  is  repeatedly  held  in  which  N  individuals  are  selected  from  the  current 
population  and  the  fittest  individual  is  copied  into  the  inteirmediate  population  (this  may  be 
with  or  without  replacement).  The  uniform  crossover  method  is  employed  in  this  research, 
in  which  offspring  individuals  are  created  from  a  ramdomly  genereted  uniform  bit  mask. 
An  elitism  scheme  is  also  implemented.  The  elitism  shceme  retains  the  top  perforining 
individuals  forrn  each  population,  copies  them  to  the  new  population.  The  rest  fo  the 
population  is  filled  with  individuals  generated  by  the  crossover  and  mutation  as  described 
above.  The  percentage  of  top  perforn-ling  individuals  to  be  retained  is  set  at  the  beginning 
of  the  auction  run.  The  elite  is  not  mutated. 
Given  gaming  generators  are  concerned  about  the  expected  payoff  in  the  long  run  rather 
than  the  pay-off  in  a  particular  round  of  auction,  the  average  of  6  generations  (6  trading 
rounds)  fitness  is  utilized  as  one  fitness. Chapter  5  Model  Simulation  and  Validation  Experiments  48 
5.  Model  Simulation  and  Validation  Experiments 
5.1  NETA  Trading  Mechanism  Modelling 
The  NETA  trading  mechanism  is  simulated  in  this  Chapter.  The  motivation  behind 
developing  this  market  model  is  to  to  model  the  dynamic  and  decision  making 
behaviour  of  the  LTK  electricity  trading  system,  and  to  discover  the  impact  of  gaming 
trading  strategies  on  the  NETA.  Although  extensive  effort  has  been  made  to  simulate 
power  trading  mechanisms  with  their  performance  and  player's  strategies,  the 
traditional  modelling  techniques,  which  solely  apply  noncooperative  game  theory 
and/or  traditional  optimization  methodologies,  have  been  not  able  to  conduct  the 
study  on  existence  of  gaming  strategies  and  market  power  practiced  in  global 
electricity  markets.  It  is  understood  that  traditional  mathematical  methods  are  not 
suitable  to  demonstrate  the  decision-making  procedure,  especially  search  the  optimal 
solutions.  Therefore  Evolutionary  Algorithms  is  introduced  to  help  building  this 
morel.  Not  only  can  it  generally  provide  the  trade-off  for  each  individual  problem, 
also  be  capable  of  evaluating  and  detennining  the  final  suitable  solution.  The 
fundamental  structure  of  the  market  modelling  is  based  on  market  structure  of  NETA 
and  developed  from  published  documents  of  Office  of  Gas  and  Electricity  Markets 
[3],  [5],  [17],  [18],  [19]  and  [58]. 
5.1.1  The  Broad  Objectives 
Three  broad  objectives  are  set  for  the  modelling  activities: 
*  To  gain  insights  into  aspects  of  the  new  trading  arrangements; 
*  To  search  for  possibility  and  impact  of  market  manipulation  on  the  UK  power 
market  given  Britain's  generation  companies  make  effort  to  attempt  market  power 
and  gaming  strategies; Chapter  5  Model  Simulation  and  Validation  Experiments  49 
To  provide  a  platfonn  which  potential  participants  can  use  to  gain  experience  of 
the  trading  envirom-nent  that  they  will  face  under  NETA. 
The  first  and  second  objectives  are  achieved  by  conducting  a  series  of  experiments 
using  the  simulation  model  that  has  been  developed.  The  third  could  be  achieved  by 
encouraging  the  industry  to  participate  in  those  experiments  and  then  making  the 
model  generally  available. 
5.1.2  The  Approach  to  Modelling 
To  capture  all  the  markets  expected  to  operate  under  the  new  trading  arrangements 
and  explore  all  their  interactions  within  one  model  would  be  a  considerable  task  and 
would  result  in  a  model  of  substantial  complexity,  both  in  its  construction  and  its 
operation.  This  would  lead  to  significant  risks,  including  that: 
*  The  development  and  operation  of  the  model  would  be  prohibitively  time 
consuming; 
*  The  results  of  any  run  of  the  model  would  be  hard  to  interpret,  as  so  many  factors 
would  need  to  be  taken  into  account;  and 
9  The  model  would  be  too  complex  for  meaningful  insights  to  be  obtained  from  its 
use  by  potential  participants. 
The  research  therefore  focuses  its  modelling  efforts  on  the  specific  parts  of  the  New 
Electricity  Trading  Arrangements  proposals  most  likely  to  generate  results  of  interest. 
A  range  of  modelling  approaches  has  been  considered.  The  principal  interest  is  not 
only  to  investigate  what  level  of  prices  might  be  obtained,  but  also  to  explore  how 
different  incentives  might  influence  participants'  behaviour.  It  was  therefore  decided Chapter  5  Model  Simulation  and  Validation  Experiments  50 
to  commission  an  experimental  simulation  model,  as  this  is  fit  best  the  need  to  assess 
behaviour  by  market  participants. 
5.1.3  The  NETA  Model 
Since  the  interest  is  in  the  incentives  to  trade  in  the  various  markets  that  together 
make  up  the  new  trading  arrangements,  the  modelling  effort  can  not  focus  solely  on 
the  those  elements  that  are  being  procured  by  the  program,  namely  the  Balancing 
Mechanism  (BM)  and  the  Imbalance  Settlement  Mechanism  (ISM). 
At  the  same  time,  as  noted  above,  it  cannot  capture  all  the  markets  in  their  entirety.  It 
is  therefore  decided  to  focus  on  trading  in  a  Power  Exchange  (PX),  with  the 
assumption  that  prior  trading  has  taken  place  on  the  forwards  and  futures  markets,  and 
assess  the  impact  of  the  Balancing  Mechanism  and  the  ISM  in  terms  of  what  trades 
take  place  in  the  PX,  and  what  are  left  to  those  mechanisms.  In  doing  this,  the  implicit 
assumption  is  that  the  PX  trades  are  a  proxy  for  trades  in  all  the  markets  that  might 
operate  in  advance  of  gate  closure,  including  those  with  longer-tenn  activities  than  the 
day  ahead  usually  assumed  for  the  PX. 
It  is  accepted  that  this  is  only  one  of  a  number  of  approaches  that  could  have  been 
used  and  that  other  models  could  also  provide  insights  into  the  operation  of  the 
markets  under  the  NETA  proposals. 
5.1.4  Outline  of  the  Model 
The  model  simulates  trading  in  a  PX.  A  number  of  players  trade  in  real  time,  each 
playing  the  role  of  a  market  participant  and  working  from  infon-nation  on  prior  trades, 
production  or  consumption  costs,  capacity  limits  and  potential  prices,  to  develop 
trading  bids  and  offers.  The  model  simulates  the  operation  of  a  PX  and  matches Chapter  5  Model  Simulation  and  Validation  Experiments  51 
beneficial  trades  and  then  allows  unmatched  positions  to  be  offered  into  the  Balancing 
Mechanism;  any  open  positions  that  are  not  closed  out  by  the  acceptance  of  offers  or 
bids  became  subject  to  Imbalance  Settlement.  The  overall  results  of  trading  are  then 
analyzed  and  passed  back  to  participants  to  allow  them  to  amend  their  behaviour  in 
future  runs  in  the  light  of  experience. 
The  trading  model  with  these  set  of  parameters  introduced  in  Chapter  4  is 
experimented  and  then  profits  from  the  participants  with  complete  non-cooperative 
strategy  and  coalition  members  are  then  calculated  and  compared  in  next  chapters.  A 
set  of  validation  and  experiments  are  carried  out  based  on  different  system  parameters 
on  which  the  model  scale  is  limited.  The  estimates  used  are  consistent  with  those  used 
in  published  studies  on  the  NETA  electricity  market,  i.  e.  actual  demand  profiles, 
generation  and  supply  system  parameters.  There  are  five  sorts  of  power  generation 
concerned  in  this  model,  including  gas  turbine,  oil,  coal,  combined  cycle  gas  turbine 
(CCGT)  and  nuclear  plants. 
Because  the  flexibility  of  each  kind  of  generation  plant  is  different  and  it  results  in 
different  market  performance,  it  is  reasonable  to  introduce  the  flexibility  (maximal 
numbers  of  startups  within  one  day)  of  each  type  of  plants  in  the  UK: 
(1)  Gas  turbine  and  oil  generation  plants  were  classified  as  having  three  daily  cycles. 
(2)  Midmerit  technologies  were  classified  with  one  and  two  cycles,  which  include 
CCGT  and  coal. 
(3)  Finally,  the  base-load  plants  (running  in  a  nonstop  regime)  are  the  nuclear  stations, 
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This  is  a  reasonable  way  of  incorporating  some  consideration  of  dynamic  plant 
constraints.  We  define  the  parameter  cycles  for  each  type  of  plant  (see  above).  Thus, 
base-load  plants  with  high  startups  or  inflexible  technology  need  to  run  continuously 
and  specify  zero  or  just  one  cycle.  Flexible  plant  with  low  startup  cost  can  have  a 
higher  number  of  cycles.  The  availability  of  installed  capacity  is  specified  by 
individual  generator's  self-parameter. 
Plants  owned  by  each  generator  are  specified  at  the  generating  set  level.  Plants  of  the 
same  type  are  assumed  to  have  similar  operating  generation  cost  (marginal  costs, 
fixed  costs  including  startup  costs,  and  no-load  costs).  This  model  does  not  take  into 
account  the  fixed  cost.  Thus,  each  agent  has  an  objective  for  the  position  of  each  plant 
in  the  load  duration  curve  (we  identify  for  each  plant  the  maximum  number  of  cycles 
per  day  that  it  can  operate). 
We  impose  some  lower  bounds  of  rationality  through  operational  rules. 
1)  Portfolio  Management:  a  plant  with  higher  or  equal  number  of  cycles  will  never 
undercut  the  offers  of  another  plant  with  equal  or  less  number  of  cycles. 
2)  Noninterruption:  plants  that  have  to  run  continuously  or plants  with  one  cycle  may 
run  without  profit  in  certain  hours  of  the  day. 
3)  Peak  Premia:  Peak  plant  never  offer  prices  below  marginal  cost. 
The  estimated  marginal  generation  costs  for  each  plant  ranged  from  f9/MWh  to 
f  88/MWh.  The  base-load  generation  plants,  i.  e.  nuclear,  combined  cycle  gas  turbine 
(CCGT),  and  some  large  coal  plants,  are  operated  in  lower  marginal  costs.  The  gas 
turbines  and  oil  plants  are  associated  with  higher  marginal  costs.  Generation  plants  on 
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consistent  with  those  used  in  other  published  studies  on  the  UK  generation  market,  as 
well  as  with  known  data  on  plant  efficiencies  and  fuel  costs.  The  estimated  marginal 
generation  costs  Pmc'  .  for  each  generator  and  assumed  maximal  generation  capacity, 
Qsmax  1. 
,  of  each  generator  of  each  generation  type  are  presented  in  Table  5.1: 
Table  5.1  Generators'  system  self-parameters 
Type  of  generation  Nuclear  Combined  cycle  Large  Gas  Oil 
plants  Gas  turbine  coal  turbines 
(CCGT) 
Marginal  generation 
24.50  9.72  33.23  66.95  87.91 
cost  (E/MWH) 
For  suppliers,  their  individual  self-parameters  are  assumed  as  identical  and  the 
estimated  marginal  revenues  C,,,,  J  for  each  supplier  is  set  as  71f/MVM. 
Once  this  is  completed,  the  generators'  profits  and  suppliers'  revenues  are  calculated, 
so  that  each  seller  and  buyer  will  respectively  get  their  fitness  on  each  round.  The 
operating  cost  function  of  each  generator,  usually  is  represented  as  the  following 
fonn; 
Ci(Qd  =  ai  +  biQi  +  ciQi 
2i=152, 
....  n  (5.1) 
min  <  Qi.:  S,  I,  Qimax 
where 
Ci(Qd  operating  costs  of  entity  i  with  generation; 
V111.17,  Qj"  minimum  and  maximum  generation  output  of  entity  I, 
ai,  bi,  ci  constants. 
The  profit  PG  of  generation  entity  i  at  time  t  will  be; 
PFi,  t=  P"t  Qi,  t 
allocated  _  Ci  Qi'tallocated  (5.2) Chapter  5  Model  Simulation  and  Validation  Experiments 
where 
PXPI 
Qi,  tallocated 
market  clearing  price  (MCP)  at  time  t, 
allocated  generation  volume  of  entity  i. 
The  profit  PS  of  supplying  entityj  at  time  t  will  be; 
where 
-)  allocated  pXpt  Q  allocated  Psi, 
tý 
Cmrl  Qj'  t  ý.  't 
Cmrj  marginal  revenue  of  entityj  with  supplying; 
PxPt  market  clearing  price  (MCP)  at  time  t, 
Q  allocated t  allocated  supply  volume  of  entityj. 
5.1.5  Running  the  Model 
A  run  of  the  model  proceeded  as  follows. 
(5.3) 
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*  Forwards  contracts  arising  from  any  vertical  integration  and  the  customer  base  are 
represented  by  an  'opening  position'  provided  to  each  participant  before  a  model 
run  begins. 
9  The  PX  opens  for  trading  and  participants  post  offers  and  bids  as  introduced 
earlier. 
e  There  are  48  trading  rounds  running  each  day.  The  market  both  clears  any 
mutually  acceptable  offers  and  bids  (in  other  words  an  offer  at  or  lower  than  a  bid) 
and  allowed  participants  to  accept  an  extant  offer  or  bid.  The  clearing  procedure  is 
based  on  the  methodology  introduced  in  Chapter  4.  The  Market  Clearing  Prices 
(MCP)  will  be  used  as  one  of  benchmarks  to  asses  the  different  trading  strategies. 
Until  the  end  of  trading,  participants  were  allowed  to  post  new  offers  and  bids  and 
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*  Once  the  relevant  trading  period  was  closed,  participants  submit  FPNs  for 
generation  to  the  system  operator  and,  if  they  so  choose,  Balancing  Mechanism 
bids. 
9  The  model's  system  operator(SO)  then  optimizes  and  balances  the  system  at  a 
single  turn,  accepting  offers  and  bids  necessary  to  do  this  and  allowing  for  any 
random  perturbations  in  demand  or  generation  failures  introduced  by  the  model 
operator.  System  and  participant  imbalances  were  then  calculated. 
9  Imbalance  prices  and  payments  are  calculated.  Participants  who  are  out  of  balance 
are  charged  or  paid  at  energy  imbalance  prices. 
*  Results  are  collated  and  participants  are  infonned  how  they  have  perfonned. 
*  Participants'  strategies  and  strategic  parameters  adopted  in  previous  trading  round 
are  evaluated  and  new  parameters  are  searched  out  by  optimization  tool  for  next 
round. 
In  the  experiments  conducted  by  the  program,  the  model  is  run  with  up  to  a  number  of 
players  representing  a  variety  of  industry  participants.  A  supervisor,  acted  as  both 
market  and  system  operator,  takes  overall  charge  of  each  run. 
The  model  provided  the  following  types  of  output: 
0  Traded  prices  in  the  PX; 
&  Balancing  Mechanism  trades  prices; 
Imbalance  Settlement  pnces  and  volumes; 
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0  Costs  of  generation; 
0  Short  run  profitability  for  each  participant. 
5.1.6  Simplification 
Before  evolving  the  strategy,  some  features  of  this  model  are  described  as  following: 
9  Trading  participants  include  m  electricity  generators  (sellers),  as  some  generation 
companies  that  sell  energy  in  the  market,  n  power  suppliers  (buyers),  as  energy 
service  companies,  i.  e.  power  transmission  companies  that  buy  electricity  to  serve 
end-users,  and  the  System  Operator  (SO)  who  operates  the  markets; 
*  Bilateral  bidding  mechanism  is  adopted  following  the  fact  on  NETA; 
9  Collusive  generators  are  concerned  about  the  expected  payoff  in  the  long  run 
rather  than  the  pay-off  in  a  particular  round  of  trading; 
e  System  Operator  broadcasts  2-14  day-ahead  demand  forecast  and  provides  real 
time  information  and  offers  made  and  accepted,  as  the  same  case  on  NETA; 
e  The  total  amount  of  bidding  generations  is  enough  to  provide  the  market  demand 
(Le.  ,  Ei  Qi, 
bid 
->  L,,  where  Qi,, 
bid  denotes  the  bidding  generation  of  entity  i,  and  L, 
denotes  total  system  demand  at  time  t); 
9  The  bidding  generation  of  each  player  is  less  than  the  total  system  demand  in  a 
specific  spot  market  (i.  e.,  Qj, 
bid  <Lt'). 
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*  All  trades  contain  price  and  quantity  only.  Other  contract  fonns,  such  as  caps,  ) 
collars  and  load  following  were  excluded; 
9  Plant  technical  constraints,  such  as  ramping,  are  not  modeled  or  included  in  the 
Balancing  Mechanism  calculations; 
*  Transmission  constraints  and  loss  are  not  modeled  or  included  in  the  Balancing 
Mechanism  calculations; 
9  Offers  and  bids  to  the  Balancing  Mechanism  were  made  once  only; 
*  The  Balancing  Mechanism  is  treated  as  a  'one-shot'  market  and  the  real  time 
effects  of  emerging  Balancing  Mechanism  acceptances  is  not  modeled. 
5.1.7  Scenarios  in  the  Experiments 
The  experiments  look  at  two  types  of  scenarios: 
0  Validation  test  is  carried  out  in  the  first  set  of  experiments.  The  scenario  is  run 
with  an  approximation  of  the  market  structure  likely  to  be  in  place  in  around 
October  2004.  All  these  experiments  are  based  on  the  average  winter  daily 
demand  profile  in  October  published  by  NETA,  shown  earlier  in  Figure  4.3  in  this 
Chapter.  On  the  validation  test,  all  market  players  only  employ  non-cooperative 
strategy  to  conflict  on  this  marketplace  at  which  no  gaming  behaviour  is 
attempted.  The  relationship  among  each  generator  is  completely  competitive, 
following  the  general  reality  on  NETA. 
The  feasibility  and  efficiency  of  this  model  and  analysis  technique  are  tested  in 
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strategic  actions  designed  for  the  model  is  capable  of  producing  similar  outputs 
from  the  real  market,  in  the  absence  of  disturbance. 
Application  experiments  are  made  in  Chapter  6.  Cooperative  gaming  strategies 
will  be  covered  on  the  second  and  third  tests  based  on  different  model  scales. 
Because  the  modelling  exercise  employs  only  a  certain  number  of  players,  some 
simplifications  to  the  full  complexity  of  the  anticipated  structure  have  to  be  made 
introduced  previously.  As  well  as  the  two  main  scenarios,  sensitivities  are  run  either 
with  shocks,  such  as  a  generator  failure  or  a  change  in  fuel  prices,  or  with  a  changed 
industry  structure,  especially  greater  vertical  integration. 
5.2  Setup  of  Validation  Experiments 
In  order  to  evaluate  perfon-nance  of  this  research  technique,  the  model  is  examined  in 
this  section.  The  modelling  results  are  compared  with  real  data  of  NETA  to  identify 
its  efficiency  and  against  unseen  data. 
The  model  is  organized  into  running  4  weeks  in  October  2004,  given  20  trading  days 
totally.  Therefore  each  week  has  5  trading  days.  On  each  trading  day  the  market 
mechanism  runs  48  iterations  according  to  the  reality  of  NETA  market, 
correspondingly  they  are  represented  by  48  generations  in  GA  algorithms. 
Each  trading  day  starts  with  the  System  Operator  (SO)  publishing  one-day  demand 
forecast,  then  the  market  participants  buying  (selling)  electricity  in  the  Power 
Exchange  (PX).  In  the  PX,  the  suppliers  try  to  buy,  at  a  price  as  low  as  possible,  the 
amount  of  electricity  needed  to  fulfill  their  contract  covering  objectives.  Oppositely, 
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round  in  PX  market,  each  market  participant  from  two  sides  respectively  submits  a  set 
of  bids  (offers)  including  prices  -  responding  volumes,  i.  e.,  f  11.50/MW  -  11.23MWI 
f  16.62/MW  -  18.30MW,  ... 
f68.42/MW  -  78.70MW,  and  so  on,  to  the  SO.  The 
overall  matching  procedure  follows  the  market  running  process  introduced  in  section 
2.2.2  in  Chapter  2. 
At  gate  closure,  each  participant  will  know  exactly  how  much  it  has  sold  or  bought 
and  provides  the  SO  with  its  final  physical  notifications  (FPNs). 
Then  the  trading  in  the  Balancing  Mechanism  (BM)  begins.  The  System  Operator 
total  demand  forecasts  are  common  knowledge  in  the  industry,  period  by  period  (and 
it  is  assumed  for  these  experiments  that  the  forecasts  are  accurate).  Nevertheless,  each 
one  of  the  suppliers  will  have  some  uncertainty  predicting  its  own  demand.  Thus, 
using  their  FPN's  and  its  demand  forecast,  the  SO  calculates  the  total  system  surplus 
or  shortfall  for  each.  Given  this  total  system  position,  the  SO  will  accept  either 
spillage  or  top-up  in  the  BM.  The  trades  in  the  BM  are  done  between  the  SO  and  each 
one  of  the  generators  and  suppliers  offering  (bidding)  the  spillage  (top-up)  into  the 
BM. 
After  all  trading  in  the  BM  has  occurred  and  the  SO  has  bought  or  sold  whatever 
energy  is  needed  to  balance  the  system,  the  SO  will  compare  the  contract  positions 
(quantities  contracted),  plus  whatever  is  bought  or  sold  in  the  BM  with  the  actual 
position  (quantities  generated  or  consumed)  for  each  one  of  the  suppliers  and 
generators  (plant  by  plant)  to  calculate  the  imbalances,  then  the  imbalance  prices  and 
volumes  of  each  generator  and  supplier  are  calculated.  If  the  SO  accepts  spillage,  the 
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if  the  SO  accepts  top-up,  the  SSP  will  be  defined  as  the  weighted-  average  of  the  bids 
accepted  in  the  BM.  Thus,  if  a  trading  participant  is  long  (short)  when  the  system  is 
short  (long),  there  will  be  no  imbalance  price  defined  for  its  case.  We  adopted  a  rule 
that  the  SO  has  indicated  it  may  have  to  use  if  there  are  insufficient  bids  (offers), 
which  is  to  take  the  average  of  past  SBP  (SSP)  values  for  that  particular  hour  for  the 
SBP  (SSP)  not  defined.  The  formulations  of  calculating  SBP  and  SSP  were  presented 
in  Chapter  2. 
It  should  be  noted  that  a  supplier  without  load  management  will  not  be  influencing  the 
net  position  of  the  system  and  so  its  bids  in  the  BM  are  only  to  cover  its  own 
uncertainty  to  avoid  the  imbalance  charges.  The  bids  (offers)  of  these  players  will 
only  be  accepted  if  there  is  an  arbitrage  opportunity. 
The  objective  of  the  power  generators  in  this  experiment  is  to  search  for  optimal 
bidding  points  to  sell  power  at  prices  as  high  as  possible  in  PX  market,  and  no 
cooperative  strategy  is  adopted  in  the  validation  experiment.  Whereas,  the  objective 
of  the  suppliers  is  to  buy  power  at  prices  as  low  as  possible.  However,  on  the  other 
hand,  since  the  imbalance  penalties  in  imbalance  settlement  system  are  much  different 
from  market  clearing  prices  in  wholesale  market  PX  where  most  of  power  volumes 
are  traded,  the  risk  of  having  to  buy  and  sell  in  this  way  through  the  Balancing 
Mechanism  with  its  very  volatile  prices  emphasises  the  importance  of  market 
participants'  trading  strategies.  A  lot  of  efforts  with  introducing  traditional 
mathematical  methods  have  not  been  able  to  solve  this  kind  of  challenges  with  many 
uncertainties  and  incommensurable  objectives.  Evolutionary  Computation,  which  was 
not  so  far  effectively  employed  in  this  field,  plays  a  vital  role  to  lead  the  search 
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By  the  nature  of  Genetic  Algorithms,  the  trading  strategies  parameters  are  evaluated 
and  determined  by  GA.  In  the  task  each  seller  runs  its  own  GA.  Each  participant's 
portfolio  parameters  are  mapped  into  a  GA's  chromosomes.  The  trading  procedure 
and  searching  process  are  described  in  Figure  5.1: 
Start?  I 
Define  start-up  availability 
Round  =0 
Mapping  trading  variables  into  GA 
Generate  bidding  parameters,  i.  e. 
price  and  quantity  from  GA 
Market  participants  submit 
offer/bid  to  System  Operator 
SO  runs  the  Power  Exchange 
Market  price  and  contracted  quantity 
is  calculated  in  PX  Clearing  House 
Unmatched  participants  submit 
bids  and  offers  to  Balancing 
Mechanism  to  match  shortfall 
By  end  of  this  round,  calculating 
individual  traded  volume  and  profit 
Evaluate  fitness  of  individuals 
Select  individuals  for 
reproduction  according  to  fitness 
Combine  parent  genotypes  to  produce 
Offspring,  replace  parents  with  offspring 
No 
Expire? 
Yes 
End 
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5.3  Validation  Experiments  and  Experimental  Results 
To  exercise  the  model's  veracity  and  efficiency,  the  validation  experiments  are  carried 
out  against  standard  daily  demand  profile  in  October  2004,  published  by  NETA  and 
shown  in  Figure  5.2.  The  experimental  model  runs  for  4  trading  weeks  continuously, 
given  20  trading  days,  at  which  there  are  5  working  days  per  week  and  48  trading 
iterations  within  one  day.  As  introduced  in  chapter  4,  there  are  five  sorts  of  power 
generation  type  investigated  in  this  model,  including  gas  turbine,  oil,  coal,  combined 
cycle  gas  turbine  (CCGT)  and  nuclear  power  generators.  The  number  of  generators, 
is  assumed  to  15,  given  3  generators  each  generation  type,  and  suppliers',  n,  is 
assumed  to  10  in  this  experiment.  The  generators  of  the  same  type  are  assumed  to 
have  similar  marginal  costs  and  generation  capacity.  The  estimated  marginal 
generation  costs  P,,,,  '  for  each  generator  and  assumed  maximal  generation  capacity, 
Qsmax  I,  of  each  generator  on  each  generation  type  are  presented  in  Table  5.1  below. 
The  total  available  generation  capacity  is  set  as  66.7GW.  Oppositely,  the  maximal 
market  demand  is  50GW9  which  is  same  as  the  market  scale  of  the  NETA.  Hence  the 
average  maximal  demand,  Qdniax%  of  each  supplier  is  500OMW.  The  ratio  of  maximal 
market  demand  to  total  available  generation  capacity  is  therefore  0.75,  following  the 
real  situation  in  NETA. 
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Table  5.2  Generators'  system  self-parameters 
Type  of  generation  Nuclear  Combined  cycle  Large  Gas  Oil 
plants  Gas  turbine  Coal  Turbines 
(CCGT) 
Marginal  generation  24.50  9.72  33.23  66.95  87.91 
cost  (fIMVVH) 
Maximal  generation  4450  4450  4450  4450  4450 
capacity  (MW) 
5.3.1  Modelling  Results 
In  order  to  validate  the  model's  performance,  three  major  model  outputs,  the 
wholesale  market  clearing  price  PXP,  imbalanced  settlement  prices  System  Buy  Price 
SBP  and  System  Sell  Price  SSP,  are  presented  and  evaluated  with  NETA  data  below. 
5.3.1.1  Traded  Market  Clearing  Prices  in  Power  Exchange 
In  order  to  have  a  better  view  of  how  the  model  works  and  the  evolution  of  market 
participants  strategies,  the  model's  running  process,  given  20  days,  are  divided  into 
four  consecutive  stages,  given  the  first  week,  the  second  week,  the  third  week  and  the 
fourth  week.  These  three  trading  results,  including  PX  market  clearing  price  PXP, 
imbalanced  settlement  prices  System  Buy  Price  SBP  and  System  Sell  Price  SSP,  in 
each  trading  week,  are  separately  represented  by  three  typical  mean  daily  trading 
results.  Consequently  for  each  of  the  three  model  outputs,  there  are  4  sets  of 
experimental  results  corresponding  to  the  four  trading  weeks,  and  one  set  consists  of 
48  experimental  outputs  which  are  coming  from  48  trading  iterations  in  which  the 
market  player  take  part  within  one  trading  day.  These  trading  results  are  demonstrated 
week  by  week  to  discover  how  the  market  players  learn  through  GA  and  how  their 
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As  introduced  previously,  the  PX  trades  are  a  proxy  for  trades  In  all  the  markets  that 
might  operate  in  advance  of  gate  closure,  those  with  longer-term  activities. 
The  market  clearing  price  in  PX,  PXP,  calculated  by  equation  (2.1),  which  is  the 
fundamental  output  and  evaluation  parameter  of  this  model,  is  presented  following. 
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Figure  5.3:  Mean  daily  market  clearing  price  in  PX  in  the  first  trading  week 
As  one  of  the  most  important  system  outputs  and  model  perfon-nance  references,  the 
market  clearing  price  in  Power  Exchange,  PXP,  in  each  of  the  four  weeks,  is 
represented  by  a  set  of  mean  daily  market  clearing  price.  The  PXP  in  the  first  week  is 
aggregated  into  a  mean  daily  PX  clearing  prices  and  is  demonstrated  in  Figure  5.3. 
This  price  value  curve  is  consisted  of  48  PXP  values.  We  can  see  that  in  the  initial 
stage  there  are  a  large  number  of  price  spikes  rising  up,  and  the  PXP  is  waving  around 
a  high  level  after  the  first  peak  demand  period  starts  at  7:  00am  to  8:  00am,  ranging 
from  f  37/MWh  to  f  88/MVvlh. Chapter  5  Model  Simulation  and  Validation  Experiments 
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Figure  5.4:  Mean  daily  market  clearing  price  in  PX  in  the  second  trading  week 
Since  the  trading  runs  over  4  periods  continuously,  there  are  4  sets  of  Power 
Exchange  market  clearing  prices  as  experimental  results.  Figure  5.4  shows  the  mean 
daily  PXP  in  the  second  week. 
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Figure  5.5:  Mean  daily  market  clearing  price  in  PX  in  the  third  trading  week 
Figure  5.5  shows  the  development  of  mean  daily  PXP  in  the  third  week.  Figure  5.4 
and  Figure  5.5  show  two  clear  trends  exhibited  on  these  two  weeks.  First,  the  PXP  is 
going  down  along  with  the  model's  running  and  strategies  evolution.  Second,  the 
price  spikes  have  less  appearance. Chapter  5  Model  Simulation  and  Validation  Experiments 
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Figure  5.6:  Mean  daily  market  clearing  price  in  PX  in  the  forth  trading  week 
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Figure  5.6  illustrates  mean  daily  PXP  from  the  last  trading  week.  An  observation  is 
evident  that  the  PXP  remains  stable  in  most  of  the  trading  periods.  There  are  only  two 
price  spikes  rising  in  peak  demand  periods,  17:  00pm  to  18:  00pm  and  21:  00pm  to 
22:  00pm.  The  detailed  discussion  for  these  results  will  be  taken  in  the  end  of  this 
chapter. 
5.3.1.2  Traded  Prices  in  Imbalance  Settlement  System  -  System  Sell  Price  and 
System  Sell  Price 
This  is  one  of  the  main  principles  of  trading  electricity.  If  a  market  participant  falls  to 
achieve  what  it  predicted  then  it  is  going  to  cost  it  to  balance  the  system.  In  the 
imbalance  settlement  process,  the  generators'  metered  generation  and  suppliers' 
metered  demand  are  compared  with  the  contractual  positions  they  notify.  The  sum 
total  of  contracts  negotiated  in  PX  is  added  together  to  arrive  at  these  contract 
positions.  Participants  that  act  both  as  generators  and  suppliers  will  be  exposed  to 
separate  production  and  consumption  imbalance  charges  for  the  two  sides  of  their 
business.  The  difference  between  the  amount  of  electricity  bought  and  sold  under 
contracts  and  the  actual  amount  produced  and  consumed  is  calculated  by  the Chapter  5  Model  Simulation  and  Validation  Experiments  67 
imbalance  settlement  price.  The  price  for  buying  more  energy  is  known  as  the  System 
Buy  Price  (SBP),  and  is  a  weighted  average  of  accepted  Offers  and  calculated  by  a 
function  illustrated  in  chapter  2.  Generally  it  is  higher  than  the  PXP  because  it  reflects 
the  cost  of  extra  generation  at  short  notice.  Conversely,  the  price  for  selling  excess 
energy  to  the  system  the  System  Sell  Price  (SSP),  is  a  weighted  average  of  accepted 
Bids  and  generally  lower  than  the  forward  price,  reflecting  the  relatively  low  price 
that  generators  are  prepared  to  bid  to  SO  to  reduce  output  at  short  notice.  It  is 
calculated  by  the  other  function  introduced  in  chapter  2.  The  same  goes  for  suppliers. 
Figure  5.7,  Figure  5.8,  Figure  5.9  and  Figure  5.10  reveal  the  effect  of  market 
participants'  strategies  on  the  imbalance  settlement  process  in  tenus  of  showing  the 
other  two  important  reference  parameters,  imbalanced  settlement  prices  System  Buy 
Price  SBP  and  System  Sell  Price  SSP.  Since  the  market  model's  trading  process  is 
divided  into  four  consecutive  weeks,  for  each  of  these  two  imbalanced  settlement 
prices,  there  are  four  sets  of  mean  daily  prices  corresponding  to  the  four  trading 
weeks,  separately.  There  are  48  price  values  in  each  set  representing  48  trading 
iteration  results  from  each  typical  trading  day. 
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Figure  5.7:  Mean  daily  System  Imbalance  Price  in  the  first  trading  week Chapter  5  Model  Simulation  and  Validation  Experiments  68 
Figure  5.7  demonstrates  the  mean  daily  price  curves  of  the  imbalanced  settlement 
prices  SBP  and  SSP  in  the  beginning  week. 
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Figure  5.8:  Mean  daily  System  Imbalance  Price  in  the  second  trading  week 
The  mean  daily  price  imbalance  settlement  prices  curves  in  the  second  week  are 
presented  in  Figure  5.8  above.  Based  on  the  figures  shown  here  and  in  previous 
section,  when  PXP  curves  has  price  spike  ansing,  so  does  the  System  Buy  Price 
during  the  same  trading  period,  and  the  SBP  is  considerably  higher  than  the  price  in 
PX  market. 
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Figure  5.9:  Mean  daily  System  Imbalance  Price  in  the  third  trading  week 
Figure  5.9  shows  the  development  of  mean  daily  imbalanced  settlement  prices  in  the 
third  week. Chapter  5  Model  Simulation  and  Validation  Experiments 
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Figure  5.10:  Mean  daily  System  Imbalance  Price  in  the  forth  trading  week 
The  model's  mean  daily  imbalanced  settlement  prices  in  the  last  trading  week  are 
introduced  in  Figure  5.10.  Next,  we  shall  proceed  to  investigate  the  results  efficiency 
against  real  NETA  data. 
5.3.2  Discussion  of  Modelling  Error 
To  asses  the  accuracy  of  the  market  model,  the  NETA  market  outcome  data 
corresponding  to  the  standard  daily  demand  profile  in  October  2004  which  is  shown 
in  Figure  5.2,  are  presented  as  benchmark  data  in  Figure  5.11  to  Figure  5.18.  Then  the 
modelling  error  is  measured  next. 
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Figure  5.11:  Mean  market  clearing  pnce  on  NATE  in  the  first  trading  week Chapter  5  Model  Simulation  and  Validation  Experiments  70 
The  NETA  PX  market  clearing  prices  which  are  from  the  trading  happened  in  the  first 
week  in  October  2004 
,  is  aggregated  into  a  single  dally  price  curve  and  illustrated  in 
Figure  5.11. 
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Figure  5.12:  Mean  market  clearing  price  on  NATE  in  the  second  trading  week 
The  NETA  mean  daily  prices  in  the  second  week  in  October  2004  is  demonstrated  in 
Figure  5.12. 
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Figure  5.13:  Mean  market  clearing  price  on  NATE  In  the  third  trading  week 
The  NETA  mean  daily  prices  in  the  third  week  in  October  2004  is  shown  below  in 
Figure  5.13. Chapter  5  Model  Simulation  and  Validation  Experiments 
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Figure  5.14:  Mean  market  clearing  price  on  NATE  in  the  forth  trading  week 
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The  NETA  imbalance  settlement  prices  which  are  from  the  trading  happened  in  the 
first  week  in  October  2004,  is  aggregated  into  a  single  daily  price  curve  and  illustrated 
in  Figure  5.15. 
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Figure  5.15:  Mean  System  Imbalance  Price  in  the  first  trading  week Chapter  5  Model  Simulation  and  Validation  Experiments  72 
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Figure  5.16:  Mean  System  Imbalance  Price  in  the  second  trading  week 
The  NETA  mean  daily  imbalance  prices  in  the  second  week  in  October  2004  is 
illustrated  in  Figure  5.16. 
System  Imbalance  Price 
I)r)n 
zvu 
160 
120 
80 
40 
n 
16  11  16  21  26  31  36  41  46 
-System  Sell  Price  Trading  iterations 
---#-System  Buy  Price 
Figure  5.17:  Mean  System  Imbalance  Price  in  the  third  trading  week 
Figure  5.17  presents  the  mean  daily  imbalance  prices  in  the  third  week  in  October 
2004. Chapter  5  Model  Simulation  and  Validation  Experiments 
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Figure  5.18:  Mean  System  Imbalance  Price  in  the  forth  trading  week 
The  imbalance  system  result  from  the  last  week  is  shown  above  in  Figure  5.18. 
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Next,  all  the  experimental  results,  including  market  clearing  price  PXP,  imbalanced 
settlement  prices  System  Buy  Price  SBP  and  System  Sell  Price  SSP  are  measured 
against  the  NETA  market  results  presented  in  Figure  5.11  to  Figure  5.18  above,  to 
assess  the  modelling.  The  modelling  error  is  discovered  by  RMS  (root-mean-  square) 
error  which  is  introduced  following. 
n=48 
RMSpxp  =  square-root  of  (PXPiinodel 
- 
PXPineta  )2  /48)  (5.5) 
where  PXPhnodel  IS  the  model  estimated  PXP  value  at  the  ith  trading  iteration  in  one 
trading  week,  and  PXPi,,,,  is  true  PXP  value  on  NETA  at  the  ith  trading  iteration  in 
one  trading  week. 
n=48 
RMSssp  =  square-root  of 
(SSPiniodel 
- 
SSPineta  )2  /48)  (5.6) 
where  SSPintodel  is  the  model  estimated  SSP  value  at  the  ith  trading  iteration  in  one 
trading  week,  and  SSPineta  is  true  SSP  value  on  NETA  at  the  ith  trading  iteration  in 
one  trading  week. Chapter  5  Model  Simulation  and  Validation  Experiments  74 
n=48 
RMSsBp  =  square-root  of 
(SBPimodel 
- 
SBPineta  )2  /48)  (5.7) 
where  SBPi,,,  dl  is  the  model  estimated  SSP  value  at  the  ith  trading  iteration  in  one 
trading  week,  and  SBPi,,,,,  is  true  SBP  value  on  NETA  at  the  ith  trading  iteration  in 
one  trading  week. 
Table  5.3  shows  the  results  of  modelling  error  during  the  overall  trading  process. 
Table  5.3  Modelling  error  performance  during  4  trading  weeks 
Trading  Period  1  st  Trading 
Week 
2nd  Trading 
Week 
3rd  Trading 
Week 
4th  Trading 
Week 
RMSpxp  9.30  8.55  6.98  5.65 
RMSssp  7.19  3.09  3.70  2.86 
RMSSBP  12.02  11.12  11.80  9.47 
Based  on  the  experimental  results  and  the  modelling  errors  demonstrated  above,  the 
evolvement  trend  of  major  modelling  results,  market  clearing  price,  PXP,  system 
imbalance  prices,  SSP  and  SBP,  are  considerably  similar  to  the  NETA  market 
outcomes.  The  proposed  model  appears  to  be  capable  of  running  the  trading 
mechanism  well  in  the  way  of  which  NETA  is  doing. 
5.4  Discussion 
A  validation  experiment  against  unused  real  NETA  data  has  been  finished,  and  the 
modelling  performance  has  been  exercised. 
An  example  of  how  the  market  participants  leams  and  how  they  improve  their 
strategy  can  be  observed  from  Figure  5.2  to  Figure  5.9  and  Table  5.2,  in  terms  of 
displaying  the  development  progress  of  main  model  outputs,  including  mean  daily Chapter  5  Model  Simulation  and  Validation  Experiments  75 
prices  in  the  PX  and  in  the  Imbalance  Settlement  Process  (PXP,  SBP,  and  SSP)  during 
the  large  number  of  trading  iterations  of  the  baseline  experiment.  For  detailed 
analysis,  according  to  the  results  shown  above,  in  the  initial  stages  the  prices  in  the 
wholesale  PX  market,  PXP,  and  in  balancing  mechanism  and  imbalance  settlement, 
SSP  and  SBP,  are  very  volatile.  Occasionally,  high  priced  bids  and  offers  have  been 
taken  at  very  short  notice.  The  volumes  of  accepted  bids  and  offers  in  the  balancing 
mechanism  have  sometimes  been  very  small.  SSP  for  spilling  have  been  low  with 
sometimes  extreme  high  SBP  for  shortfalls.  It  appears  that  the  spread  between  the  SSP 
and  SBP  reduces  in  later  weeks.  It  is  not  unreasonable  because  the  market 
participants,  especially  the  players  on  demand  side,  are  learning  to  respond  to  the 
mechanism  and  improve  their  trading  strategies.  The  relationship  between  supply  and 
demand  gets  loose  and  it  is  likely  to  lead  further  convergence  of  SSP  and  SBP  prices. 
There  are  also  price  spikes  on  wholesale  market  price  PXP  happened  in  later  stage. 
These  price  spikes  emerge  when  the  demand  is  on  peak  periods,  9:  00am  to  I  1:  00am, 
14:  00am  to  16:  00am,  and  20:  00pm  to  22:  00pm.  For  most  industries,  standard 
economic  theory  suggests  that,  under  perfect  competition,  where  no  individual 
supplier  has  market  power,  the  bids  offered  by  each  supplier  should  equal  their 
marginal  production  costs.  Under  this  scenario,  price  spikes  should  only  occur  when 
demand  exceeds  supply.  However,  in  virtually  all  electric  power  markets,  price  spikes 
giving  profits  much  in  excess  of  marginal  costs  have  been  observed,  even  when 
sufficient  supply  is  available. 
Note  that  market  prices  do  emerge  to  create  a  wide  spread  between  SBP  and  SSP  and 
that  PX  clearing  price  is  centrally  located  between  them.  This  is  what  the  advocates  of 
NETA  hoped  would  occur  in  that  out-of-balance  players  would  regret  they  had  not Chapter  5  Model  Simulation  and  Validation  Experiments  76 
traded  forward  at  PX.  The  level  of  prices  that  have  emerged  around  f  80MWh  for 
winter  days  is  rather  high  because  in  this  experiment,  as  will  be  seen  below,  market 
participants  learn  to  create  price  spikes  at  the  three  peak  periods.  Notice  that  the  SBP 
is  much  more  volatile  than  the  PX  market  clearing  price  or  the  SSP,  also  the 
emergence  of  daily  price  cycles  (with  high  prices  at  the  peaks)  as  participants  learn 
from  experience. 
The  prices  in  all  cases  come  out  below  existing  NETA  real  prices.  There  seem  to  be  at 
least  two  reasons  for  this: 
1.  The  experiments  lasts  for  a  maximum  of  twenty  days.  This  gives  less 
opportunities  for  participants  to  observe  the  behaviour  of  others  and  subsequently 
adjust  offers  accordingly.  In  real  life,  participants  literally  have  years  to  achieve 
this; 
2.  and  one  of  the  modelling  assumptions  is  that  the  PX  trades  are  a  proxy  for  trades 
in  all  the  markets,  including  those  with  longer-term  activities  than  the  day  ahead 
usually  assumed  for  the  PX.  The  model  assumes  a  higher  degree  of  trade 
concentration  than  is  currently  the  reality. 
The  study  in  this  chapter  has  certified  that  the  model  designed  here  is  well  capable  of 
operating  over  simulating  the  market  mechanism  and  players'  trading  behaviours.  In 
general,  the  type  of  trading  system  envisaged  by  this  model  is  able  to  respond 
efficiently  to  changing  supply  and  demand  conditions.  The  response  of  prices  to 
demand  vanations  through  the  days  is  close  to  actual,  and  there  is  no  evidence  from 
the  experiments  that  there  would  be  any  problems  in  the  system  responding  to  supply 
and  demand  shocks. Chapter  5  Model  Simulation  and  Validation  Experiments  77 
It  is  clear  that  the  proposed  technique  for  search,  learning  and  optimisation  of  best 
strategies  is  efficient.  The  next  chapter  will  use  the  model  to  discuss  the  development 
of  gaming  strategies  on  NETA. Chapter  6  Strategy  Development  and  Prediction  Experiments  78 
6.  Strategy  Development  and  Prediction  Experiments 
6.1  Gaming  Behaviours 
Following  successful  modelling  of  the  NIETA  market,  the  model  can  then  be  used  to 
analyse  the  market  behaviour  of  gaming  strategies  practiced  in  the  power  market  and 
to  find  out  possible  influence  on  NETA.  The  cooperative  strategy  is  adopted  and 
examined  in  this  model,  which  is  based  on  two  different  scales.  The  experiment 
results  are  discussed  and  compared  with  the  results  of  the  first  set  of  experiments, 
which  represents  the  actual  market  performance  in  this  marketplace. 
Based  on  what  has  been  discussed  previously,  it  is  revealed  that  generators  have  an 
incentive  to  withhold  capacity  from  the  market.  That  is,  under  certain  conditions, 
enough  generation  companies  cooperatively  withholding  capacity  can  drive  the 
market  into  an  oligopoly  situation. 
Nevertheless  the  relationship  among  the  collusive  members  is  not  stiff.  There  are  two 
types  of  gaming  generators.  The  first  is  the  classical  "tacit  collusion"  that  occurs  in 
static  repeated  withholding  output  capacity,  where  the  object  is  for  all  players  to  learn 
that  they  can  always  make  excess  profits  if  they  withhold  amount  of  capacity  from  the 
market.  This  kind  is  referred  to  "loyal  cooperators",  suggesting  that  these  generators 
should  "always"  withhold  a  portion  in  anticipation  of  an  agreement.  The  second  type 
assertsl  however,  that  it  is  not  always  profitable  to  withhold  capacity  from  the  market, 
since  the  opportunity  for  raising  profits  does  not  always  exist  due  to  internalities  and 
externalities,  such  as  collaborative  generators  breaking  the  agreement,  the  demand 
bid 
,  imbalance  prices,  etc.  In  other  words,  the  payoff  in  the  payoff  matrix  change  with 
the  internalities  and  externalities,  making  it  necessary  to  recognize  when  the 
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tacit  collusion"  to  distinguish  it  from  the  classical  "tacit  collusion".  These  generators 
follow  an  "opportunistic  collusion"  strategy  whereby  generators  withhold  capacity 
from  the  market  only  when  they  perceive  an  "opportunity"  to  raise  profits  by  doing  so 
exists.  Opportunistic  collusion  might  result  in  a  generator  setting  aside  a  portion  of 
their  capacity  and  deciding  for  each  trading  round  whether  or  not  to  offer  that  capacity 
to  the  market  depending  on  expectations  of  raising  profits.  Once  this  is  learned 
suppliers  "tacitly  collude"  to  sustain  high  market  prices. 
For  the  "opportunistic  collusive"  generators,  it  is  difficult  to  judge  an  "opportunity"  to 
get  more  profits  by  estimating  possible  profit  with  cooperative  strategy.  Because  in  a 
certain  market  environment  where  a  wide  number  of  market  participants  are  trading 
interactively,  there  are  uncertainties  and  it  is  unlikely  to  precisely  predict  all 
participants'  future  moves  and  trading  consequence.  Nevertheless,  the  market  clearing 
price  in  PX,  PXP,  and  individual  generators'  capacity  used  in  both  of  PX  and  BM,  are 
introduced  as  the  reference  for  the  "opportunistic  collusive"  generators  to  decide 
whether  or  not  to  join  the  coalition  agreement  and  withhold  capacity  from  the  market. 
6.2  Experimental  Setup  for  Analysis 
The  market  clearing  prices  in  PX  is  divided  into  three  periods: 
1)  A  low  price  period,  where  the  prices  tend  to  be  close  to  individual  generator's 
specific  marginal  costs; 
2)  An  average  price  period,  where  the  prices  are  at  least  75%  above  the  marginal 
costs; 
3)  A  high  price  period,  where  the  prices  rise  to  at  least  20  times  the  marginal  cost. 
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1)  A  low  demand  period,  below  75%  of  individual  generator's  particular  available 
capacity; 
2)  An  average  demand  period,  between  75%  and  85%  of  available  capacity; 
3)  A  high  demand  period,  above  85%  of  available  capacity. 
We  assume  if,  and  only  if,  that  the  market  clearing  prices,  PXP,  is  in  either  of  average 
price  period  or  high  price  period  of  a  "opportunistic  collusive"  generator,  and  its  used 
capacity  is  in  low  demand  period,  this  "opportunistic  collusive"  generator  will  quit 
coalition  agreement  and  trade  independently  in  market.  If  either  of  these  two 
conditions  is  unsatisfied,  it  will  rejoin  the  collusive  group. 
The  base-load  plants  (running  in  a  non-stop  regime),  say  the  nuclear  stations,  are 
specified  as  "the  "loyal  cooperator",  because  they  need  to  run  continuously  and 
specify  zero  start-up  cycle  so  that  they  are  not  able  to  respond  flexibly  to  real  time 
trading  in  the  BM.  The  gas  turbine  power  plants  and  oil  generation  plants  are  defined 
as  "opportunistic  collusive"  generators  as  they  own  the  highest  flexibility  which 
means  their  generation  features  allow  them  to  start  up  a  numbers  of  times  within  one 
day.  CCGT  and  coal  power  plants  are  assumed  only  adopt  non-cooperative  strategy 
and  trade  independently  in  power  market. 
Besides,  as  we  assume,  this  gaming  behaviour  can  take  place  independently  of 
transmission  constraints,  or  insufficient  supply,  and  is  only  enhanced  by  those  factors. 
6.3  Small-Scale  Model  Experiment  and  Verification 
In  order  to  gain  a  better  view  of  the  effects  of  gaming  trading  strategies  on  NETA,  the 
first  application  experiment  is  carried  out  based  on  a  small  scale  model.  The  total Chapter  6  Strategy  Development  and  Prediction  Experiments  81 
available  generation  capacity  is  assumed  as  33.3GW  in  this  experiment,  half  size  of 
the  model  experimented  in  last  chapter.  The  number  of  generators,  m,  is  assumed  to  5, 
and  suppliers',  n,  is  assumed  to  4  in  this  experiment.  The  total  demand  is  set  as  25 
GW,  therefore  the  individual  maximal  demand,  Qdm  ax',  of  each  supplier  is  set  as 
6250MW.  These  experiments  are  based  on  the  standard  daily  demand  profile  in 
November  2004,  published  by  NETA  and  shown  in  Figure  6.1. 
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Figure  6.1:  Standard  daily  demand  profile  in  November  [63] 
There  are  still  five  sorts  of  power  generation  concerned  considered  in  this  model, 
including  gas  turbine,  oil,  coal,  combined  cycle  gas  turbine  (CCGT)  and  nuclear 
plants.  The  generators  of  the  same  type  are  assumed  to  have  similar  marginal  costs 
and  generation  capacity.  Their  generation  system  self-parameter  is  demonstrated  in 
Table  6-1. 
Table  6.1  Generators'  system  self-parameters 
Type  of  generation  Nuclear  Combined  cycle  Large  Gas  turbines  Oil 
plants  Gas  turbine  coal 
(CCGT) 
Marginal  generation  24.50  9.72  33.23  66.95  87.91 
cost  (f/MWH) 
Maximal  generation  6600  6600  6600  6600  6600 
capacity  (MW) Chapter  6  Strategy  Development  and  Prediction  Experiments  82 
6.3.1  Market  Results 
In  order  to  assess  the  perfon-nance  of  market  players'  different  strategies,  three  major 
model  outputs,  the  wholesale  market  clearing  price  PXP,  imbalanced  settlement  prices 
System  Buy  Price  SBP  and  System  Sell  Price  SSP,  are  presented  and  evaluated  below. 
6.3.1.1  Traded  Market  Clearing  Prices  in  Power  Exchange 
For  gaining  insights  into  aspects  of  the  model  and  observing  the  evolution  of  the 
trading  strategy,  the  analysis  method  imposed  on  the  data  in  last  chapter  is  also 
adopted  here.  The  model's  running  process,  given  20  days,  is  divided  into  four 
consecutive  stages,  week  by  week.  These  three  trading  results,  including  market 
clearing  price  PXP,  imbalanced  settlement  prices  System  Buy  Price  SBP  and  System 
Sell  Price  SSP,  in  each  trading  week,  are  respectively  represented  by  three  typical 
mean  daily  trading  results.  Then  for  each  of  the  three  model  outputs,  there  are  overall 
4  sets  of  experimental  results  corresponding  to  the  four  trading  weeks,  and  one  set 
includes  48  model  experimental  outputs.  These  trading  results  are  shown  week  by 
week  to  observe  how  the  market  players  improve  their  strategies  and  how  their 
behaviours  influence  the  market  outcomes. 
The  PX  runs  as  a  proxy  for  trades  in  all  the  markets.  As  the  crucial  system  output  and 
model  perfon-nance  assessment  reference,  the  market  cleanng  price  in  Power 
Exchange,  PXP,  in  each  of  the  four  weeks,  is  represented  by  a  set  of  mean  daily 
market  price.  Each  daily  PXP  curve  has  48  PXP  values  coming  from  the  48  trading 
iterations  within  each  typical  trading  day.  Figure  6.2  demonstrates  the  mean  daily 
Power  Exchange  market  prices  in  the  first  week. Chapter  6  Strategy  Development  and  Prediction  Experiments 
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Figure  6.2:  Mean  daily  market  clearing  price  in  PX  in  the  first  trading  week 
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Figure  6.3:  Mean  daily  market  clearing  price  in  PX  in  the  second  trading  week 
According  Figure  6.2  and  Figure  6.3  above,  there  are  a  number  of  extremely  sharp 
price  spikes  emerged  in  demand  peak  periods  during  the  first  two  weeks.  It  is 
interesting  that  in  the  rest  of  trading  times  the  PXP  remains  on  similar  level  to  the 
experimental  data  in  last  experiment  in  Chapter  5,  where  no  cooperative  strategy  is 
introduced. Chapter  6  Strategy  Development  and  Prediction  Experiments 
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Figure  6.4:  Mean  daily  market  clearing  price  in  PX  in  the  third  trading  week 
Figure  6.4  shows  the  development  of  mean  daily  PXP  in  the  third  week. 
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Figure  6.5:  Mean  daily  market  clearing  price  in  PX  in  the  forth  trading  week 
The  market's  mean  daily  Power  Exchange  clearing  prices  from  the  last  trading  week 
are  presented  in  Figure  6.5.  We  can  see  that  the  degree  of  price  spikes  has  dropped 
down  along  with  the  model's  running  and  strategies  evolution. 
6.3.1.2  Traded  Prices  in  Imbalance  Settlement  System  -  System  Sell  Price  and 
System  Buy  Price 
In  the  Imbalance  Settlement  Process,  the  generators'  metered  generation  and 
suppliers'  metered  demand  are  compared  with  the  contractual  position  they  notify. Chapter  6  Strategy  Development  and  Prediction  Experiments  85 
The  difference  between  the  amount  of  electricity  bought  and  sold  under  contracts  and 
the  actual  amount  produced  and  consumed  is  calculated  by  the  imbalance  settlement 
system.  The  weighted  average  of  accepted  Offers  price  for  buying  more  energy  is 
known  as  the  System  Buy  Price  (SBP).  Conversely,  the  price  for  selling  excess  energy 
to  the  system  the  System  Sell  Price  (SSP),  is  a  weighted  average  of  accepted  Bids.. 
The  same  goes  for  suppliers. 
Figure  6.6  to  Figure  6.9  reveal  the  impact  of  market  participants'  strategies,  especially 
the  gaming  strategy,  on  the  Imbalance  Settlement  Process.  The  other  two  fundamental 
system  outputs,  imbalanced  settlement  prices  System  Buy  Price  SBP  and  System  Sell 
Price  SSP  are  illustrated  below.  Figure  6.6  demonstrates  the  mean  daily  price  curves 
of  the  imbalanced  settlement  prices  SSP  and  SBP  in  the  beginning  week. 
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Figure  6.7:  Mean  daily  System  Imbalance  Price  in  the  second  week 
Figure  6.7  shows  the  mean  daily  price  curves  of  the  imbalanced  settlement  prices  SSP 
and  SBP  in  the  second  week.  There  is  evident  observation  that  both  of  SSP  and  SBP 
stay  stable  at  much  higher  degrees  than  previous  experiment  data  in  most  of  the 
trading  rounds. 
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Figure  6.8:  Mean  daily  System  Imbalance  Price  in  the  third  week 
Figure  6.8  shows  the  development  of  mean  daily  imbalanced  settlement  prices  in  the 
third  week. Chapter  6  Strategy  Development  and  Prediction  Experiments 
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Figure  6.9:  Mean  daily  System  Imbalance  Price  in  the  forth  week 
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The  model's  mean  daily  imbalanced  settlement  prices  in  the  last  trading  week  are 
introduced  in  Figure  6.9. 
6.3.1.3  Discussion  of  Results 
Based  on  the  experiment  results  demonstrated  above,  significantly  different  to  the 
results  in  last  experiments  at  which  generators  only  employ  non-cooperative  strategy, 
the  PXP  is  driven  to  very  high  degrees  during  demand  peak  times  and  in  the  rest  of 
trading  times  the  PXP  remains  on  similar  level  to  the  experimental  data  in  last 
experiment  with  no  cooperative  strategy  employed.  The  reason  will  be  discussed  in 
the  section  of  summary. 
Also,  the  System  Buy  Price  SBP  is  varied  within  an  extremely  wide  of  range,  between 
40f/MVvlh  to  790f-/MWh.  Further,  much  more  price  spikes  emerges  in  SBP  rather 
than  only  at  the  three  peak  periods,  9:  00am  to  1  1:  00am,  14:  00am  to  16:  00am,  and 
20:  00prn  to  22:  00pm,  in  previous  experiments,  due  to  sharper  supply  function's 
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6.3.2  Generators  Capacity  Used 
As  we  assume,  if  and  only  if,  that  the  market  clearing  prices,  PXP,  is  in  either  of 
average  price  period  or  high  price  period  of  a  "opportunistic  collusive"  generator,  and 
its  used  capacity  is  in  low  demand  period,  this  "opportunistic  collusive"  generator  will 
quit  coalition  agreement  and  trade  independently  in  market.  If  either  of  these  two 
conditions  is  unsatisfied,  it  will  rejoin  the  collusive  group.  The  generator  used 
capacity  is  an  important  reference  to  measure  the  efficiency  of  generators'  strategies 
and  individual  generator's  position  in  this  environment.  For  the  "opportunistic 
collusive"  generators  it  is  also  a  reference  parameter  to  decide  the  next  move  on  the 
trading.  Figure  6.10  shows  the  individual  mean  used  capacity  of  the  all  five  types 
generators  in  the  first  week. 
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Figure  6.10:  Comparison  of  used  capacity  for  different  generators  in  the  first  week 
It  is  clear  in  Figure  6.10  that  the  type  of  nuclear  stations,  assumed  as  "loyal 
cooperator",  has  the  largest  market  share  in  the  initial  stage.  The  experiment  results 
show  that  suppliers  often  use  nuclear  plant  as  base-load  plants  because  of  its 
continuous  running  feature  to  avoid  the  risk  of  having  to  buy  and  sell  in  this  way 
through  the  Balancing  Mechanism  with  its  very  volatile  prices. Chapter  6  Strategy  Development  and  Prediction  Experiments 
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Figure  6.11:  Comparison  of  used  capacity  for  different  generators  in  the  second  week 
Figure  6.11  and  Figure  6.12  have  shown  that  the  generation  types  with  more 
flexibility  have  sold  more  power  to  the  market  than  base-load  plants,  given  the 
nuclear. 
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Figure  6.12:  Comparison  of  used  capacity  for  different  generators  in  the  third  week 
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Figure  6.13:  Comparison  of  used  capacity  for  different  generators  in  the  fourth  week Chapter  6  Strategy  Development  and  Prediction  Experiments  90 
The  evolvement  of  the  use  capacity  of  individual  generation  type  is  these  trading 
process  is  shown  following. 
Table  6.2:  Mean  Percentage  of  Used  Generation  Capacity 
Generation  Type  Nuclear  CCGT  Large  coal  Gas  turbine  Oil 
First  Week  0.802  0.763  0.736  0.724  0.703 
Second  Week  0.712  0.770  0.749  0.729  0.754 
Third  Week  0.659  0.742  0.766  0.775  0.807 
Forth  Week  0.685  0.749  0.741  0.780  0.832 
6.3.3  Profitability  Prediction  of  Individual  Generators 
As  we  know,  there  are  five  sorts  of  power  generation  systems  run  into  this  model, 
including  gas  turbine,  oil,  coal,  combined  cycle  gas  turbine  (CCGT)  and  nuclear 
plants.  For  each  generation  type,  the  weekly  individual  profit  is  represented  by  mean 
daily  individual  profit.  The  mean  daily  individual  profit  of  each  generation  type  is 
calculated  by  function  4.4.  In  order  to  compare  their  strategy's  efficiency,  the  mean 
individual  profit  of  nuclear  generator  on  each  trading  day  is  divided  by  the  other  four 
type's,  respectively.  The  calculated  results  are  shown  below  from  Figure  6.14  to  6.17. 
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Figure  6.14:  Comparison  of  individual  profit  of  each  generation  type  in  the  first  week Chapter  6  Strategy  Development  and  Prediction  Experiments 
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Figure  6.15:  Comparison  of  individual  profit  of  each  generation  type  in  the  second 
week 
Based  on  the  figures  shown  here,  the  individual  profit  of  each  generation  type  has 
very  similar  development  trend  to  the  case  of  their  used  capacity. 
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Figure  6.16:  Comparison  of  individual  profit  of  each  generation  type  in  the  third  week 
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Figure  6.17:  Comparison  of  individual  profit  of  each  generation  type  in  the  fourth 
week Chapter  6  Strategy  Development  and  Prediction  Experiments  92 
6.3.4  Results  of  Suppliers 
Each  supplier's  objective  is  to  optimize  its  contract  position,  as  well  as  trading  prices, 
to  minimize  the  cost  of  contracting  in  order  to  maximize  total  daily  profits.  Although 
in  NETA  the  demand  side  service  is  full  incorporated,  the  position  of  suppliers  is  still 
subordinate  in  this  marketplace.  Some  may  argue  that  demand  service  providers  can 
withdraw  demand  from  the  PX  market  to  counter  the  generator's  strategy.  On  one 
hand,  NETA's  transition  rules  limited  the  ability  of  the  major  providers  to  do  this  by 
requiring  that  they  purchase  a  majority  of  their  needs  from  the  PX  markets.  On  the 
other  hand,  even  when  demand  providers  can  move  their  purchases  between  markets, 
the  generators  always  have  an  advantage.  Once  the  PX  market  clears,  generators  can 
use  System  Operator  load  forecasts  to  know  how  much  energy  is  required  by  the 
market. 
As  described  in  previous  part,  the  suppliers  have  adopted  a  strategy  to  respond  to 
NETA  imbalance  prices  by  over-contracting  to  reduce  exposure  to  the  penalty  in  BM. 
The  strategy  is  represented  by  functions  4.2  and  4.3.  A  percentage  premium,  which  is 
used  to  evaluate  supplier's  strategy  and  profit  efficiency,  can  be  defined  as  (Cs/  CL)  * 
100;  the  lower  the  premium  the  more  efficient  the  strategy.  The  mean  daily  premium 
on  each  round  are  presented  week  by  week.  The  efficiency  of  the  suppliers'  strategy 
optimization  is  clearly  demonstrated  in  the  Figure  6.17  to  Figure  6.20. Chapter  6  Strategy  Development  and  Prediction  Experiments 
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Figure  6.18:  Average  suppliers'  percentage  of  overcontracting  in  the  first  week 
In  each  of  the  four  trading  weeks,  the  suppliers'  percentage  of  overcontracting  is 
represented  by  a  set  of  mean  daily  overcontracting  points.  Figure  6.18  shows  the 
suppliers  overcontract  situation  in  the  initial  stage. 
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Figure  6.19:  Average  suppliers'  percentage  of  overcontracting  in  the  second  week 
Figure  6.19  and  6.20  present  the  development  of  suppliers'  overcontracting  when  the 
model  is  running  in  the  midway. Chapter  6  Strategy  Development  and  Prediction  Experiments 
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Figure  6.20:  Average  suppliers'  percentage  of  overcontracting  in  the  third  week 
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Figure  6.2  1:  Average  suppliers'  percentage  of  overcontracting  in  the  forth  week 
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According  to  results  above,  the  suppliers'  strategy  effectiveness  is  quite  poor  when 
gaming  strategy  is  adopted  by  a  number  of  generators.  The  over-contracting  maintains 
serious  especially  in  peak  periods  when  the  risks  of  being  short  and  cost  for  imbalance 
are  high. 
6.3.5  Summary 
Based  on  the  application  experimental  results  presented  above,  it  has  been  proved  that 
gaming  generators  have  the  potential  to  unilaterally  raise  the  market  price  by Chapter  6  Strategy  Development  and  Prediction  Experiments  95 
withholding  generation  under  certain  situation.  The  detailed  analysis  will  be  taken  in 
the  last  section  of  this  chapter. 
6.4  Large-Scale  Model  Experiment  and  Verification 
In  order  to  compare  the  effects  of  market  player  strategies  under  different  market 
circumstance,  the  second  application  experiment  is  taken  on  a  large-scale  model 
which  is  comparably  similar  to  the  NETA  market.  The  total  available  capacity  is  set 
same  as  the  experimental  model  at  which  the  non-cooperative  strategy  is  employed, 
say  66.7GW.  The  number  of  generators,  m,  is  assumed  to  15,  and  suppliers',  n,  is 
assumed  to  10  in  this  experiment  as  well.  There  are  five  sorts  of  power  generation 
systems  run  into  this  model,  including  gas  turbine,  oil,  coal,  combined  cycle  gas 
turbine  (CCGT)  and  nuclear  plants.  The  generators  of  the  same  type  are  assumed  to 
have  similar  marginal  costs  and  generation  capacity.  The  generators'  system 
parameters,  i.  e.  estimated  marginal  generation  costs  P,,,,  i,  assumed  maximal 
generation  capacity,  Qsmaxi,  of  each  generator  on  each  generation  type  are  presented  in 
Table  6.3  below.  The  total  available  generation  capacity  is  set  as  66.7GW. 
Oppositely,  the  maximal  market  demand  is  50GW,  which  is  same  as  the  market  scale 
of  the  NETA,  so  that  the  average  maximal  demand,  Qdniax  i,  of  each  supplier  is 
1125MW.  The  ratio  of  maximal  market  demand  to  total  available  generation  capacity 
is  set  as  0.75,  following  the  real  situation  in  NETA.  The  large-scale  experiments  are 
based  on  the  same  winter  daily  demand  profile  introduced  in  the  previous  experiment. Chapter  6  Strategy  Development  and  Prediction  Experiments 
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Type  of  generation  Nuclear  do-mbined  cycle  Large  Gas  Oil 
plants  Gas  turbine  Coal  Turbines 
(CCGT) 
Marginal  generation  24.50  9.72  33.23  66.95  87.91 
cost  (f/MWH) 
Maximal  generation  4450  4450  4450  4450  4450 
capacity  (MW) 
6.4.1  Modelling  Results 
6.4.1.1  Traded  Market  Clearing  Prices  in  Power  Exchange 
The  method  to  analyse  the  experimental  results  is  same  as  in  the  last  expenment. 
These  major  trading  results,  including  market  clearing  price  PXP,  imbalanced 
settlement  prices  System  Buy  Price  SBP  and  System  Sell  Price  SSP,  generators  used 
capacity,  individual  profit  are  shown  and  assessed. 
In  each  trading  week,  the  PX  market  clearing  price,  is  represented  by  a  set  of  mean 
daily  market  clearing  price.  There  are  overall  4  sets  of  experimental  results 
corresponding  to  the  four  consecutive  trading  weeks. 
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Figure  6.22:  Mean  daily  market  clearing  price  in  PX  in  the  first  trading  week Chapter  6  Strategy  Development  and  Prediction  Experiments  97 
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Figure  6.23:  Mean  daily  market  clearing  price  in  PX  in  the  second  trading  week 
From  the  diagraphs  above,  there  is  an  interesting  trend  arising,  that  the  wholesale 
price  PXP  under  cooperative  situation  in  the  first  small-scale  model  is  more  higher 
than  in  the  large-scale  model  with  same  trading  strategy.  There  are  a  few  price  spikes 
on  wholesale  market  price  PXP  happened  in  the  later  model  as  compared  with  in 
former  where  the  price  spikes  arise  even  when  sufficient  supply  is  available.  Whereas, 
in  the  second  model  these  price  spikes  only  emerge  when  the  demand  is  on  peak 
times,  10:  00am  to  12:  00am,  and  19:  00pm  to  21:  00pm.  Also,  in  the  second 
experiment,  the  PXP  in  the  rest  of  trading  rounds  are  very  close  to  the  PXP  in  the 
model  at  which  market  participants  adopt  non-cooperative  strategy.  Hence,  in  order  to 
get  better  understanding  of  how  the  strategies  work,  we  adjust  an  crucial  gaming 
strategy  parameter,  X,  which  represents  the  percentage  of  how  much  output  capacity 
each  member  of  the  coalition  agreement  intends  to  withhold  in  its  total  generation 
capacity,  to  a  new  range  between  10%  and  40%,  which  was  set  between  10%  and 
25%.  The  new  variable  is  experimented  in  the  third  and  forth  trading  weeks. Chapter  6  Strategy  Development  and  Prediction  Experiments 
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Figure  6.24:  Mean  daily  market  clearing  price  in  PX  in  the  third  trading  week 
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Figure  6.25:  Mean  daily  market  clearing  price  in  PX  in  the  forth  trading  week 
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On  the  last  two  experiments,  the  emergence  of  price  spikes  keeps  same  as  in  the  first 
two  experiments.  The  discussion  for  this  feature  will  be  carried  out  later  on. 
6.4.1.2  Traded  Prices  in  Imbalance  Settlement  System  -  System  Sell  Price  and 
System  Buy  rice 
Imbalance  Settlement  prices  are  parameters  to  observe  the  efficiency  of  gaming 
generators  strategy  and  how  market  players'  performance  influence  on  the  market. Chapter  6  Strategy  Development  and  Prediction  Experiments 
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Figure  6.26:  Mean  daily  System  Imbalance  Price  in  the  first  week 
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Figure  6.26  to  Figure  6.29  reveal  the  impact  of  market  participants'  strategies  on  the 
Imbalance  Settlement  Process  in  terms  of  showing  the  other  two  important  reference 
parameters,  imbalanced  settlement  prices  System  Buy  Price  SBP  and  System  Sell 
Price  SSP.  Figure  6.26  demonstrates  the  mean  daily  price  curves  of  the  imbalanced 
settlement  prices  SBP  and  SSP  in  the  beginning  week. 
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Figure  6.27:  Mean  daily  System  Imbalance  Price  in  the  second  week 
Figure  6.27  and  6.28  present  the  development  of  mean  daily  System  Imbalance  price 
when  the  model  is  running  in  the  midway.  It  is  clear  that  the  price  spikes  only  emerge 
in  peak  demand  penods  in  the  model. Chapter  6  Strategy  Development  and  Prediction  Experiments  100 
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Figure  6.28:  Mean  daily  System  Imbalance  Price  in  the  third  week 
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Figure  6.29:  Mean  daily  System  Imbalance  Price  in  the  forth  week 
The  model's  mean  daily  imbalanced  settlement  prices  in  the  last  trading  week  are 
illustrated  in  Figure  6.29. 
6.4.1.3  Generators  Capacity  Used 
The  traded  generation  output  volumes  from  different  types  of  generators  are  presented 
as  following  by  week: Chapter  6  Strategy  Development  and  Prediction  Experiments 
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Figure  6.30:  Comparison  of  used  capacity  for  different  generators  in  the  first  week 
The  generator  used  capacity  is  a  crucial  reference  to  measure  the  efficiency  of 
generators'  strategies  and  to  decide  the  next  move  on  the  trading.  Figure  6.30  shows 
the  individual  used  capacity  for  different  generators  in  the  first  week.  Similar  to  the 
last  experiment  carried  out  in  a  small-scale  model,  the  nuclear  plants  get  more  market 
share  than  others  in  the  initial  stages. 
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Figure  6.3  1:  Comparison  of  used  capacity  for  different  generators  in  the  second 
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Figure  6.32:  Comparison  of  used  capacity  for  different  generators  in  the  third  week 
Figure  6.32  shows  the  development  of  used  capacity  for  different  generators  in  the 
third  week. 
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Figure  6.33:  Comparison  of  used  capacity  for  different  generators  in  the  forth  week 
The  evolvement  of  the  use  capacity  of  individual  generation  type  is  these  trading 
process  is  shown  following. 
Table  6.4:  Mean  Percentage  of  Used  Generation  Capacity 
Generation  Type  Nuclear  CCGT  Large  coal  Gas  turbine  Oil 
First  Week  0.829  0.755  0.729  0.728  0.727 
Second  Week  0.832  0.778  0.748  0.722  0.728 
Third  Week  0.68  0.729  0.782  0.727  0.75 
Forth  Week  0.685  0.734  0.713  0.761  0.82 Chapter  6  Strategy  Development  and  Prediction  Experiments  103 
6.4.1.4  Profitability  of  Individual  Generators 
There  are  five  sorts  of  power  generation  systems  run  into  this  model,  including  gas 
turbine,  oil,  coal,  combined  cycle  gas  turbine  (CCGT)  and  nuclear  plants.  The  mean 
daily  individual  profit  of  each  generation  type  is  calculated  by  function  4.4.  To 
compare  the  individual  generation  sort's  strategy  efficiency,  the  mean  profit  of 
nuclear  generation  plant  on  each  trading  round  is  set  as  the  benchmark.  The 
experiment  results  are  shown  below. 
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Figure  6.34:  Comparison  of  individual  profit  of  each  generation  type  in  the  first 
week 
Corresponding  to  the  situation  at  which  the  nuclear  plant  has  more  used  generation 
capacity  and  gain  more  market  share,  its  profit  is  the  highest  in  the  beginning. 
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Figure  6.35:  Comparison  of  individual  profit  of  each  generation  type  in  the  second 
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The  evolvement  of  the  individual  profit  when  the  trading  is  running  in  midway  is 
shown  in  Figure  6.35  and  Figure  6.36. 
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Figure  6.36:  Comparison  of  individual  profit  of  each  generation  type  in  the  third 
week 
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Figure  6.37:  Comparison  of  individual  profit  of  each  generation  type  in  the  forth 
week 
The  individual  profit  of  each  generation  type  from  the  last  trading  week  are  presented 
in  Figure  6.37. Chapter  6  Strategy  Development  and  Prediction  Experiments  105 
6.4.2  Results  of  Suppliers 
A  percentage  premium,  which  is  used  to  evaluate  supplier's  strategy  and  profit 
efficiency,  is  calculated  by  equations  4.2  and  4.3.  The  lower  the  premium  the  more 
efficient  the  strategy.  The  mean  daily  premium  on  each  round  are  presented  week  by 
week.  The  efficiency  of  the  suppliers'  strategy  optimization  Is  clearly  demonstrated 
from  these  figures. 
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Figure  6.38:  Comparison  of  suppliers'  percentage  of  overcontracting  in  the  first  week 
In  each  of  the  four  trading  weeks,  the  suppliers'  percentage  of  overcontracting  is 
represented  by  a  set  of  mean  daily  overcontracting  points.  Figure  6.38  shows  the 
suppliers  overcontract  situation  in  the  initial  stage. 
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Figure  6.39:  Comparison  of  suppliers'  percentage  of  overcontracting  in  the  second 
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In  the  first  two  stages,  the  suppliers'  percentage  of  overcontracing  is  around  5%. 
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Figure  6.40:  Comparison  of  suppliers'  percentage  of  overcontracting  in  the  third  week 
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Figure  6.41:  Comparison  of  suppliers'  percentage  of  overcontracting  in  the  fourth 
week 
We  can  observe  that  the  evolution  of  supplier  strategy  has  significantly  made  less 
overcontracting  in  last  stage. 
6.5  Summary 
From  the  generalisation  and  prediction  experiments  carried  out,  the  experiment  results 
have  revealed  some  significant  changes  and  differences  among  the  outputs  of  the Chapter  6  Strategy  Development  and  Prediction  Experiments  107 
models  with  different  trading  strategies  and  two  different  scale  models,  they  have  also 
drawn  some  conclusions  below. 
1.  In  the  small-scale  model  where  the  market  size  is  similar  to  the  scale  of 
Californian  electricity  market,  but  much  smaller  than  the  reality  in  NETA,  a 
number  of  generation  companies  adopt  cooperative  strategy.  The  market 
circumstance  has  been  successfully  changed  by  gaming  generation  companies. 
The  Imbalance  Settlement  price  SBP  is  driven  up  to  a  significantly  high  level  and 
the  PX  market  price  PXP  has  a  number  of  sharp  price  spikes  which  are  not 
affordable  for  electricity  suppliers.  Further,  the  individual  profit  of  gaming  players 
are  much  higher  than  in  both  of  the  large-scale  model  where  some  generation 
companies  adopt  same  cooperative  strategy  and  the  model  where  all  trading 
participants  employ  non-cooperative  strategy. 
2.  Experimental  results  from  the  large-scale  model  where  some  generation 
companies  adopt  cooperative  strategy  have  revealed  that,  on  one  hand,  the  PX 
market  prices  PXP  are  not  obviously  influenced  by  the  strategic  trading  imposed 
by  some  gaming  generators,  whereas  the  PXP  results  are  close  to  the  results  in  the 
model  with  all  using  non-cooperative  strategy,  even  when  the  percentage  of 
withheld  output  capacity  of  individual  coalition  member  is  tuned  to  40%  of  its 
maximal  generation  volume;  on  the  other  hand,  the  Imbalance  Settlement  prices 
SBP  and  SSP  have  caused  lots  of  serious  price  spikes  in  demand  peak  times.  And 
individual  profit  of  gaming  players  is  comparably  higher  than  other  market 
participants  employing  non-cooperative  strategy.  Experimental  results  expose  that 
one  of  major  reasons  for  this  phenomena  in  which  the  trading  outcomes  from  two 
models  are  obviously  different  is  that,  in  the  large-scale  market  place  where  a Chapter  6  Strategy  Development  and  Prediction  Experiments  108 
large  number  of  participants  are  involved,  a  minority  group  of  players  do  no  have 
significant  effect  on  market  share.  Another  reason  is  that  the  "opportunistic 
collusion"  generators  do  not  always  join  the  agreement  to  withhold  output  and, 
according  to  their  strategy  evaluation  results,  in  some  trading  rounds  they  choose 
non-cooperative  strategy  to  work  independently  and  try  to  make  their  individual 
profit  maximized  in  the  market  place. 
3.  Experimental  results  also  illustrate  that  implementing  both  physical  (bid  only  a 
portion  of  one's  capacity)  and  economic  (bid  a  portion  at  a  very  high  price) 
withholding  generation  capacity  is  an  efficient  methodology  to  change  the  market 
circumstance,  given  causing  price  spikes.  Theoretically  which  type  of  withholding 
a  generator  should  choose  depends  on  the  market  structure.  In  NETA 
circumstance,  all  markets  (forwards  and  futures  markets,  short-term  Power 
Exchange  and  BM)  are  continuate  and  interchangeable.  Therefore  both  of  physical 
and  economic  withholding  is  employed  to  make  the  maximal  profit  by  gaming 
generators. 
4.  It  is  evident  that  a  number  of  price  spikes  do  emerge  on  PX  market  price  PXP  and 
Imbalance  Settlement  Prices,  no  matter  in  our  designed  models  or  in  actual  NETA 
market.  In  the  experiment  with  non-cooperative  strategy  the  price  spikes  often 
emerge  when  the  demand  is  on  peak  times,  10:  00am  to  12:  00am,  and  19:  00pm  to 
21:  00pm.  When  the  market  is  driven  to  an  oligopoly  situation  in  the  small-scale 
model,  much  more  price  spikes  arises.  For  most  industries,  standard  economic 
theory  suggests  that,  under  perfect  competition,  where  no  individual  supplier  has 
market  power,  the  bids  offered  by  each  supplier  should  equal  their  marginal 
production  costs.  Under  this  scenario,  price  spikes  should  only  occur  when Chapter  6  Strategy  Development  and  Prediction  Experiments  109 
demand  exceeds  supply.  However,  in  virtually  all  electric  power  markets,  price 
spikes  giving  profits  much  in  excess  of  marginal  costs  have  been  observed,  even 
when  sufficient  supply  is  available. 
5.  Based  on  the  experimental  results,  the  power  plants  in  base-load  position  with 
lower  marginal  costs,  like  nuclear  power  generators,  have  sole  out  more 
generation  volume  and  got  comparably  higher  profits  in  initial  weeks.  Along  with 
the  development  of  strategy  and  algorithms  optimization,  the  other  power 
generation  with  lower  startups  which  are  flexible  in  Balancing  Mechanism  are 
meeting  the  mechanism's  system  balance  requirements  and  learning  to  improve 
their  trading  strategies.  In  the  later  weeks,  the  power  plants  with  flexibility  which 
means  their  generation  features  allow  them  to  start  up  a  numbers  of  times  within 
one  day  to  respond  the  48-round  market  trading  in  one  day,  whereas  the  power 
plants  with  inflexible  technology  have  to  run  continuously,  have  sold  more 
volumes  and  won  significantly  high  profits  from  the  BM. 
In  general,  the  performance  of  developed  models  and  the  experimental  results  have 
proved  that,  on  one  hand,  there  is  no  evidence  that  on  a  non-naturally  oligopoly 
electricity  market  where  the  market  scale  is  similar  to  the  NETA,  the  effort  that  a  part 
of  generators  make  a  coalition  of  withholding  output  capacity  to  drive  the  market  to 
an  oligopoly  circumstance  could  achieve  its  original  targets,  when  the  generation 
capacity  of  these  gaming  generators  do  not  account  for  significant  share  of  the  total 
market  supply;  on  the  other  hand,  withholding  capacity  may  have  an  extreme  impact 
on  the  imbalance  settlement  prices,  hence  cause  extra  profit  for  related  generators. Chapter  7  Evaluation  Experiments  110 
7.  Evaluation  Experiments  of  Developed  Model  and 
Method 
7.1  Introduction 
In  order  to  assess  the  performance  of  the  proposed  NETA  market  model  and  the 
evolving  trading  strategy,  it  is  necessary  to  compare  them  against  other  related  works. 
A  comparably  similar  simulation  model  with  its  developed  strategies  from  [34]  is 
chosen  to  be  examined  in  this  Chapter.  In  this  chosen  research  work,  the  designed 
model's  scale  is  close  to  the  model  proposed  in  this  thesis.  The  trading  agents  in  this 
model  use  Genetic  Algorithm  coupled  with  various  price  forecasting  techniques  to 
select  appropriate  bidding  strategies  for  the  current  market  conditions.  The  bidding 
strategies  adapt,  or  evolve,  as  other  traders  change  their  trading  behavior.  The 
research  results  from  this  work  are  compared  with  my  experimental  results  following. 
7.2  Evaluation  Results 
To  evaluate  the  efficiency  of  the  two  different  developed  strategies,  three  major 
system  parameters  from  two  models,  the  ratio  of  PX  market  clearing  price  PXP  to 
mean  marginal  cost  MC,  the  individual  generator  capacity  used,  and  the  market 
imbalance  volume,  are  compared  respectively. 
7.2.1  Traded  Market  Clearing  Prices  in  Power  Exchange 
Because  the  PX  is  the  marketplace  where  most  trades  are  made  and  its  clearing  price 
PXP  is  one  of  the  most  important  model  outputs,  the  ratio  of  PXP  to  mean  marginal 
cost  MC,  PXPIMC,  is  a  significant  reference  which  directly  assess  the  effect  of Chapter  7  Evaluation  Experiments  III 
generation  companies5  gaming  strategy  on  the  wholesale  market,  and  also  measures 
the  interaction  between  the  market  environment  and  the  market  player's  payoff. 
As  introduced  previously,  the  model's  running  process,  given  20  days,  is  divided  into 
four  consecutive  stages,  week  by  week.  The  PXPIMC,  in  each  trading  week,  are 
respectively  represented  by  a  set  of  mean  daily  trading  results.  There  are  4  sets  of 
experimental  results  corresponding  to  the  four  trading  weeks,  and  one  set  includes  48 
calculated  values.  Figure  7.1  demonstrates  the  mean  daily  PXPIMC  in  the  first  week. 
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Figure  7.1:  Comparison  of  PXP/MC  from  two  strategies  in  the  first  trading  week 
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Figure  7.2:  Comparison  of  PXP/MC  from  two  strategies  in  the  second  trading  week 
ri  111. Chapter  7  Evaluation  Experiments  112 
According  Figure  7.1  and  Figure  7.2  above,  during  the  first  two  weeks  the  two 
strategies  have  similar  performance  in  most  trading  rounds.  The  trading  strategy 
proposed  by  this  thesis  works  better  in  demand  peak  periods. 
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Figure  7.3:  Comparison  of  PXP/MC  from  two  strategies  in  the  third  trading  week 
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Figure  7.4:  Comparison  of  PXP/MC  from  two  strategies  in  the  fourth  trading  week 
Based  on  the  experiment  results  demonstrated  above,  the  difference  of  two  strategies 
is  calculated  through  dividing  the  mean  PXPIMC  of  the  chosen  model  by  mean 
PXPIMC  of  my  model.  There  is  significant  evidence  that  the  latter  has  stronger 
influence  on  the  PX  prices. Chapter  7  Evaluation  Experiments 
Table  7.1  Comparison  of  PXP/MC  from  two  strategies 
Comparison  of 
Pxpýmc  from  two 
strategies 
Mean  PXPVMC  of 
chosen  model 
Mean  PXPIMC  of 
my  model 
Ratio  of  two 
PXPVMC 
First  Week  1.72  1.83  6.40% 
Second  Week  1.68  1.93  14.88% 
Third  Week  2.39  2.98  24.69% 
Forth  Week  2.40  2.83  17.92% 
7.2.2  Generators  Capacity  Used 
113 
As  we  assume,,  there  are  three  kinds  of  generation  companies  playing  in  the  trading 
system.  The  first  is  "loyal  cooperator",  which  "always"  withhold  a  portion  in 
anticipation  of  coalition  agreement.  The  second  is  "opportunistic  collusive"  generator. 
They  follow  an  "opportunistic  collusion"  strategy  whereby  generators  withhold 
capacity  from  the  market  only  when  they  perceive  an  "opportunity"  to  raise  profits  by 
doing  so  exists.  The  third  is  assumed  only  adopt  non-cooperative  strategy  and  trade 
independently  in  power  market. 
As  we  introduced  earlier,  the  generator  used  capacity  is  an  important  reference  to 
measure  the  efficiency  of  generators'  strategies  and  individual  generator's  position  in 
this  environment.  The  individual  mean  used  generation  capacities  of  "loyal 
cooperator",  "opportunistic  collusive"  generator,  competitive  generator  and  the 
generator  in  the  chosen  model  are  shown  below  from  Figure  7.5  to  7.8. Chapter  7  Evaluation  Experiments 
100 
80 
m  60 
CL 
m 
0 
a  40 
0 
Comparison  of  Different  Generators'  Used  Capacity 
20 
a 
01-I 
123456789  10  11  12  13  14 
-loyal  cooperator 
competitive  generator  Trading  iterations 
-generator  of  chosen  model 
opportunistic  collusive  generator-, 
114 
Figure  7.5:  Comparison  of  used  capacity  for  different  generators  in  the  first  week 
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Figure  7.6:  Comparison  of  used  capacity  for  different  generators  in  the  second  week 
It  is  clear  in  Figure  7.1  and  Figure  7.2  that  the  "loyal  cooperator"  and  competitive 
generators  have  sold  more  generation  volumes  in  the  initial  stage. Chapter  7  Evaluation  Experiments  115 
Comparison  of  Different  Generators'  Capacity  Used 
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Figure  7.7:  Comparison  of  used  capacity  for  different  generators  in  the  third  week 
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Figure  7.8:  Comparison  of  used  capacity  for  different  generators  in  the  fourth  week 
The  evolvement  of  the  use  capacity  of  individual  generation  type  is  these  trading 
process  is  shown  in  Table  7.2. Chapter  7  Evaluation  Experiments 
Table  7.2  Mean  percentage  of  used  generation  capacity  of  different  strategies 
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Kinds  of  generators' 
strategies 
Loyal 
cooperator 
Competitive 
generator 
opportunistic 
collusive" 
generator 
Generator  of 
chosen  model 
First  Week  0.82  0.76  0.69  0.72 
Second  Week  0.79  0.77  0.77  0.72 
Third  Week  0.67  0.72  0.82  0.74 
Forth  Week  0.69  0.73  0.82  0.76 
Mean  Used  Capacity 
0.74  0.75  0.78  0.74 
7.2.3  Imbalance  Volume  In  PX  of  Two  Strategies 
The  fundamental  objective  of  gaming  generators  is  to  make  up  supply/demand 
imbalance  in  PX  and  drive  the  market  into  an  oligopoly  situation.  The  imbalance 
volume  in  PX  is  the  major  parameter  to  assess  the  efficiency  of  the  strategy.  The 
mean  imbalance  volume  in  PX  on  each  trading  week  are  shown  below  from  Figure 
7.9  to  7.12. 
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Figure  7.9:  COmPan*son  of  imbalance  volume  for  different  generators  in  the  first  week Chapter  7  Evaluation  Experiments 
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Figure  7.10:  Comparison  of  imbalance  volume  for  different  generators  in  the  second 
week 
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Figure  7.11:  Comparison  of  imbalance  volume  for  different  generators  in  the  third 
Week 
Figure  7.12:  Comparison  of  imbalance  volume  for  different  generators  in  the  fourth 
week 
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7.3  Summary 
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Based  on  the  evaluation  experiments  carried  out,  the  comparison  results  have  revealed 
some  significant  differences  between  the  two  models  and  their  developed  trading 
strategies.  The  experimental  results  have  drawn  conclusions  that  the  proposed  model 
and  the  designed  trading  strategies  have  better  perfonnance  than  other  related  work. 
In  contrast  to  those  related  work  from  the  literature,  the  proposed  market  model  and 
the  trading  strategy  evolving  method  have  advantages  following, 
1.  Although  the  electricity  trading  system  in  the  U.  K.  is  a  deregulated  market  with 
the  longest  history  in  global  energy  industry  and  has  become  the  benchmark  of 
worldwide  electricity  markets,  there  are  few  research  results  published  for 
analysing  such  a  trading  market  mechanism,  especially  involving  human 
intelligence.  Furthermore  the  other  major  work  that  has  not  been  proposed  by 
academia  and  industry  is  to  study  the  possibility  and  consequence  of  gaming 
behaviours  and  market  power  on  NETA.  The  research  demonstrated  in  this  thesis 
has  done  some  pioneering  work  to  first  model  the  trading  mechanism  of  this 
market  and  to  study  the  influence  of  market  manipulation  by  trader's  gaming 
strategies. 
2.  The  features  of  the  designed  model  has  made  closer  to  the  reality  in  power  market 
than  any  other  research  models  which  had  been  developed  before,  such  as 
e  The  number  of  market  participants  is  same  as  the  real  case  in  NETA; 
9  The  market  model  simulates  a  two-side  market,  with  demand  fully 
incorporated,  which  had  been  achieved  by  others; Chapter  7  Evaluation  Experiments  119 
3.  While  there  has  been  an  amount  of  effort  imposed  on  analysing  the  gaming 
strategies  and  their  influences  over  the  electricity  trading  market  by  adopting 
game  theory,  only  had  they  solely  used  either  noncooperative  or  cooperative  game 
theory  to  analyse  the  market  player's  gaming  behaviours.  However  the  energy 
crisis  in  California  and  problems  happening  in  other  power  markets  have 
demonstrated  that  it  is  not  capable  of  analyzing  the  gaming  strategies  practiced  in 
power  market,  because  market  players  have  been  using  mix  of  both  when  they  are 
making  collusion  among  energy  companies. 
One  of  the  creative  contributions  presented  by  this  research  is  that  both  of  the 
cooperative  and  competitive  game  strategies  are  employed  together  to  simulate 
various  forms  of  trading  strategies  of  different  market  players,  which  follows  the 
reality  of  power  market  trading. 
4.  So  far,  no  research  work  has  ever  studied  how  to  make  gaming  binding  more 
efficient  when  market  participants  are  cooperating.  In  this  case,  a  more  extreme 
management-  enforcement  cooperative  gaming  technique,  "Trigger  price 
strategies",  is  introduced  to  enhance  this  strategy  and  has  been  proved  to  be  a 
useful  method  for  executing  cooperative  agreements  among  gaming  generators. 
5.  Incorporating  these  problems  into  a  decision  making  process  requires  search  and 
optimisation  techniques.  Most  research  have  tried  using  conventional  optimization 
techniques  to  find  best  trading  strategies.  However  many  of  the  classical  learning 
and  search  methodologies  require  the  use  of  derivative  information  that  usually  is 
not  available.  Others  are  limited  to  one  dimension  only.  In  addition  all  of  the 
classical  techniques  are  single-peak  optimisation  techniques.  Yet  modelling  these 
complex  market  behaviours  and  search  the  right  trading  strategies  often  do  not Chapter  7  Evaluation  Experiments  120 
have  accurate  measurement  of  their  variables  and  require  many  objectives  to  be 
met  before  any  solution  is  considered  adequate.  These  deficiencies  have  made 
most  research  in  this  field  have  to  bring  a  lot  of  assumptions  to  make  their 
algorithms  work.  Therefore,  a  search  technique  which  can  handle  these  problems 
should  be: 
9  Be  capable  of  handling  possible  non-linear  interactions  between  various 
elements; 
9  It  is  able  to  deal  with  incomplete,  uncertain  and  imprecise  of  information; 
*  Non-detenninistic  and  posterior; 
9  Global  optimization; 
9  Be  able  to  deal  with  non-numerical  variables. 
Evolutionary  Computing,  a  new  breed  of  learning  and  search  techniques  that  meets 
the  requirements  of  this  research,  is  chosen  and  well  overcome  these  decision-making 
problems. 
6.  In  previous  related  work  that  adopted  Evolutionary  Computing  as  the  search  and 
learning  technique,  Evolutionary  Computing  has  been  used  as  only  fundamental 
method  to  develop  trading  strategies.  This  fact  made  the  evolvement  of  market 
player's  strategy  start  from  random,  which  had  no  sense  to  reality  of  power  markets. 
In  our  study,  Evolutionary  Computing  is  used  as  a  search,  learning  and  optimization 
technique  to  assist  game  theory  to  discover  the  optimal  strategies. 
Although  this  research  work  has  made  some  creative  work  and  achievements,  there 
are  still  some  deficiencies  existing  in  this  model  and  developed  method,  which  could 
be  improved  in  future  work: Chapter  7  Evaluation  Experiments  121 
1.  In  this  research,  Genetic  Algorithms  are  introduced  to  search  and  optimize  market 
players'  trading  strategies.  Limited  range  of  GA  operators  have  been  used  in  this 
research. 
2.  Currently  the  simulated  NETA  market  model  does  not  take  transmission 
constraints  and  losses  into  account  when  market  trading  is  carried  out  for 
simplicity  reason.  These  lack  of  physical  features  of  power  system  made  this 
model  less  feasible. 
3.  The  current  model  omits  some  endogenous  power  system  variables,  including 
start-up  costs  and  no-load  costs,  and  does  not  consider  the  vertical  generators  who 
own  both  power  generation  and  transmission  obligations. 
In  general,  the  developed  market  model  and  the  designed  trading  strategies  is  capable 
of  providing  a  better  simulation  platform  to  analyse  the  dynamic  and  decision  making 
behaviour  of  the  UK  electricity  trading  system,  and  of  developing  an  effective  tool  of 
predicting  the  impact  of  the  gaming  strategy  and  market  power  on  such  a 
circumstance  like  NETA. Chapter  8  Conclusions  and  Future  Work  122 
8.  Conclusions  and  Future  Work 
8.1  Conclusions 
This  research  is  motivated  by  the  market  collapse  events  occurring  in  California  in 
year  2001,  for  which  no  effective  system  models  existed  to  predict  and  take  prompt 
action  rom.  An  effective  model  appeared  to  be  difficult  to  establish,  due  to  human 
involvement  in  the  trading  system  and  gaming  strategies  practised.  It  is  hence  hard  to 
qualify  using  conventional  modelling  and  data  fitting  techniques. 
This  work  has  attempted  the  application  of  Game  Theory  to  the  modelling  and 
application  of  Evolutionary  Algorithms  to  evolve  a  game  theory  based  model.  The 
aims  are  to  model  the  market  structure  and  trading  behaviours  in  the  New  Electricity 
Trading  Arrangements  and  to  analyse  and  predict  the  possibility  and  consequence  of 
gaming  behaviours  and  market  power  on  NETA.  The  work  has  led  to  the  following 
achievements. 
e  An  effective  NETA  system  model  has  been  established,  using  a  hybrid  method  of 
game  theory  and  evolutionary  computation.  The  model  is  capable  of  reproducing 
NETA  market  mechanism,  which  has  not  been  achieved  before. 
9  Compared  with  existing  models,  a  more  sophisticated  and  more  realistic  two-sided 
transaction  mechanism  with  demand  fully  incorporated  is  anommodated  in  this 
new  model,  which  has  not  been  achieved  successfully  in  this  research  field  so  far. 
e  By  utilizing  game  theory,  the  gaming  strategies  of  power  generation  finns  are  well 
simulated  and  the  market  manipulation  and  strategic  trading  behaviours  made  by Chapter  8  Conclusions  and  Future  Work  123 
market  players  can  hence  be  analysed.  Further,  the  impact  of  such  market 
performance  on  NETA  has  been  found  out. 
*  Another  creative  contribution  in  this  research  is  that,  the  cooperative  strategy 
which  is  being  more  frequently  employed  by  electricity  firms  in  global  markets, 
can  now  be  modeled,  simulated,  and  explored  fro  analysis  and  prediction. 
e  "Trigger  price  strategies"  is  introduced  to  enhance  this  research  and  has  been 
proved  to  be  a  useful  method  for  executing  cooperative  agreements  among 
gaming  generators. 
Evolutionary  Computation  based  methods  are  developed  to  search  for  trading 
strategies  against  many  uncertainties  and  incommensurable  objectives. 
In  summary,  this  research  has  successfully  addressed  problems  identified  in  the 
Introduction.  The  research  has  shown  that  the  model  designed  and  methodologies 
developed  are  a  useful  decision-  support  tool  for  developing  competent  strategies  and 
decision-making  for  the  NETA  system. 
8.2  Future  Work 
The  work  presented  in  this  thesis  could  be  extended  in  a  number  of  directions: 
*  In  Chapter  5,  Genetic  Algorithms  are  introduced  to  search  and  optimize  market 
players'  trading  strategies.  Limited  range  of  GA  operators  have  been  used  in  this 
research.  For  instance,  Tournament  selection  is  chosen  as  the  only  selection 
method  to  pick  up  parents.  Research  could  be  performed  to  employ  more 
selection,  crossover  and  mutation  techniques,  and  find  the  suitability  of  different Chapter  8  Conclusions  and  Future  Work  124 
functions  for  this  task.  Therefore  research  into  this  would  be  fruitful.  It  would  also 
be  interesting  to  compare  these  techniques  for  improving  the  algorithms'  power. 
e  It  has  been  recognized  that  most  of  the  generation  based  ancillary  services  such  as 
spinning  reserves  and  AGC  provision,  are  playing  more  important  roles  in  power 
markets.  In  some  electricity  markets  such  as  NETA  and  Spain,  serious  strategic 
behaviour  by  power  suppliers  has  been  observed  in  some  ancillary  services 
markets.  There  have  exhibited  extreme  price  volatility  in  these  markets.  Further 
attempts  to  extend  the  research  interests  to  go  through  the  influence  of  market 
player's  gaming  trading  strategy  on  these  concerned  market  would  be  reasonable. 
Similarly,  it  would  also  be  attractive  to  cover  the  reactive  power  provision  field. 
Optimal  Power  Flow  that  is  able  to  gain  reliable,  analytical  and  experimental 
insight  of  power  system  could  be  employed  as  a  main  technique  to  solve  these 
problems  out. 
*  Currently  the  simulated  NETA  market  model  does  not  take  transmission 
constraints  and  losses  into  account  when  market  trading  is  carried  out  for 
simplicity  reason.  These  physical  features  of  power  system  would  be  covered  by  a 
more  realistic  market  model  in  future  work. 
e  Another  direction  of  future  research  work  would  be  a  deeper  theoretical  and 
experimental  study.  The  current  model  omits  some  endogenous  power  system 
variables,  including  start-up  costs  and  no-load  costs,  and  does  not  consider  the 
vertical  generators  who  own  both  power  generation  and  transmission  obligations. 
This  model  could  be  improved  by  considering  more  if  data  are  available. References  125 
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Appendices 
Tools  to  Analyse  Trading  Competition  and  Strategies 
1  Introduction 
As  described  in  Chapter  2,  there  exists  no  electricity  market  that  is  perfectly 
competitive  in  the  world.  Market  participants  in  the  electricity  market  develop  gaming 
strategies  in  order  to  maximize  their  own  profits.  The  electricity  generators  (main 
sellers)  are  neither  competitive  price-takers  who  have  no  control  over  price,  nor 
monopolistic  price-setters  who  are  the  single  decision  makers.  Market  Clearing  Price 
(MCP),  market  share  allocation  and  then  individual  profit  are  results  of  the 
interactions  among  individual  market  participants,  as  individual  decision  makers. 
Each  market  participant  has  to  determine  and  evaluate  its  strategic  behaviours  based 
on  a  great  deal  of  uncertainty  and  risk. 
Game  theory  is  a  discipline  that  is  concerned  with  how  individuals  make  decisions 
when  they  are  aware  that  their  actions  affect  each  other  and  when  each  individual 
takes  this  into  account.  It  is  the  interaction  among  individual  decision  makers,  all  of 
who  are  behaving  purposefully,  and  whose  decisions  have  implications  for  other 
people  that  make  strategic  decisions  different  from  other  decisions  [45]. 
Necessarily  gaming  strategies  need  to  be  explored  and  evaluated.  Incorporating  these 
problems  into  a  decision  making  process  requires  some  search  and  optimisation 
techniques.  Many  of  the  classical  learning  and  search  methodologies  require  the  use 
of  derivative  information  that  usually  is  not  available.  Others  are  limited  to  one 
dimension  only.  In  addition  all  of  the  classical  techniques  are  single-peak  optimisation 
techniques  [461.  Therefore  Evolutionary  Computing,  a  new  breed  of  learning  and 132  Appendices 
search  techniques  that  are  non-deterministic  and  a  suitable  solution  to  search  the 
global  optimum,  is  chosen  to  solve  this  decision-making  problem. 
This  chapter  deals  with  the  two  evolving  tools  that  are  being  employed  in  this  project, 
namely  game  theory  and  Evolutionary  Computing  (EC).  The  first  part  provides 
background  and  application  of  developing  strategic  behaviours  on  electricity  markets 
through  Game  Theory.  EAs  is  discussed  in  the  second  part. 
2  Game  Theory 
Game  theory  is  a  discipline  that  is  used  to  analyze  problems  of  conflict  among 
interacting  decision  makers.  It  may  be  considered  as  a  generalization  of  decision 
theory  to  include  multiple  players  or  decision  makers.  Game  theory  can  be  classified 
into  two  areas:  cooperative  and  non-  cooperative,  in  which  the  distinction  relates  to 
whether  agreements  made  between  trading  participants  are  binding.  Cooperative  game 
theory  assumes  that  such  agreements  are  binding,  whereas  non-cooperative  game 
theory  does  not. 
2.1  Noncooperative  Game  Theory 
So  far  there  are  much  more  research  contribution  of  using  non-cooperative  game 
theory  on  electricity  market  research  and  developing  gaming  strategies. 
Noncooperative  games  can  be  zero-sum  games  or  nonzero-sum  games.  In  zero-sum 
games,  the  gains  of  one  player  equal  the  losses  of  the  other  player.  In  nonzero-sum 
games,  the  gains  of  one  player  do  not  equal  the  losses  of  the  other  player.  The  solution 
for  nonzero-sum  games  was  first  fon-nulated  by  John  Nash,  and  the  Nash  equilibrium 133  Appendices 
is  now  a  universally  used  game  theory  methodology  on  the  research  of  electricity 
trading  strategy. 
Noncooperative  games  can  be  described  using  two  kinds  for  formats.  The  first  format 
is  the  normal  or  strategic  form,  and  the  second  is  the  extensive  form.  In  the  strategic 
fonn,  one  deals  with  a  set  of  players,  a  set  of  choices  or  strategies  available  to  the 
players,  and  a  set  of  payoffs  corresponding  to  these  strategies.  The  payoff  for  a  given 
player  depends  not  only  on  the  strategy  chosen  by  that  player  but  also  on  the 
strategies  chosen  by  the  other  players.  Additionally,  it  is  assumed  that  the  rules  of  the 
game,  the  strategies  available  to  the  players,  and  the  payoffs  are  common  knowledge. 
Each  player  is  assumed  to  act  rationally  to  maximize  its  profit. 
As  introduced  above,  the  Nash  Equilibrium  is  the  most  widely  used  noncooperative 
game  theory  among  then.  The  formal  definition  of  his  concept  is  given  below  [47]: 
Suppose  there  are  N  players  in  a  game,  Xi  is  the  set  of  possible  strategies  for  player  i, 
and  vi  (si,  SN).  A  Nash  Equilibrium  is  a  strategy  profile  f  Si 
.... 
sNj  I  such  that 
each  strategy  si  is  an  element  of  Xi  and  maximizes  the  function  Qx)  =  vi  (s,  S, 
_,  ,  x. 
Sj+j  sNj  I  among  the  elements  of  Xi.  That  is,  at  a  Nash  Equilibrium,  each 
player's  equilibrium  strategy  is  a  best  response  to  the  belief  that  other  players  will 
adopt  their  Nash  Equilibrium  strategies.  In  Nash  Equilibrium  it  is  assumed  that  the 
rules  of  the  game,  the  strategies  available  to  the  players,  and  the  payoffs  are  common 
knowledge,  which  does  not  reflect  the  real  cases  in  power  markets. 
Finite  nonzero-sum  games  are  also  called  bimatrix  games,  given  the  notation  used  to 
represent  the  payoffs  in  the  game.  A  bimatrix  game  consists  of  two  players,  each  of 134  Appendices 
whom  has  a  finite  number  of  actions  called  pure  strategies.  When  player  I  chooses 
pure  strategy  i  and  player  2  chooses  pure  strategy  j,  their  payoffs  or  gains  are 
represented  by  aij,  and  bij,  respectively.  A  mixed  strategy  for  player  I  is  a  vector  x 
whose  i-th  component  represents  the  probability  of  choosing  pure  strategy  i.  Thus  xi 
ý!  O  and  Z  xi  =  1.  A  mixed  strategy  for  player  2  is  defined  analogously.  If  x  and  y  are  a 
pair  of  mixed  strategies  for  players  1  and  2,  their  expected  gains  are  xAy  and  xBy, 
respectively.  A  pair  of  mixed  strategies  (x*,  y*)  is  said  to  be  a  Nash  equilibrium  if 
(x*)'Ay*  >-  x'Ay*  Vx>0,  Z  xi  =1 
and 
(x*)'By*>-(x*)'By*Vyýý0,  Z  yi=  1 
In  other  words,  (x*,  y*)  is  a  Nash  equilibrium  if  neither  player  can  gain  by  unilaterally 
changing  its  strategy. 
A  particularly  interesting  special  case  of  a  Nash  equilibrium  is  a  Nash  equilibrium  in 
pure  strategies,  i.  e.,  one  in  which  the  probability  of  choosing  a  particular  strategy  is  I 
for  each  player. 
Noncooperative  games  are  the  foundation  for  some  of  the  standard  models  in 
oligopoly.  The  study  of  oligopoly  models  is  essential  to  study  market  power. 
2.1.1  Cournot  Duopoly 
A  Cournot  model  [48]  involves  a  duopoly  game  in  which  two  firms  produce  an 
identical  product  and  must  decide  how  much  to  produce  without  knowing  the  output 
decision  of  the  other.  For  convenience,  assume  that  each  firrn's  cost  is  0.  Assume  that 
x,  andX2,  represent  the  output  decisions  of  each  firm.  The  market  price  is  represented 135  Appendices 
by  p(xl+  X2),,  where  p(x)  is  the  inverse  demand  curve.  The  profits  or  payoffs  for  each 
firm  are  Ai  =  p(xi  +  x2).  The  strategy  of  each  fin-n  is  to  choose  xi  in  order  to  maximize 
its  profit  without  knowing  the  decision  of  the  other  firm. 
2.1.2  Bertrand  Duopoly 
Under  a  Bertrand  model,  each  firm  must  choose  the  price  at  which  it  is  willing  to 
produce.  Ignoring  bounds  on  output,  we  can  assume  that  the  lower  priced  firm  will 
capture  market  share  and  that  both  firms  will  have  equal  outputs  at  equal  price.  If  x(p) 
represents  the  market  demand  function,  the  payoff  or  profit  of  firm  I  can  be 
represented  as 
PI  X(PI)5  if  PI  P2 
k](Pli,  P2Y::::::: 
I 
pi  x(pl)/2,  if  PI  P2 
oil  if  PI  : ý:  P2 
Bertrand  game  has  a  structure  similar  to  the  problem  of  simple  prisoner's  dilemma 
[57].  If  both  players  cooperate,  they  can  both  charge  the  monopoly  price.  However, 
each  player  has  an  incentive  to  reduce  its  price  slightly  and  capture  market  share,  even 
though  it  knows  that  both  players  will  be  worse  off  if  they  both  cut  price. 
2.1.3  Market  Power  Mitigation 
Market  power  can  be  defined  as  the  ability  of  a  market  participant  to  raise  prices 
above  the  competitive  level  by  restricting  output  or  restricting  new  entrants. 
Horizontal  market  power  is  often  associated  with  a  single  firm  or  a  few  finns 
controlling  a  large  part  of  the  supply. 
Although  generation  divestiture  has  been  used  as  a  remedy  for  this  problem  in  the 
electric  power  industry,  it  is  not  always  a  viable  option.  In  such  instances,  financial 136  Appendices 
contracts  such  as  contracts  for  differences  (CfD)  can  be  used  to  accomplish  what 
might  be  termed  as  virtual  divestiture.  Game  theory  can  be  used  to  study  the  effects  of 
CfDs  on  bidding  incentives.  The  purpose  of  a  CfD  is  to  insulate  the  supplier  against 
the  temporal  price  variations  in  the  market.  Once  counter  party  in  the  CfID  agrees  to 
pay  the  other  the  difference  between  the  contract  price  and  the  prevailing  market  or 
pool  price. 
A  CfD  can  be  either  two-way  or  one-way.  A  two-way  CfD  is  similar  to  a  financial 
futures  contract  and  is  defined  in  tenns  of  a  strike  price  (f/MWh),  and  a  quantity 
(MWh).  For  the  defined  quantity,  the  seller  pays  the  buyer  if  the  pool  price  rises 
I"k Wove  the  strike  price,  and  the  buyer  pays  the  seller  if  the  pool  price  falls  below  the 
strike  price.  A  one-way  CfD  is  similar  to  a  financial  option  contract  and  also  includes 
an  option  fee  in  addition  to  the  strike  price  and  contract  quantity.  Under  a  one  way 
contract,  difference  payments  are  made  only  if  the  pool  price  rises  above  the  strike 
price. 
The  effect  of  a  CfD  is  to  fix  or  bound  the  revenue  for  a  generator.  In  the  extreme, 
where  the  entire  output  of  a  generator  is  contracted  under  a  CfD,  the  generator's 
revenue  will  be  completely  insulated  from  market  price  variations,  and,  consequently, 
the  generator  should  have  no  incentive  to  raise  prices.  Ideally,  one  would  like  to 
contract  just  the  appropriate  fraction  of  output  required  to  mitigate  market  power. 
To  illustrate  how  CfDs  can  eliminate  incentives  to  raise  prices,  we  will  set  up  a  simple 
Cournot  model  with  two  generators  (A  and  B)  and  one  load.  Each  of  the  generators 
has  an  incremental  cost  of  EIO/MYvlh  and  a  maximum  output  of  75  MW.  The  strategic 
decision  for  the  generators  is  to  choose  a  level  of  output  that  maximizes  their  profits. 137  Appendices 
The  price  is  set  by  the  demand  curve.  We  will  assume  that  each  generator  chooses 
between  two  levels  of  output,  a  high  output  of  75  MW  and  a  low  output  of  20  MW,  as 
shown  in  Table  1. 
Table  A.  1:  Output  decisions  of  A  and  B 
Generator  B 
Output  (MW) 
High  Low 
75  75 
High 
Generator  75  20 
A  20  20 
Low 
75  20 
Table  A.  2:  Prices  corresponding  to  output  decisions 
Generator  B 
Pirce  (f/MW) 
High  Low 
High  40  45 
Generator 
A 
Low  45  150 
Table  A.  3.  Profits  without  CfD 
Generator  B 
Profit  (f) 
High  Low 
2250  2625  A's  profit 
High 
Generator  2250  700  B's  profit 
A  700  2800  A's  profit 
Low 
2625  2800  B's  profit 138  Appendices 
Table  A.  4.  Profits  with  CfD  for  30MW 
Generator  B 
Profit  (f) 
High  Low 
High 
2250  2475  jks-p-rofit 
Generator  2250  550  B's  profit 
A 
Low 
700  -500  A's  profit 
2475  -500  B's  profit 
Table  A.  5.  Profits  with  CfD  for  I  OMW 
Generator  B 
Profit  (f) 
High  Low 
2250  2575  A's  profit  High 
Generator  2250  650  B's  profit 
A  650  1700  A's  profit  Low 
2575  1700  B's  profit 
The  low  output  may  be  interpreted  as  withholding  of  capacity  with  a  motivation  to 
increase  prices.  If  prices  increase  sufficiently,  the  generator  can  make  a  higher  profit 
at  the  low  output.  There  are  four  possible  cases  to  consider,  depending  on  the  decision 
of  each  generator.  The  prices  corresponding  to  these  cases  are  shown  in  Table  3.2. 
Table  3.3  shows  a  Nash  equilibrium  for  the  case  when  both  generators  choose  low 
levels  of  output  to  maximize  their  profits.  However,  if  a  CfD  is  applied  to  30  MW  of 
the  generators  output,  the  Nash  equilibrium  changes,  as  shown  in  Table  3.4.  The 
strike  price  in  the  CfD  is  assumed  to  equal  the  competitive  price  of  f40/MWh.  In  this 
case,  profits  are  maximized  at  the  competitive  price  corresponding  to  the  high  output 
by  each  generator.  Similarly,  Table  3.5  shows  the  profits  if  a  CfD  is  applied  to  10 
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2.2  Cooperative  Game  Theory 
Cooperative  game  theory,  which  is  quite  different  from  noncooperative  game  theory, 
used  to  be  generally  applied  to  solve  allocation  problems.  The  various  solutions 
proposed  for  cooperative  games  could  be  interpreted  as  alternative  solutions  to  an 
allocation  problem.  The  energy  crisis  in  California  and  problems  happening  in  other 
power  markets,  where  more  collusion  and  price  tricks  among  energy  companies 
reveal  have  emerged,  have  motivated  research  interests  in  adopting  cooperative  game 
theory  to  study  coalition  gaming  strategies.  The  key  ideas  involve  the  concept  of 
coalitions  or  groups  that  are  formed  to  benefit  from  economies  of  scale. 
For  instance,  equity  arguments  call  for  solutions  that  allocate  costs  to  coalitions  in  a 
manner  that  guarantees  that  all  coalition  members  are  at  least  as  well  off  as  they 
would  be  if  they  were  not  a  part  of  the  coalition.  This  is  sometimes  called  the  stand- 
alone  test.  Solutions  that  exactly  allocate  the  total  costs  and  satisfy  the  stand-alone 
test,  are  called  core  solutions.  Alternative  solution  concepts  such  as  the  Shapley  Value 
are  also  possible. 
The  emphasis  in  cooperative  game  theory  is  on  solutions  that  are  equitable.  In 
contrast,  noncooperative  game  theory  helps  us  study  efficient  solutions  under  new 
market  designs.  Just  as  we  study  the  stability  of  an  engineering  system,  we  can  study 
how  efficient  a  market  design  might  be  by  using  game  theory. 140  Appendices 
2.3  Application  of  Game  Theory  in  Analyzing  Trading  Strategies  in 
Power  Markets 
Solely  using  either  noncooperative  or  cooperative  game  theory  is  not  capable  of 
analyzing  the  gaming  strategies  practiced  in  power  market,  because  market  players 
have  been  using  mix  of  both  to  manipulate  the  market  prices  to  maximize  their 
profits. 
The  gaming  strategies  studied  here  is  often  called  supergame.  The  word  is  intended  to 
suggest  a  sequence  of  games,  finite  or  infinite  in  number,  played  by  a  fixed  set  of 
players.  Particularly,  the  strategies  employed  in  electricity  market  is  in  semlextensice 
fonn,  means  that  the  simultaneous  moves  of  the  market  players  are  modeled  as  game 
in  strategic  form.  Thus,  there  is  a  succession  of  points  in  time  (t  =  0,1,2, 
..  . 
).  At 
each  point  each  player  makes  a  choice.  The  simultaneous  choices  at  one  such  time  are 
represented  within  a  game  in  strategic  form  and  the  supergame  is  the  sequence  of 
these  games. 
The  interaction  among  the  market  players  in  power  market  could  be  simply 
represented  by  a  modified  famous  game  theory  game,  a  repeated  prisoners'  dilemma, 
which  is  presented  as  following. 
Table  3.6:  A  prisoners'  dilemma  game 
A 
Confess 
B 
Not  confess 
Confess  5,5  15,0 
Not  confess  0,15  10,10 141  Appendices 
A  certain  strategy  added  to  improve  the  traditional  repeated  prisoners'  dilemma, 
which  represents  the  real  strategy  that  gaming  market  players  employ  to  enhance  their 
binding  agreement,  is  called  trigger  strategy.  It  is  a  strategy  under  which  a  player  uses 
two  single-shot  actions,  si*  and  si'.  The  player  will  begin  by  choosing  si*  and  will 
have  in  mind  some  action  combination  s*.  If  all  players  j  E=-  N  choose  sj*  in  each 
iteration  of  the  game,  them  player  i  continues  to  choose  si*;  however,  if  any  playerj 
ever  deviates  from  sj*  then,  as  soon  as  that  deviation  is  detected  by  player  i  she 
switches  to  choosing  sic  and  continues  to  choose  sic  in  all  future  iterations,  no  matter 
what  choices  are  made  by  others.  When  sc  is  an  equilibrium  of  the  game  (such  as 
confess,  confess  in  the  repeated  prisoners'  dilemma),  yields  a  large  payoff  to  each 
player  than  does,  the  strategy  combination  is  a  perfect  equilibrium. 
Modelling  these  complex  market  behaviours  and  search  the  right  trading  strategies 
often  do  not  have  accurate  measurement  of  their  variables  and  require  many 
objectives  to  be  met  before  any  solution  is  considered  adequate.  Therefore,  a  search 
technique  which  is  able  to  handle  this  inaccuracy  more  effectively  is  needed. 
3  Evolutionary  Computing 
3.1  Introduction 
The  limitations  of  classical  optimisation  techniques  were  explained  earlier.  Classical 
techniques  are  single-peak  numerical  optimisation  techniques.  This  works  well  for 
reaching  the  optimum  of  a  local  peak  but  for  problems  that  are  multi-modal,  this 
optimum  will  most  likely  not  be  the  global  optimum  [49].  Optimisation  of  real-life 142  Appendices 
solutions  must  often  satisfy  more  than  one  objective  and  may  have  constraints 
imposed  on  the  search,  including  non-numerical  parameters. 
Newer  optimisation  techniques  are  non-deterministic,  by  adding  a  degree  of 
randomness  and  probability  to  the  search  for  solutions.  The  search  techniques  is 
mostly  a  posterior,  are  widely  adopted  in  machine  learning.  These  encourage  the 
search  position  to  escape  a  local  peak  in  the  hope  of  finding  higher  peaks. 
Evolution  is  ubiquitous  natural  force  that  has  shaped  all  life  on  the  Earth  for 
approximately  3.2  billion  years.  For  several  thousand  years,  humanity  has  also  utilised 
artificial  selection  to  shape  domesticated  plant  an  animal  species.  In  the  past  few 
decades,  however,  science  has  learned  that  the  general  principles  at  work  in  natural 
evolution  can  also  be  applied  to  a  completely  artificial  environment.  In  particular, 
within  Computer  Science,  the  filed  of  automated  machine  learning  has  adopted 
algorithms  based  on  the  mechanisms  exploited  by  natural  evolution. 
Darwin  [50]  first  proposed  that  there  are  four  essential  requirements  for  the  process  of 
evolution  to  occur: 
o  Reproduction  of  some  individuals  within  a  population. 
*A  degree  of  variation  that  affects  probability  of  survival. 
*  Heritable  characteristics,  that  is,  similar  individuals  arise  from  similar  parents. 
9  Finite  resources,  which  drive  competition  and  fitness  selection. 
The  consequence  of  these  processes  is  the  gradual  adaptation  of  the  individuals  in  a 
population  to  the  specific  ecological  niche  they  occupy.  This  can  therefore  be  viewed 143  Appendices 
as  a  form  of  long-term  learning  by  a  population,  on  the  characteristics  suited  to  their 
particular  environment. 
The  term  Evolutionary  Computing  (EC)  refers  to  the  study  of  the  foundations  and 
app  icat  ons  of  certain  heuristic  techniques  based  on  the  principles  of  natural 
evolution.  In  spite  of  this  fact,  these  techniques  are  traditionally  classified  into  three 
main  categories,  namely,  Genetic  Algorithms  (GAs),  Evolution  Strategies  (ESs)  and 
Evolutionary  Programming  (EP).  This  classification  is  based  on  some  details  and 
historical  development  facts  rather  than  major  functioning  differences.  In  fact,  their 
biological  basis  is  essentially  the  same. 
It  is  particularly  useful  to  consider  the  history  of  evolution  within  computing  as  it 
covers  much  of  the  timeframe  of  computing  itself  Some  of  the  earliest  work  can  be 
traced  back  to  [51],  who  introduced  the  idea  of  an  evolutionary  algorithm  approach 
for  automatic  programming.  Later  significant  development  included  the  creation  of 
EP  by  [52].  [53]  founded  the  initial  work  on  GAs  at  the  University  of  Michigan. 
Parallel  work  was  also  initiated  by  [54]  in  ESs.  However,  the  major  barrier  to  the 
early  adoption  of  evolutionary  algorithm  in  the  computing  domain  came  from 
opposition  within  the  computing  science  community  itself  That  was  often  based  on 
the  incorrect  belief  that  such  algorithms,  with  probabilistic  processed  as  a  core 
mechanism,  would  not  be  amenable  to  produce  functional  code.  The  second  barrier 
was  the  problem  that  contemporary  computing  technology  in  software,  and 
particularly  hardware,  in  the  early  1970s  was  barely  capable  of  generating  useful 
results  in  acceptable  time  scales  (i.  e.,  less  than  a  few  weeks).  This  problem  added  to 
the  belief  that  such  methods,  while  theoretically  interesting,  would  never  be  capable 
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Now  Evolutionary  Computing  is  frequently  used  as  a  generic  term  that  incorporates 
GA,  ES,  EP  and  their  variants.  The  origin  of  EA  was  an  attempt  to  mimic  some  of  the 
processes  taking  place  in  natural  evolution.  Although  the  details  of  biological 
evolution  are  not  completely  comprehended  (even  nowadays),  there  exist  some  points 
supported  by  strong  experimental  evidences: 
e  Evolution  is  a  process  operation  over  chromosomes  rather  than  over  organisms. 
The  former  are  organic  tools  encoding  the  structure  of  living  being,  i.  e.  a  creature 
is  'built'  decoding  a  set  of  chromosomes. 
*  Natural  selection  is  the  mechanism  that  relates  chromosomes  with  the  efficiency 
of  the  entity  they  represent,  thus  allowing  those  efficient  organisms  that  are  well- 
adapted  to  the  envirom-nent  to  reproduce  more  often  than  those  which  are  not. 
*  The  evolutionary  process  takes  place  during  the  reproducing  stage.  There  exists  a 
large  number  of  reproductive  mechanisms  in  the  Nature.  Most  common  ones  are 
mutation  (that  causes  the  chromosomes  of  offspring  to  be  different  to  those  of  the 
parents)  and  recombination  (that  combines  the  chromosomes  of  the  parents  to 
produce  the  offspring). 
All  EAs  have  two  prominent  features  which  distinguish  themselves  from  other  search 
algorithms.  Firstly,  they  are  all  population-based.  Secondly,  there  are  communication 
and  infonnation  exchanges  among  individuals  in  a  population.  Such  communication 
and  information  exchanges  are  the  results  of  selection  and/or  recombination  in  EAs. 145  Appendices 
The  Genetic  Algorithms  (GA)  is  a  representative  of  this  new  breed  of  search,  machine 
learning  and  optimisation  techniques  that  are  non-deterministic  and  a  posterior.  GA 
employs  coding  and  hence  deals  with  non-numencal  variables.  An  organism's  genetic 
code  is  its  position  in  solution  space  while  its  survival  in  its  environiment  and  its 
number  of  offspring  indicates  probabilistically  the  degree  to  which  it  meets  its 
objectives.  Evolutionary  algorithms  are  powerful  techniques  in  the  search  for  global 
optimal  solutions,  but  they  usually  require  to  evaluate  objective  functions  many  times. 
These  objective  ftinctions  may,  in  a  real  problem,  be  difficult  or  time-consuming  to 
evaluate.  Hence  the  less  evaluations  the  better. 
3.2  Fundamentals  of  Genetic  Algorithms 
3.2.1  The  Working  Mechanism 
Genetic  algorithms  [46]  [55]  that  represent  a  paradigm  of  evolutionary  computation, 
is  a  general-purpose  global  search  method  for  solving  complex  problems.  Based  on 
Darwinian's  survival-of-the-fittest,  GAs  work  by  repeatedly  modifying  a  population 
of  artificial  structures  through  the  application  of  selection,  crossover,  and  mutation 
operators.  A  GA's  fitness  function  measures  the  quality  of  a  particular  solution. 
The  following  sequence  is  a  common  starting  point  for  most  GAs: 
1.  Create  generated  population  of  N  chromosomes,  each  of  some  length  m  bits. 
2.  Test  each  chromosome  (i.  e.  a  possible  task  solution)  within  the  problem  space 
and  assign  a  measure  of  fitnessf(x). 
3.  Selection  phase:  Select  a  pair  of  chromosomes  from  the  population  with 
probability  based  on  their  fitness. 146  Appendices 
4.  Apply  a  set  of  genetic  operators  to  the  two  parent  chromosomes:  With  some 
crossover  probability  p,  apply  crossover  at  some  randomly  selected  point 
along  each  chromosome. 
5.  Apply  mutation  to  each  new  chromosome  with  a  probability  p,,. 
6.  Place  the  new  chromosomes  in  the  new  population. 
7.  Replace  the  old  population  with  the  new  population. 
8.  Test  if  target  termination  criteria  is  met,  such  as  a  specific  best  fitness  value; 
else  repeat  from  stage  2. 
output  best 
individual  or  results 
-  -----------  --- 
Figure  A.  1:  GA  sequence  of  operations 147  Appendices 
Each  loop  of  the  sequence,  illustrated  in  Figure  3.1,  is  termed  a  generation.  The 
central  concept  of  the  GA  is  the  chromosome,  which  is  the  encoding  of  information  in 
a  string  of  symbols.  These  strings  can  be  manipulated  by  a  set  of  genetic  operators. 
Using  the  process  of  fitness  proportional  selection,  the  chromosome  strings,  which 
encode  a  potential  solution  the  specific  task  or  function,  evolve  toward  an  improved 
solution. 
3.2.2  Technical  Details 
I  Encoding 
The  user  should  select  a  "reasonable"  (i.  e.,  not  one  bit  quantity)  or  the  smallest 
possible  coding  alphabet  that  permits  a  natural  expression  of  the  problem.  The  basic 
coding  methods  are  outlined  below  [46]. 
"  Integer  coding; 
"  Real  coding; 
"  Logarithmic  coding; 
"  Byte  coding; 
"  One-Integer-One-Parameter  coding; 
The  advantage  of  coding  is  that  logic  values  or  decisions,  e.  g.,  those  concerning 
whether  to  have  a  particular  component  in  a  design,  and  logic  operators  can  be 
encoded  ina  chromosome  and  this  included  in  the  search.  This  makes  the  search  and 
optimisation  more  versatile  and  complete  and  may  lead  to  novel  creation  or 
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Figure  A.  2:  Genetic  Algorithm  -  Working  principles  and  standard  operators  [46] 
2  Initial  population 
This  needs  to  be  large  and  mainly  random  when  string  lengths  are  large.  However, 
known  or  a-priori  parameter  sets  and  those  that  the  user  would  like  to  start  with 
should  be  included  for  a  faster  convergence  or  for  further  improvement  [56]. 
3  Objectives  and  fitness 
In  GA,  optimisation  error  is  usually  measured  by  the  sum  of  absolute  errors 
norm)  between  the  actual  and  the  simulated  output  of  the  system,  as  given  by: 
NA 
e(Pi)  =II  yj-  yj 
j=  / 
where  N  is  the  total  number  of  data  of  simulation  steps.  Clearly,  the  fitness  or 
perfon-nance  can  also  be  measured  by  an  12  or  1,  nonn,  as  they  and  1/  are  finitely 
bounded  with  one  another. 14Y 
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Note  that  non-numerical  functions,  such  as  rules  or  fuzzy  logic  terms,  can  also  be 
included  in  the  fitness  or  perforinance  index  [57]. 
4  Selection 
Selection  is  the  population  improvement  or  "survival  of  the  fittest"  operator.  The 
purpose  of  selection  is  to  increase  the  frequency  of  fitter  individuals  within  the 
population  over  repeated  generations.  Basically,  it  duplicates  structures  with  higher 
fitness  and  deletes  structures  with  lower  fitness  to  create  a  new  population. 
prop 
Pselect  (n)  =  J(n)  /I  J(k) 
K=l 
Where  n  is  the  nth  string,  p=  total  number  of  strings  in  the  population,  and  f(h)  is 
the  fitness  of  the  nth  string.  The  selected  individuals  are  then  copied  into  the  next 
generation  using  the  set  of  genetic  operators,  normally  composed  of  mutation  and 
crossover.  However  there  is  always  a  pressure  between  exploiting  the  population 
through  selection  and  exploring  the  search  space  via  crossover  and  mutation. 
Excessive  selection  will  lead  to  fit  but  suboptimal  individuals  taking  over  the 
population  before  a  target  solution  is  found.  It  is  then  difficult  for  the  population  to 
recover  sufficient  diversity  to  explore  the  remaining  search  space.  If  the  selection 
pressure  is  too  weak,  however  the  rate  of  evolution  will  fail  to  converge  on  a  useful 
solution. 
The  current  adopted  selection  mechanisms  are  addressed  as  following: 
0  Roulette-Wheel  selection; 
0  Ranked  roulette  wheel; 
*  Ranking  selection; 
*  Tournament  selection; 150  Appendices 
0  Elitist  selection; 
0  Proportionate  selection; 
9  Fuzzy  selection; 
9  Boltzmann  tournament  selection; 
0  Steady-State  selection. 
5  Crossover 
Crossover,  when  combined  with  selection,  results  in  good  components  of  good 
structures  combining  to  yield  even  better  structures.  It  works  by  selecting  two 
parent  individuals  from  the  population  with  a  fitness-dependent  probability,  and 
swapping  sections  of  each  individuals  chromosome.  The  offspring  are  the  results  of 
cutting  and  splicing  the  parent  at  various  crossover  points. 
6  Mutation 
Mutation  is  a  mechanism  where  a  randomly  selected  gene  within  the  chromosomes 
id  replaced  with  an  alternative  allele.  Mutation  creates  new  structures  that  are 
similar  to  current  structures.  A  common  perspective  is  that  mutation  is  primarily  a 
secondary  operator  and  acts  to  replace  or  regenerate  bits  or  genes  lost  during  the 
crossover  process.  At  best  mutation  can  help  move  a  chromosome  away  from  local 
optima  by  injecting  new  genes  into  the  population  of  chromosomes.  With  a  small 
pre-specified  probability,  mutation  randomly  alters  each  component  of  each 
structure.  When  used  sparingly  with  reproduction  and  crossover,  it  is  an  insurance 
policy  against  Premature  loss  of  important  information. IDI  ices 
7  Stopping  criteria 
9  Stop  after  finding  a  known  maximum  (or  minimum)  (based  on  some 
specification)  or  after  finding  a  better  solution  than  an  existing/known  one. 
*  Stop  after  a  certain  period  of  time.  Ofter,  stop  after  a  given  number  of 
generations  have  been  evolved,  e.  g,  100  generations. 
*  Stop  when  there  is  no  improvement  in  the  maximum  (or  minimum)  value  in  the 
generation  or  when  the  average  is  close  to  the  maximum  (or  minimum). 
3.2.3  Advantages  of  Genetic  Algorithms 
Compared  with  natural  evolution,  the  emulated  process  is  more  efficient,  controllable 
and  yet  more  flexible  for  artificial  optimisation.  All  these  methods  are  probabilistic  in 
nature  and  exhibit  global  search  capability,  thus  making  them  attractive  for  almost  all 
areas  of  human  activity.  Genetic  Algorithms  accommodate  all  the  facts  of  soft 
computing  and  other  attractive  features,  namely, 
I  Overcoming  all  drawbacks  of  conventional  optimisation  techniques; 
2  Domain  constraints,  performance  measures  with  dynamics  and  the  number  of 
independent  and  co-dependent  elements; 
3  Robustness; 
4  Possible  non-linear  interactions  between  various  elements; 
5  Incomplete,  uncertain  and  imprecise  of  information; 
6  Adaptive  capabilities; 
7  Providing  multiple  optimal  solutions;  and 
8  Inherent  parallelism. 
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